UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

12-19-2009

Knox v. State ex. rel. Otter Clerk's Record v. 1 Dckt.
35787

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Knox v. State ex. rel. Otter Clerk's Record v. 1 Dckt. 35787" (2009). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2268.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2268

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF STATE OF IDAHO
WENDY ICNOX and RICHARD DOTSON,
Plaintiffs 1 Appellants,
-VS-

STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel. C.L. OTTER,
Governor; BEN YSURA, Secretary of
State; and LAWRENCE WASDEN, Attorney
General,
Defendants 1 Respondents,

1
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1
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1
1
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1
1

SUPREME COURT # 35787
CLERK'S RECORD ON
APPEAL

1

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bingham.
Honorable Darren B. Simpson, District Judge, presiding.

Counsel for Appellants:

Curt R. Thornsen, THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC:
2635 Channing Way, Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404

Counsel for Respondents:

Attorney General, Civil Litigation Division, PO Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
David F. Hensley, Counsel to the Governor, PO Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0034
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICW., DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM

WENDI'KNOX, and RICHARD
DOTSON,

1
1

case NO.

?,1/ .4447-ipk7
,

1

Plaintiffs,

1

V.

1
STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel. C. L. OTTER, )
Governor; BEN YSURn,Secretary of State; )
and LAWRENCE WASDEN, Attorney
)
General,
)

1
Defendants.

COMPLAINT FOR
DECLARATORY AND
OTHER RELIEF
NOTICE: This Case is assigned to

Darren 5. Simpson, District Judge
Fee Category: G.1
Fee: $88.00

COME NOW the Plaintiffs above-named, and for cause of action against the defendants,
allege as follows:
1.

The Plaintiffs in this action challenge the constitutiollalityofIdaho Code $5 67-429B

and 67-429C, enacted by Proposition One during the November 5; 2002, general election. Plaintiffs
contend that Idaho Code $ 8 67-429B and 67-429C violate the Idaho Constitution, Article Dl, 9 20.
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COMPLALNT FOR DECLARATORY AND OTHER RELIEF

2.

Plaintiffs Wendy Knox (hereinafier "Knox") and Richard Dotson (hereinafter

"Dotson") are and at all tinies material were residents and citizens of the Bingham County, Idaho.
3.

Defendant C. L. Ofler, the Governor ofthe State of Idaho, is charged with upholding

the Idaho Constitution and faithfully executing the laws of the State of Idaho, il~cludingArticle 111,
20 of the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Code $5 18-3808 and 18-3810. Mr. Otter is sued solely
in his official capacity.
4.

Defendant Ben Ysura, the Idaho Secret~uyof State, is charged with the administration

of elections in Idaho pursuant to Title 34, Chapter 18, Idaho Code. His predecessor canvassed the
voting on Proposition One and concluded that Proposition One received a majority of the votes at
the November 5,2002 election, resulting in Idaho Code $5 67-429B and 67-429C. Mr. Ysura is sued
solely in his oacial capacity.
5.

Defendant Lawrence Wasden, Attorney General for the State ofIdaho, is also charged

with upholding the Idaho Constitution and faithfully executing and prosecuting the laws ofthe State
of Idaho, including Article ID, $ 20 of the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Code

$8 18-3808 and 18-

38 10. Mr. Wasden is sued solely in his official capacity.
6.

The Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Idaho's Uniform Declaratory

Judgment Act, Title 10, Chapter 12, Idaho Code, and Article V, $ 20 of the Idaho Constitution.

7.

Venue is proper pursuant to LC. 5 5-402(2) because this cause, or some part thereof,

arose in Bingham County. Venue is also proper pursuant to I.C. 5 5-404 because the State of Idaho
is not a resident of any particular county in the State of Idaho.
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Plaintiffs have standing to bring this action because they each have suffered injuries

8.

in fact, because there is a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or
redress their injuries, and because their injuries are different from those suffered by the general
public, as established by the lbllowing facts, inter alia:
a.

After enactment of Idaho Code

53 67-429B and 67-429C and subsequent

installation of slot machines at the Fort Hall Casino near Blackfoot, Idaho, both Plaintiffs became
compulsive gamblers, driving the short distance from their homes to gamble on the slot machines
(euphemistically called a "tribal video gaming machine") at the Fort Hall Casino, about 3 to 4 times
per week.
b.

Plaintiffs gambled al~nostexclusively at Fort Hall Casino because of its very

short distance from their respective residences, compared to the next nearest places to gamble,
hundreds of miles away.
c.

Of all .the different types of gambling available at the Fort Hall Casino,

Plaintiffs played only the slot machines.
d.

Because ofIdaho Code §§ 67-429B and 67-429C and subsequent installation

of slot machines at the Fort Hall Casino, Plaintiffs both developed clinical and devastating addictions
to gambling at the Fort Hall Casino. Plaintiff Knox estimates her slot machine losses at Fort Hall
Casino at about $50,000.00, and Plaintiff Do.tson estimates his slot machine losses at Fort Hall
Casino at about $30,000.00.
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e.

Because of the slot machines allowed at the Fort Hall Casino in violation of

Idaho law and Idaho Constitution and their consequent gambling addiction, both plaintiffs suffered
not only large monetary losses, but also incurred additional debt they otherwise would not have
incurred, were subjected to intrusive and humiliating collection efforts, stress, anxiety and marital
and family strife, and tremendous emotional distress. Dotson lost his house and job, and was
convicted of the crime of forgery in order to obtain gambling funds, all because of his gambling
addiction precipitated by Proposition One, Idaho Code

55 67-429B and 67-429C and subsequent

installation of slot machines at the Fort Hall Casino.
g.

Both Plaintiffs have sought, obtained, and continue to receive treatment for

their destructive gambling addictions, through Gambler's Anonymous. Dotson has also obtained
counseling from a private Iicensed counselor for his gambling addiction.
f.

If the defendants had originally upheld the Idaho Constitution and statutes

prohibiting slot machines against Proposition One and Idaho Code $$67-429B and 67-429C, slot
machines would not have been installed at Fort Hall Casino and neither Plaintiff would have suffered
the harm set forth above.
g.

If this Court declares Proposition One and LC. $3 67-429B and 67-429C to

be in violation of the Idaho Constitution, Fort Hall Casino will be forced to remove its slot machines,
and such casino style gambling will be much less readily available to Plaintiffs. This will malce their
recovery much easier and will prevent or minimize further harm to the Plaintiffs of the kind set forth
above.
9.

Plaintiffs have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedj?to halt the harm they are

suffering, other than the remedies sought herein.

4-
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10.

The constitutional issues raised in this proceeding concern Idaho State law only,

11.

Axticle 111, $ 20 of the Idaho Constitution, as amended in 1992, expressly prohibits

gambling in Idaho. It provides, izle? alia:

( I ) Gambling is contrary topublicpolicy and is strictly prohibited except
for thefollowing:
a. A state lottery which is authorized by the state if conducted in
conlbrmi3 with enabling legislation; and
b. Pari-mutuel betting if conducted in conformity with enabling
legislation; and
c. Bingo and raffle games that are operated by qualified charitable
organizations in the pursuit of charitable purposes if conducted in
conformity with enabling legislation.
(2) No activities permitted by subsection (1) shall employ any form of
casino gambling including, but not limited to, blackjack, craps, roulette,
poker, baccarat, keno and slot maclzines, or employs any electronic or
electromechanicalimitationor simulation.of anyform of casinogambling.
(Emphasis added).
12.

The Idaho Legislature has, by statute, likewise prohibited gambling, making it a

crime, see I.C. 5 18-3801and 18-3802, and probibited slot machines in particular. See LC. 5 183810.
13.

Idaho Code $5 67-429B and 67-429C purportto authorize gambling on Indian lands

in Idaho in violation of Article 111, $ 20 of the Idaho Constitution.
14.

The gambling activities ostensibly authorized by I.C.

$3 67-429B and 67-429C do

not fall within any of the three exceptions in subsection (1) of Article 11, Section 20, Idaho
Constitution.

5

-

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND OTHER RELIEF

007

15.

Idaho Code $5 67-429B and 67-429Cpurport to autl~orizeforms of casino gambling

which subsection (2) of Arlicle IU,
16.

5 20 of the Idaho Constitution, expressly prohibits.

Idaho Code 8 67-429B, enacted pursuant to Proposition One, purports to authorize

the use of "tribal video gaming machines" on Indian lands.
17.

The Attomey General's Certificate aclcnowledged that the tribal video gaming

machines as defined by I.C.

5

67-429B "would be construed as slot machines or imitations or

simulations of forms of casino gambling."
18.

Plaintiffs agree with the Attorney General's statement quoted above, and further

allege that the doresaid "tribal video gaming machines" are "electronic or electromechanical
imitations or simulations of any form of casino gambling."
19.

Idaho Code

$5 67-429C, enacted pursuant to Proposition One, authorizes the

unilateral amendment of state-tribal gaming compacts between the State of Idaho and the various
tribes, to incorporate and permit the illegal gambling purportedly authorized by I.C. 5 67-429B, in
violation of Article 111, Section 20 ofihe Idaho Constitution.
20.

Plaintiffs seek a judicial declaration that LC.

$5

67-429B and 67-429C are

unconstitutional and in violation of Article 111, 20 of the Idaho Coxlstitution.

WHEREFORE Plaintiffs respectfully pray the judgment, order and decree of the Court as
follows:
1.

Declaring that Idaho Code $8 67-429B and 67-429C are unconstitutional, unlawful,
and invalid under the prohibition on gambling contained in Article TIT, $ 20 of the
Idaho Constitution;

2.

6-

Enjoining the defendants from enforcing I.C. $8 67-429B and 67-429C; and

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND OTHER RELIEF
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'

3.

Requiring the defendants to uphold and enforce Article IIl, 5 20 of the Idaho
Constitution and Idaho Code $5 18-3808 and 18-3810.

DATED this &day of Mach, 2008.
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
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DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS
(Supporting Brief to Be Submitted Pursuant
to I.R.C,P. 7@)(3)(C))

i
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Defendants State of Idaho et al. respectfuIly request that the complaint in this matter be
dismissed pursuant to I.R.C,P. 12(b),

OBO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS-Page

1

RPR. 14.200B

11:48RM

AND AS GROUNDS THEREFOR state that (I) dismissal under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l) is

appropriate because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate whether certain
gaming machines operated by the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes comply with state law
requirements; (2) dismissal under I.R.C.P. 12@)(6) is appropriate because the complaint fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted; and (3) dismissal under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(7) is
appropriate because the complaint f d s to join necessary and indispensable parties as defendants,
A supporting brief will be frled within 14 days in accordance 4
t
h1.RC.P. 7(b)(3)(C).

WIBUFORE, the complaint should be dismissed under I.R.C.P.12@).
DATED this 14th day of April 2008.

LAWR.EX%X G. WASDEN
ATTOWEY G m E M
STATE OF IDAHO
STEVEN OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Civil Litigation Division
MICHAEL S.GILMORE
Deputy Attorney Creneral
Civil Litigation Division
DAVID F,HENSLEY
Counsel to the Governor
Office of the Governor

By:
Dcputy Attorney General
Natursl Resowces Division
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T. JASON WOOD,ESQ.
THOMSEN STEPKENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
2635 CHAMVING WAY
IDAHO FALLS' ID 83404

0 U.S.Mail, postage prepaid
0 Rand Delivery
I
3 Federal Express
X Facsimile: 208-522-1277
Statehouse Mail
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INTRODUCTION
Article 111, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution reserves to the people the right of
initiative-i.e.,

"the power to propose laws[] and enact the same at the polls independent of the

legislature." In November 2002, Idaho citizens used this power to pass Proposition One, also
known as the Tribal Gaming Initiative. The Initiative authorized compacts entered into between
the State and federally recognized Indian tribes pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act

("IIGRA"), 25 U.S.C. $5 2701-2721, to be amended to allow a compacted tribe to operate "tribal
video gaming machines" subject to certain conditions. Section 67-429B, Idaho Code, describes
the permitted form of tribal video gaming machine, while the companion 5 67-429C specifies the
conditions and procedures for any tribe that desired to modify its existing compact to accept the
Initiative's terms without further negotiation. The complaint in this matter seelcs a determination
that

$5 67-429B and -429C conflict with the gambling prohibition in Article ILI,

Section 20 of

the Idaho Constitution and an order to compel defendants to take actions to enforce this
constitutional provision. See Compl. 7 20. No monetary relief is requested.
The complaint should be dismissed under I.R.C.P. 12(b). The injury-in-fact alleged by
plaintiffs-the

proximity of their homes to tribal video gaming machines at a Fort Hall Indian

Reservation casino and their compulsion to gamble on such machines-cannot be redressed
without the underlying tribal-state compact with the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes ("SBT") being
modified or otherwise invalidated in part. That tribe, however, is immune from unconsented suit
and thus cannot be joined as a defendant. The relief sought by plaintiffs additionally would
prejudice the rights of three other tribes with which Idaho has IGRA-based compacts authorizing
the use of tribal video gaming machines. These basic facts, when combined with clear-cut legal
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principles, lead inescapably to the conclusion that this Court lacks authority to enter the only
relief-making

tribal video gaming machines unavailable at the Fort Hall Casino-that

will

redress plaintiffs' alleged injury. The unavailability of such relief is based on two distinct
grounds:
a

The SBT and the thee other Idaho gaming tribes are necessary and indispensable

parties that cannot be joined. Dismissal is therefore required under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(7).
0

Even if this action could proceed forward without the tribes' joinder as

defendants, this Court cannot enter the relief requested by plaintiffs for three interrelated reasons.
First, IGRA preempts the field of on-reservation gaming and in large measure leaves to States
and tribes, through tribal-state compacts, the determination of what types of casino-lilte, or "class
In," gaming can be offered and the procedures for resolving disputes over whether particular
forms of gaming are pe~missibleunder a compact. Second, Idaho and the SBT have entered into
a compact which, as definitively construed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, allows tribal
video gaming machines. The compact further specifies an exclusive process for adjusting
controversies between the parties over its application that ultimately concludes, if necessary,
with litigation in federal court. Third, whether to initiate the compact's dispute resolution
process is a matter committed to the Governor's discretion, and this Court lacks authority to issue
relief compelling him to exercise that authority in a particular manner. Dismissal is therefore
required under I.C.R.P. 12(b)(6).
STATEMENT

1.

COMPLAINT'S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiffs allege that

$5

67-429B and -429C authorize gaming proscribed under Article

111, Section 20 of the Idaho Constitution and are therefore unconstitutional. Compl. fjlj 1, 13-15.

068
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS, Page 2

They claim injury from the operation of tribal video gaming machines at the SBT's Fort Hall
Casino because of its proximity to their residences and their addiction to gambling on those
machines. Id.

'I[8.a & b. Plaintiffs state not only that they have lost substantial amounts of

money as a result of this gambling and suffered emotional distress but also that plaintiff Dotson
was convicted of a crime related to his efforts to acquire gambling funds. Id

71 8.d & e. They

contend that "[ilf the defendants had originally upheld the Idaho Conslitution and statutes
prohibiting slot machines against the Tribal Gaming Initiative and Idaho Code $$ 67-429B and
67-429C, slot machines would not have been installed at Fort Hall Casino and neither Plaintiff
would have suffered [such] harm." Compl. 'j/ 8.f. Most importantly for present purposes, they
further allege:

If this Court declares Proposition One and I.C. §§ 67-429B and 67-429C to be in
violation of the Idaho Constitution, Fort Hall Casino will be forced to remove its slot
machines, and such casino style gambling will be much less readily available to
Plaintiffs. This will make their recovery much easier and will prevent or minimize
further harm to the Plaintiffs.
Id. 1/ 8.g. Plaintiffs seek as relief a declaration that the two provisions are unconstitutional, an
injunction agai~lsttheir enforcement, and an order requiring defendants "to uphold and enforce
Article 111, $ 20 of the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Code

$5

18-3808 and 18-3810." Id.

Wherefore 77 1-3. Defendants are the Governor, the Secretary of Stale and the Attorney General
in their official capacities. Id.

17 3-5. To place these allegations in context, a brief review of

TGRA's provisions and its implementation in Ida110 is necessary.

11.

FEDERAL INDIAN GAMING REGULATION
Congress enacted IGRA in 1988 to regulate gaming by federally recognized tribes on

"Indian lands." Pub. L. No. 100-487, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. $5 1166-1168
& 25 U.S.C.

$8 2701-2721). Those lands include Indian reservations. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4).
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IGRA separates gaming into three classes and imposes differing regulatory requirements as to
each. Id.

55 2703(6)-(8), 2710(a), (b) & (d); see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 48-50

(1996) (summarizing IGR4's regulatory scheme). "Class 111 gaming" is a residual category for
all gambling activity not encompassed by the class I and class II gaming categories. 25 U.S.C. $
2703(8). Class 111gaming includes lotteries and electronic facsimiles of lotteries and most forms
of machine-related gambling, including slot machines and more modem electronic or
electromechanical facsimiles of any game of chance. See, ee.g.,25 C.F.R.

$5

502.7, 502.8

(National Indian Gaming Commission regulations defining, respectively, an "electronic,
computer or other technologic aid" deemed part of class I1 gaming and an "electronic or
electromechanical facsimile" deemed class I n gaming). IGRA requires that class I11 gaming be
conducted pursuant to a tribal-state compact approved by the Secretary of the Interior or pursuant
to "procedures" adopted by the Secretary when a State has not negotiated in good faith for a class
111 gaming compact. 25 U.S.C.

@

5

2710(d)(l)(C) & (d)(7)(B)(vii). A condition precedent to

Secretarial approval of a compact is that the authorized class I11 gaming be permissible in the
involved state. Id §§2710(d)(I)(B) & 2710(d)(8)(B)(i).
Idaho Governors have entered into class I11 gaming compacts on the State's behalf with
four of the five Idaho tribes, all of which compacts were ratified by the Legislature under Idaho
Code $ 67-429A and approved by the Secretary under IGRA. See 58 Fed. Reg. 8478 (Feb. 12,
1993) (Coeur d'Alene Tribe compact approval notice); 58 Fed. Reg. 59,926 (Nov. 10, 1993)
(Kootenai Tribe compact approval notice); 60 Fed. Reg. 57,246 (Nov. 14, 1995) (Nez Perce
Tribe compact approval notice); 65 Fed. Reg. 54,541 (Sept. 8, 2000) (SBT compact approval
notice); 68 Fed. Reg. 1068 (Jan. 8, 2003) (Coeur d'Alene Tribe compact addendum approval
notice); 68 Fed. Reg. 1068 (Jan. 8, 2003) (Kootenai Tribe compact amendment approval notice);
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68 Fed. Reg. 1068 (Jan. 8, 2003) mez Perce Tribe compact addendum approval notice).' The
three compact modifications approved by the Secretary in 2003 involved the tribes' exercise of
their rights under the voter-approved Tribal Gaming Initiative. See Clay R. Smith Aff. ("Smith
Aff"), Ex. 1 (Miren E. Arliach ~ f f . 1 . ~
In relevant part, S, 67-429B authorizes the use of "tribal video gaming machines" by an
Indian tribe if specifically allowed under a tribal-state compact and if compliant with certain
technical criteria identified in subsection (1). It further declares in subsection (2) that a S, 67429B-authorized machine "is not a slot machine or an electronic or electromechanical imitation
or simulation of any form of casino gambling" under Idaho law. Section 67-429C sets out a
procedure allowing a tribe to amend an existing compact to provide for gaming through these
machines by filing with the Secretary of State a resolution "siguifjing [its] acceptance" of
several conditions. Id. $ 67-429C(2). Those conditions include limitations on the permissible
number of machines, contributions of five percent of "annual net gaming revenue for the support
of local educational programs and schools on or near the reservation[,]" and agreement "not to
conduct gaming outside of Indian lands." Id. S, 67-429~(l)(b)-(c).~
The SBT, however, followed a different course to offer gambling through tribal video
gaming machines. Its class I11 compact with Idaho authorized "any gaming activity that the State
of Idaho 'permits for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity,' as the phrase, is

'

Section 67-429A in its original form was enacted in 1993 (1993 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 408) and authorizes the
Governor to represent the State in class I11 gaming negotiations but subjects any proposed gaming compact to
ratification by both Houses of the Legislature through a concurrent resolution. It additionally requires gaming
authorized under a proposed compact to be pe~mittedunder Idaho law. Idaho Code $67-429A(2)(a).
2
A pre-election challenge to the Tribal Gaming Initiative's constitutionality was dismissed on standing and ripeness
grounds. In re Petition to Dcte~mineComtihrtionalify of Indian Gaming Initiative, 137 Idaho 798, 53 P.3d 1217
(2002) ("lndiarr Gaiiting Iizitiative"). A post-election challenge filed before the Supreme Court also was dismissed
because the Court lacked original jurisdiction. In re Petition to Determine Constitutionality of Idaho Code Sections
67-429B aizd 67-429C, No. 29226 (Idaho S. Ct. June 2, 2003) (order dismissing petition), reh'g denied (Oct. 16,
2003). Smith Aff., Exs. 2,3.
Section 67-429C(3) permits any tribe to negotiate "for an initial compact or a conlpacl amendment regarding lribal
video gallling maellines or any other matter through a procedure othes than the procedure specified in subsectioil (2)
above or which contains terms different than those specified in subsection (1) above."
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interpreted in the context of the lndian Gaming Regulatory Act." Smith Aff., Ex. 4 at

5 4.a.

The SBT compact provided for either or both parties to file an "initial declaratory judgment
action" in United States district court to determine "wliat gaming the Tribes may conduct under
the Act and what restrictions on the operations, if any, may be imposed by the State." Id., Ex. 4

at § 5 . The SBT and the State filed separate declaratoryjudgment actions in 2001 in the United
States District Court for the District of Idaho, which were then consolidated. Shoshone-Bannock

Tribes v. Idaho, No. CV-01-052-E-BLW (D. Idaho); Idaho

1).

Shoshone-Bannock Tribes,

No. CV-01-171-E-BLW (D. Idaho). Following passage of the Tribal Gaming Initiative and
Secretarial approval of the modifications to the Coeur d1A1ene, Kootenai and Nez Perce
compacts, the consolidated action's focus i~arrowed to whether the SBT compact, most
particularly its most-favored-nation provision, allowed the SBT to offer gambling through tribal
video gaming machines as identified in § 67-429B without compliance with the conditions
specified in § 67-429~(1).~
The district court said yes. Smith Aff., Ex. 5. It held that Section 4 of the compact
encompassed the newly-authorized tribal video gaming machines, since such gaming was being
conducted by other hibes, and construed Section 24.d as "merely [an] administrative provision[]
requiring the Tribe to serve upon the Idaho State Gaming Counsel a brief amendment clarifying
that that Tribe is authorized to operate tribal video gaming machines." Id. at 14-15. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment but gave the compact a somewhat
different reading. Idaho v. Shoshone-Banrzoclc Tribes, 465 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2006). It
construed Section 24.d as "leav[ing] no room for negotiation" because "it mandates an
amendment to permit one thing-the

operation of the same games conducted by other tribes

4

Section 24.d of the SBT compact provides in part that "[iln the event any other Indian tribe is permitted by
compact or final court decision to conduct any Class 111 games in Idaho in additioll to those games permitted by this
Compact, this Compact shall be amended to permit the Tribes to collduct those same additional games."
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under their compacts." Id. at 1099. The court of appeals rejected the State's position that Section
24.d required the SBT to adhere to the conditions contained in

5

67-429C and accepted by the

other Idaho tribes. Id. at 1101 (while "[tlhe other tribes agreed to accept the statutory package of
amendments that were not included in their compacts[,]" the SBT "chose instead to rely on [its]
Compact's existing provisions to confer the necessary permission to operate the video gaming
machines"). The SBT thus was "entitled to a mandatory amendment of the Compact stating that
[it is] authorized to conduct tribal video gaming." Id. at 1102.

APPLICABLE I.R.C.P. 12 STANDARDS
The general standard for determining motions under I.R.C.P. 12 is the same as under
I.R.C.P. 56. Gallagherv. State, 141 Idaho 665, 668, 115 P.3d 756, 759 (2005). A district court
thus must "view[] all facts and inferences fiom the record in favor of the non-moving party . . .
[and] ask whether a claim for relief has been stated," since "ItJhe issue is not whether the
plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is 'entitled to offer evidence to support the
claims."' Bradbuvy v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 Idaho 63, 67, 28 P.3d 1006, 1010 (2001);
accovd Young v. City ofKetchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104,44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002). This Court,
however, may consider matters of public record susceptible of judicial notice at any stage of a
proceeding. I.R.E. 201(f); see Crawford v. Dep't of Corrections, 133 Idaho 633, 636 n.1, 991
P.3d 358, 361 n.1 (1999); cJ: Lee v. City ofLos Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[a]
court may take judicial notice of 'matters of public record' without converting a motion to
dismiss into a motion for sununary judgment").

ARGUMENT
The Supreme Court has reiterated the core jurisdictional principle that a litigant must
possess staiding to invoke judicial intervention. Idaho law, in agreement with federal law, has
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adopted a three-part standing analysis. As the Court explained almost two decades ago in the
seminal Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 778 P.2d 757 (1989), two of three
considerations are injury-in-fact and causation:
"The essence of the standing inquiry is whether the party seeking to invoke the court's
jurisdiction has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure the concrete adversariness which sharpens the presentation upon which the court
so depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.' As refined by
subsequent reformation, this requirement of 'personal stake' has come to be understood
to require not only a 'distinct palpa'jle injury' to the plaintifE but also a 'fairly traceable'
causal connection between the claimed iijury and the challenged conduct."
116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763 (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl, Study Group,
438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978) (citations omitted)). A litigant also must identify the availability of
judicial relief that redresses the injury. Young-, 137 Idaho at 104, 44 P.3d at 1159 ("[tlo satisfy
the case or controversy requirement of standing, a litigant must 'allege or demonstrate an injury
in fact and a substantial likelihood the relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed
injury"'); accord Gibbons v. Cenarrusa, 140 Idaho 316, 318, 92 P.3d 1063, 1065 (2002);

Troutner v. Kempthorne, 142 Idaho 389, 391, 128 P.3d 926, 928 (2006); Indian Gaming
Initiative, 137 Idaho at 800, 53 P.3d at 1219. The Supreme Court additionally has made clear
that the injury alleged must be specific to the complainant and, therefore, more than a
generalized grievance shared by the public at large-ie.,

"a concerned citizen who seeks to

ensure the government abides by the law does not have standing." MilEs, 116 Idaho at 641, 778
P.2d at 763; accord Koch v. Canyon County, 177 P.3d 372, 374 (Idaho 2008). Existence of each
element of standing-injury-in-fact,

causation and redressability-constitutes

a "preliminary

question to be determined by [a] C o w before reaching the merits of the case." Young, 137 Idaho

02 4
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS, Page 8

Here, plaintiffs seek to establish the requisite injury-in-fact through their alleged
compulsive gambling at the Fort Hall Casino. They ask this Court to enter relief that makes it
easier for them to avoid the temptation to gamble on "slot machines" by eliminating the
availability of such gaming activity near their homes. In so characterizing their harm, they seek
to avoid alleging a "generalized grievance" shared by citizens at large over the claimed
inconsistency of

$5

67-429B and -429C with Article 111, Section 20. Plaintiffs' attempted end-

run around a "generalized grievance" nevertheless raises substantial difficulties under the
redressability prong of the standing test, since their asserted harm can be eliminated only by the
SBT actually ceasing to operate tribal video gaming machines at the Fort Hall Casino. Even
were it assumed for the sake of argument that this Court determined the machines authorized
under

5 67-429B

and operated by the SBT constitute gambling proscribed under Article ID,

Section 20, such ruling would not terminate the challenged gaming at the SBT casino or
elsewhere in Idaho.
It is instead plain that the use of tribal video gaming machines on the SBT casino can be
affected only through n~odificationof the SBT's gaming compact. This Court, however, cannot
provide that relief for both procedural and substantive reasons. Part I below addresses the
procedural hurdle: The SBT and the other Idaho gaming tribes must be joined as defendants to
provide effective relief to plaintiffs. Part I1 below addresses the substantive constraint: the
Court lacks authority to effect such a modification given IGRA's and the SBT compact's
comprehensive regulation of tribal gaming within the Fort Hall Reservation.
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I.

THIS COURT CANNOT ENTER RELIEF REDRESSING PLAINTIFFS'
ALLEGED INJURY IN THE ABSENCE OF THE GAMING TRIBES' JOINDER
AS A DEFENDANT, AND SUCH JOINDER IS PRECLUDED BY THEIR
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Federally-acla~owledgedindian tribes are immune from suit by Idaho or its citizens in
any court absent their consent or congressional abrogation of that immunity. E.g., Kiowa Tribe

v. Mfg. Techns., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998); Olclahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band
Potawatomi Indian Tvibe, 498 U.S. 505, 510 (1991). Plaintiffs have not named the SBT or the
three other Idaho gaming tribes and, in light of tribal sovereign immunity, could not do so even if
they so desired. They nonetheless seek relief that, to be effective, must adversely adjudicate the
SBT's right to operate tribal video gaming machines under its compact. The issue accordingly
becomes whether this Court may award such relief consistently with LR.C.P. 19's requirements
concerningjoinder of indispensable parties.
Rule 19(a) is derived from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a). Federal courts, whose
decisions are given substantial weight in determining the Idaho rule's proper application,5 have
adopted a three-step test to determine whether an absent party should be joined and, if so,
whether the action should be permitted to continue when joinder is not feasible:

[m

First, the court
Application of Rule 19 involves "three successive inquiries."
must determine whether a nonparty should be joined under Rule 19(a). We and other
courts use the term "necessary" to describe those "[plersons to [b]e [jloined if
[fleasible." . . . [q If an absentee is a necessary party under Rule 19(a), the second stage
is for the court to determine whether it'is feasible to order that the absentee be
joined. . . . [li] Finally, if joinder is not feasible, the court must determine at the third
5

As the Supreme Cout explained in Chacon v. Speny Corp., 111 Idaho 270,723 P.2d 814 (1986):
Part of the reason for adopting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Idaho, and interpreting our own
mles adopted from the federal courts as uniformly as possible with the federal cases, was to establish a
uilifonn practice and procedure in hoth the federal and state courts in the State of Idaho. We recently
adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence as the niles of evidence in Idaho in order to obtain uniformity in
the trial practice in both the state and federal courts. Lack of uniformity ill the rules ofprocedure, as well
as iules of evidence, creates problems for hoth the courts and the practitione1.s. These problems can be
avoided by inte~eipretingour iules of civil procedure in conformance with the interpretation placed upon
the same rules by the federal coults.
1 l l Idaho at 275,723 P.2d at 819.
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stage whether the case can proceed without the absentee, or whether the absentee is an
"indispensable party" such that the action must be dismissed. . . . Rule 19 uses "the
word 'indispensable' only in a conclusory sense, that is, a person is 'regarded as
indispensable' when he cannot be made a party and, upon consideration of the factors
[in Rule 19(b)], it is determined that in his absence it would be preferable to dismiss the
action, rather than to retain it."
Wilbur v. Loclce, 423 F.3d 1105, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation ~ m i t t e d ) . Rule
~
19 issues
frequently arise in connection with Indian tribes. E.g., YashenJco v. Hurrah's NC Casino Co.,
446 F.3d 541, 551-53 (4th Cir. 2006) (tribe was indispensable party in terminated employee's
suit against casino management company); Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 305 F.3d 1015
(9th Cir. 2002) (tribe was indispensable party in suit challenging governor's authority to renew
compacts); see generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Comparative Rights of Indispensable
Sovereigns, 40 Gonz. L. Rev. 2 (2004-2005) (discussing application of Rule 19-related joinder
where rights of Indian tribes may be affected).
Wilbur and American Greyhound are particularly instructive concerning the proper
application of Rule 19 under the circumstances here. The Wilbur plaintiffs sought to enjoin the
Washington governor and various state revenue department officials from implementing a
cigarette tax compact with a tribe on the ground that arrangement would violate the Indian
Commerce Clause and various federal statutes. 423 F.3d at 1104-05. The Ninth Circuit had no
difficulty concluding that the absent tribe was a necessary party, since it had a legally protected
interest in the involved compact's benefits and since the plaintiffs were required to show "the
illegality of the Compact in order to succeed on the merits of any of their claims." Id. at 1112.
Recognizing that the compact was contract~~al
in nature, the court pointed to various decisions
standing for the "'fundamental principle' that 'a party to a contract is necessary, and if not

The present formulation of 1R.C.P. 19(a) includes as separate subparagraphs what is set out in Fed. R. Civ. P.
19(a) tluough (a).Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(l) is therefore identical to I.R.C.P. 19(a)(l), but the 1-eferencesin Wilbur to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b) fu~dthek corolla~yin I.R.C.P. 19(a)(2).
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susceptible to joinder, indispensable to litigation seeking to decimate that contract."' Id. at 1113.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the contention that state officials could represent the tribe's interests
adequately, noting that "the Tribe and the state have been adversaries in disputes over the subject
of the [compact] in the past (indeed, resolution of a 'long-standing disagreement' regarding
cigarette taxation was one of the purposes recited in the Compact's preamble)" and that "the state
owes the Tribe no trust duty that might ensure vindicatio~lof the Tribe's interest." Id. To accept
the plaintiffs' adequate-representation argument, the court added, would negate the "general rule"
that all parties to a contract-there

the tribal-state compacts-are

necessary parties to an action

whose a& is to compromise a contract in some material respect. Id. at 1114.
The Wilbur court turned then to the Rule 19(b) considerations and held the tribe
indi~~ensable.~
It noted the obvious impairment of the tribe's interest if the compact were
determined to be unlawful and the impossibility of shaping protective provisions in a judgment
given the fact that plaintiffs "want nothing less than nullification of the Compact." 423 F.3d
at 1114. The lack of any avaiIabIe shaping relief also canied with it the conclusion that an
adequate judgment couldnot be entered because any decree would prejudice the tribe's interest in
the compact's integrity. Only the fourth consideration-"whether

[the plaintiffs] will have an

adequate remedy if the action is dismissedu-weighed against an indispensability finding, but the
court observed that "we have 'regularly held that the tribal interest in immunity overcomes the

7

Rule 19(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., reads:
When Joinder Is Not Feasible. If a person who is required to be joined if feasible cannot be joined, the
court must determine whether, in equity and good conscience, the action should proceed among the
existing parties or should be dismissed. The factors for the court to consider include:
(1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person's absence might prejudice that person or the
existing parties;
(2) the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or avoided by: (A) protective provisions in the
judgnlent; (8)shaping the reiiee or (C) other measures;
(3) whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence would be adequate; and
(4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder.
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lack of an alternative remedy or forum for the plaintiffs."' Id at 1115. Finally, it rejected the
plaintiffs' reliance on the "public rights exception," reasoning that the doctrine does not apply
where the litigation could "destroy the legal entitlements of the absent parties." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). The plaintiffs' claim sought precisely that result, since "[tjhe Tribe
would lose valuable contractual benefits if the Compact was held invalid."
While Wilbur involved a tax agreement, Amen'can Greyhound arose from a suit filed by
racetrack operators challenging a statute that empowered the Arizona governor to negotiate new,
or to extend existing, class IPI gaming compacts with various tribes "[njotwithstanding any other
law." The district coua enjoined the governor from engaging in either action because, in its
view, the state statute which authorized her to negotiate the compacts embodied an unlawful
delegation of legislative power insofar as it exempted such compacts from compliance with other
state statutory constraints on gambling. An?. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 146 F. Supp. 2d
1012, 1066-67, 1069-72 (D. Ariz. 2001), rev'd, 305 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2002). The district coug
further held that various types of "casino" gaming were unlawful under Arizona law.

Id. at 1063-66.

In reversing, the Ninth Circuit did not reach the substantive issues because it concluded
that the absent tribes were necessary and indispeilsable parties under Rule 1.9. The court of
appeals found that the tribes were necessary parties under Rule 19(a)(2)(i) because, as a practical
matter, the relief entered by the lower court impeded the tribes' ability to protect their contractedfor compact interests; i.e., "[bjefore this litigation, the tribes had a riglit to renewal if the
Governor was willing to leave tlie compacts in effect; after the litigation, termination was the
only option." 305 F.3d at 1023. It added later:
The district court's ruling that state law prohibits casino-type gaming, and its
consequent ruling that such gaming by Indian tribes violates IGRA, present another
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problem. Although the district courl enjoined only the execution of futurecompacts or
the extension of existing ones, its order amounts to a declaratory judgment that the
present gaming conducted by the tribes is unlawful. It is true that the tribes are not
bound by this ruling under principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel because they
are not parties, but their interests may well be affected as a practical matter by the
judgment that its operations are illegal. . . . Tile sovereign power of the tribes to
negotiate compacts is impaired by the ruling. . . . Moreover, enforcement authorities
may consider themselves compelled to act against the tribes.

Id. at 1024 (citations omitted). The court of appeals next addressed the Rule 19(b) factors and
held that (1) the tribes would suffer "enormous" prejudice from the required compact
terminations; (2) the prejudice could not ameliorated through remedial shaping; (3) any judgment
in the tribes' absence would not be adequate from the plaintiffs' perspective unless it
compromised tribal interests; and (4) the tribes' immunity from suit took precedence over the
unavailability of any other forum for the plaintiffs' grievance in the event of dismissal. Id. at
1025. It also found the plaintiffs' invocation of the public rights exception unavailing. Although
recognizing that "[tlhe general subject of gaming may be of great public interest," the court
deemed dispositive the fact that "[tlhe plaintiffs souglit th[e] injunction to avoid competitive
harm to their own operations." Id. at 1026. "[Tlhe rights in issue between the plaintiffs in this
case, the tribes and the state," in short, "are more private than pnblic." Id.
Wilbur and American G~eyhoundleave no doubt about the necessary and indispensable
party status of not only the SBT but also the three other tribes whose compacts permit tribal
video gaming machines. First, no legitimate question exists that the principal relief sought by
plaintiffs-a

declaration of

$5

67-42913 and -429C's unconstitutionality and that the games

actually operated by the SBT are in violation of the Idaho Constitution-could

"as a practical

matter" impair the tribes' contractual interest in offering such gaming. I.R.C.P. 19(a)(l). IGRA,
as explained above, conditions Secretarial authority to approve a class 111 compact on its being
"located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or
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entity." 25 U.S.C. 5 2710(d)(l)(B); see, e.g., Rumsey Indian Rancheria v. Wilson, 41 F.3d 421,
425 (9th Cir. 1994) ("where a state does not 'permit' gaming activities sought by a tribe, the tribe
has no right to engage in these activities, and the state thus has no duty to negotiate with respect
to them"), amended, 64 F.3d 1250 (9th Cir. 1994) and 99 F.3d 321 (9th Cir. 1996); accord Coeur
dxlene Tribe v. Idaho, 51 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curium). A detemiination that the
gaming sanctioned under $ 67-429B is proscribed under Article 111, Section 20 thus could lead to
controversy over the tribal video gaming now authorized under the various compacts. See Sun
Pasqual Band of Mission Indians v. California, No. 06cv0988-LAB, 2007 WL 935578, at "1 1
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2007) (where one tribe sought determination concerning permissible number
of gaming devices under a "model compact" provision largely identical to provisions in other
model compacts, tribes signatory to model compacts were necessary parties under Fed. R. Civ. P.
19(a)(l) because, inter alia, "a determination of the maximum number of licenses available
.collectively to all the 1999 Compact tribes is uniformly applicable to all through a formula
common to all those Con~pacts");c j Sruder v. Yerant, 964 P.2d 82, 90 W.M. 1998) (tribes were
indispensable parties under state procedural rule identical to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 in action seeking
to compel enforcement of state gambling prohibitions with respect to pre-compact tribal gaming;
"[tlhis requested relief would halt the exchange of money upon which the tribes rely for business
at their casinos"). The tribes have an obvious interest in any judicial proceeding that has as its
goal declaring unconstitutional a voter initiative that not only sanctioned a form of gaming for
their specific use and benefit but also has been serving that objective for years.
Plaintiffs concede their intent to visit prejudice directly on the SBT, and indirectly on the
remaining tribes, since it is only through cessation of the video gaming that their alleged interest
in controlling compulsive "slot machine" gambling can be hrtllered. Necessary party status for
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the four tribes plainly exists. The State, moreover, would be exposed to a "substantial risk of
incurring . . . inconsistent obligations" within the reach of I.R.C.P. 19(a)(l) because plaintiffs
seek relief that would impose obligations on defendants which conflict with the Ninth Circuit's
judgment authorizing the SBT to add tribal video gaming machines to its IGRA-sanctioned class
111 gaming compact. The same risk of inconsistency exists as to the other tribes' gaming
compacts, which are valid under IGRA now and would remain so regardless of how plaintiffs'
claim is resolved.
Second, any reasonable assessment of the four I.R.C.P. 19(a)(2) considerations requires
the conclusion that the tribes are indispensable. The threshold consideration-the
prejudice to the absent party-has

possibility of

been discussed and strongly counsels indispensability. There

additionally appear no "protective measures" that could mitigate this prejudice; again, plaintiffs
unabashedly seek to shut down video gaming at the Fort Hall Casino on grounds that would cast
legal doubt on the identical gaming permitted under the north Idaho tribes' compacts. Any
meaningful judgment rendered in plaintiffs' favor to address their purported injury would require
the SBT to cease operating tribal video gaming machines; anything less leaves them in precisely
the same practical position as they are now, i.e., living in proximity to allegedly available "slot
machine" gaming. Here, absent the SBT's joinder, plaintiffs simply cannot secure a judgment
that redresses their asserted injury-in-fact. See Yashenko, 446 F.3d at 553 ("any judgment
entered without joining the Tribe would be inadequate because it would bind only Yashenko and
Hanah's; the Tribe would remain l?ee to enforce the tribal preference policy on its reservation
and through its contractual relations"). As is often the result where tribal immunity from suit is
the basis for the infeasibility of joinder, plaintiffs may have no alternative forum, but the lack of
one simply means that they must employ non-judicial means to control their claimed gambling
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compulsion. They are situated no diflerently in this respect than the complainants in Wilbur and
Amevican Greyhound.
Last, the public rights exception has no play here. Plaintiffs advance a sui generis theory
of injury for the precise purpose of avoiding the "generalized grievance" characterization. But
for their purported and quite individualized addiction to "slot machine" gambling, plaintiffs
would not be before this Court. The complaint, therefore, should be dismissed under I.R.C.P.

11.

THIS COURT CANNOT GRANT PLAINTIFFS RELIEF AFFECTING THE
FORT HALL CASINO'S OPERATIONS EVEN IF IT COULD PROCEED
FORWARD WITHOUT THE IDAHO GAMING TRIBES AS PARTIES

This Court lacks authority to enter the relief requested by plaintiffs even if the SBT and
the other compacted Idaho tribes were not indispensable parties under I.R.C.P. 19: (1) IGRA
preempts plaintiffs' request that defendants be compelled "to uphold and enforce Article 111, 3 20
of the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Code

$8

18-3808 and 18-3810" (Compl. Wherefore 13);

(2) the exclusive process for addressing any disputes over gaming provided at the Fort Hall
Casino is prescribed in Section 18.a of the SBT conlpact; and (3) the Court has no power to
require the Governor to initiate the Section 18.a dispute resolution process. IGRA, in other
words, fully occupies the field of gaming within Indian reservations and leaves to States and
tribes determination of, inter alia, the types and conditions under which class III games may be
offered and the methods by which disputes under tribal-state compacts are resolved. The SBT
and Idaho have used that authority not only to authorize tribal video gaming machines under
their conlpact but also to lay out quite specific processes for dispute resolution. Plaintiffs may
not interpose themselves into a federal law-sanctioned sovereign-to-sovereign relationship either
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through the relief actually sought in the complaint or, alternatively, through efforts to control
gubernatorial discretion in administering the State's interests under the compact.
A.

IGRA's Preemptive Scope

No factual dispute exists that the Fort Hall Casino is located within the Fort Hall
Reservation set aside for the SBT's occupancy and that its operations are subject to regulation
under IGRA. See Smith Aff., Ex. 4 at

8 2.h & j

(SBT compact's definitions of, respectively,

"gaming facility" and "Indian lands"). Relevant case law equally leaves no dispute that IGRA
occupies the field of Indian lands-related gaming. The leading decision in this regard is Gaming

Gorp. ofAmerica v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d 536, 544 (8th Cir. 1996). The Gaming Corp.
litigation arose from various federal- and state-law claims by a casino management company that
a law firm had engaged in improper conduct while representing a tribe in a license application
process before a tribal gaming commission. The case began in state court but was removed to
federal district court and then remanded back to state court after the federal claims were
dismissed. 88 F.3d 539-41. The court of appeals reversed the remand order, agreeing with the
defendant law firm that IGRA "completely preempts the field of Indian gaming regulation." Id.

In so holding, the Gaming Corp. court examined "the text and structure of IGRA, its
legislative history, and its jurisdictional framework" and reasoned that, absent agreement in the
compact itself, no room existed for independent operation of state law:
It is a long- and well-established principle of Federal-Indian law . . . that unless
authorized by an act of Congress, the jurisdiction of State g o v e m e ~ ~ and
t s the
application of state laws do not extend to Indian lands. . . . [y] The legislative history
indicates that Congress did not intend to transfer any jurisdictional or regulatory power
to the states by means of IGRA unless a tribe consented to such a transfer in a tribalstate compact. . . . [Y] Congress thus left states with no regulatory role over gaming
except as expressly authorized by IGRA, and under it, the only inethod by which a state
can apply its general civil laws to gaming is through a tribal-state compact.
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88 F.3d at 545-46. The Eighth Circuit reiterated the complete-preemption rule several years later
in Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 164 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 1999), where it
explained that, in Gaming Corp., "[wle concluded that at least some of the [state law] claims
were preempted because they potentially interfered with the Tribe's casino licensing process, a
process mandated and regulated by the IGRA." Id. at 1108. The suit that was removed in Nixon
stood on a different footing, since it was unclear whether the involved state-law claim-an

action

by the Missouni attorney general to enforce state statutes against a tribal Internet gaming
operation-related

to conduct not on Indian lands and thus not subject to IGRA. See id. ("[olur

conclusion in [Gaining Corp.] that the IGRA preempted claims interfering with tribal gaming
must be viewed in the context of an IGRA-regulated licensing of casino gaming that was
indisputably conducted solely on Indian lands"). Other courts have reached the same conclusion
with respect to state law-grounded claims that relate directly to the conduct of IGRA-sanctioned
gaming. See CounQ)of Madera v. Picayune Rancheria of Chulcchansi Indians, 467 F. Supp. 2d
993, 997 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (state court has no jurisdiction to consider county's contention that
casino did not comply with county environmental requirements because compact contained no
provision for county's exercise of such authority).*
Here, plaintiffs' professed goal is to eradicate a form of gaming authorized under the SBT
compact. Compl. T/ 8.g. The holding in Gaming Covp. dictates that their request for a mandatory
injunction compelling defendants to enforce Article 111, Section 20 and Idaho Code

$5

i8-3808

Sracier v. Yerant, supra, does not support a different conclusion in a post-conlpact euviromlent. The New Mexico
Supreme Court held there that IGRA did uot preempt state gambling statutes because, in relevairt part, "gaming
compacts are the vehicles that give force to IGRA1spotential preemptive power." 964 P.2d at 88. "Without some
clear manifestation of an intention to surrender jurisdictiol~within its territorial jurisdiction, alleged vioIations of
New Mexico law remain wiiilin this Court's control." Id. The Idaho Legislature, however, ratified the SBT
conlpact. See Pt. I1 ilzfiu. The federal courts have held, moreover, that the compact expressly permits tribal video
gaming machines, and, in any event, the State has no criminal jurisdiction under Section 17 with respect to the
SBTS Haming activities.
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and -3810 with respect to the use of tribal video gaming machines at the Fort Hall Casino falls
squarely within IGRA's preemptive a ~ n b i t . ~Even if defendants had direct enforcement
responsibility under $4 18-3808 and -3810-and

they do not-this

Court laclcs authority to direct

them to exercise that authority as to IGRA-regulated gaming on the Fort Hall Reservation. State
gaming law, in short, has no independent application to the tribal gaining operations.

B.

SBT Compact's Remedial Exclusivity

On April 12, 2000, the Governor signed into law the Idaho Legislature's ratification of
the Shoshone-Bannock Compact and waiver of the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity from
suit in Federal Court regarding certain issues under the Compact. See 2000 Idaho Sess. Laws ch.
220. Section 1 of that session law explained why the parties had not designated State court or
Tribal court as fonuns to resolve issues of legality of games under the Compact:
It is the strong public policy of the state of Idaho to forbid all forms of
gambling, including casino-style gambling except a state lottery, pari-mutuel betting,
and charitable bingo and raffle games. Nothing contained in this act can or should be
construed in contravention of that policy. The tribes believe that they are entitled to
conduct gaming operations beyond what the state believes is legally permissible.
It is necessary to have a neutral judicial forum available to resolve these issues
and to provide a framework for the resolution of future issues that may arise with
respect to tribal gaming. To that end, the parties have agreed to resolve these legal
disputes in federal court. The resolution of such disputes in federal court requires
legislation authorizing the state to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit
by the tribes in federal court. The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes have agreed to adopt a
tribal ordinance authorizing the waiver of their claims of sovereign immunity with
respect to such disputes. [Emphasis added.]
The compact, in turn, contains three provisions requiring arbitration or suit in federal court to
resolve which gaming activities are permitted under state law or to resolve other compact-related
9

Section 18-3808 directs '"elvery prosecuting or county attorney, sheriff, constable or police officer, [to] inform
against and diligently [to] prosecute persons whom they have reasonable cause to believe offenders against the
provisions of this chapter, and every such officer refusing or neglecting so to do is guilty of a misdemeanor.''
Section 18-3810 makes it a misdemeanor, with certain exceptions for antique slot machines, "for any person to use,
possess, operate, keep, sell, or maintain for use or operation or otherwise, anywhere within the state of Idaho, ally
slot machine of any sort or kind wl~atsoever."Section 67-429B(2)excludes tribal video gaming machines from tlle
reacl~of this provision
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disputes.
As a threshold matter, Section 6.b of the compact authorizes either or both the State and
the SBT to file an initial declaratory judgment action in federal district court to resolve the
parties' legal disputes about what games the SBT may lawfully operate. The parties employed
that process to resolve the compact-amendment disagreement arising in the wake of Proposition
One's passage. Next, Sectioll 6.c provides for arbitration or additional suit in federal court, if
necessary, to impleme~itany decision arising from the initial declaratory judgment action. The
fact that tribal video gaming machines are being operated at the Fort Hall Casino indicates that
resort to the Section 6.c process proved unnecessary. Last, Section 18.a sets out a "General
Dispute Resolution" process that "shall apply exclusively for the resolution of issues &sing
under the provisions of this Compact." (Emphasis added.) The upshot is that when a dispute
over the compact's application exists, the parties must engage in informal dispute resolution
(Section 18.a(l)), and, to the extent necessary, arbitration (Section l8.a(2)) and federal court suit
(Section 18.a(3)).
Instantly, if the State desired to argue that the Tribal Gaming Initiative's authorization of
tribal video gaming machines conflicted with Article 111, Section 20 and thereby affected the
SBT's right to operate those machines at the Fort Hall Casino, the procedures in Section 18.a for
informal dispute resolution, arbitration and federal court resolution provide the only remedy.
The compact's process, again, is exclusive and recognizes no distinctions based on whether the
dispute has a compact, statutory or constitutional source. The parties' choice of process is, as
with other components of a tribal-state class I11 gaming compact, the product of IGRA-derived
and -protected choice. IGRA accordingly provides that a tribal-state compact "may include
provisions relating to . . . the allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction between the State and
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the Indian tribe necessary for the enforcement of . . . laws and regulations."

5 2710(d)(3)(C)(ii).

25 U.S.C.

After a compact has taken effect, in other words, state authority over tribal

gaming is determined by the compact. See Hatcher v. Hurrah's NC Casino Co., L.L.C.,
565 S.E.2d 241, 243 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) ("Congress has expressly left certain questions of
jurisdiction to be decided by the tribe and the state").
That the compact-derived procedure enjoys precisely the same insulation from state law
jurisdiction as the claims at issue in Gaming Corp. is reflected in various federal and state court
decisions. Examples include:
e

Doe v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 154 P.3d 644, 654 (N.M. 2007) ( I G M authorized a

tribe to consent to state court jurisdiction with respect to casino-related personal or property
injuries; "instead of Congress allocating jurisdiction between the tribes and states, the compact
provision allowed the tribes and the states to negotiate and decide for themselves the division of
civil, criminal, and regulatory responsibility").

*

Hatcher v. Hurrah's NC Casino Co., L.L.C., 610 S.E.2d 210, 214-15 (N.C. Ct.

App. 2005) (state court was bound by a compact's allocation of civil and criminal jurisdiction
between the State and the tribe, and a state court lacked jurisdiction over a casino patron's claim
of improper denial of winnings in the absence of a compact graz~tof authority).
0

Kizis v. Morse Diesel Int'l, Inc., 794 A.2d 498, 503-06 (Conn. 2002) (where a

compact with the tribe provided a mechanism to resolve tort claims arising out of tribal gaming
facilities, a state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction for such tort claims because the State
had agreed that a tribal gaming disputes court would be the exclusive forum for such claims).

Great W: Casinos, Inc. v. Morongo Band of Mission Indiaizs, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d
828, 840-42 (Ct. App. 1999) (IGRA preempted former tribal casino manager's wronghl
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termination suit against tribal gaming operations and deprived the state court of subject-matter
jurisdiction).
For present purposes, these decisions mean that the sole method available for adjudicating the
types of gaming that may legally be offered at the Fort Ilall Casino is through Section 18.a
processes. Plaintiffs' action here is not provided for under the Section 18.a process.
C.

Lack OfJudicial Authority To Enter Mandatory Injunctive Relief

Plaintiffs' request that defendants be directed "to uphold and enforce Article 111, 4 20 of
the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Code 55 18-3808 and 18-3810"with respect to the use of tribal
video gaming machines at the Fort Hall Casino asks this Court to require an action inconsistent
with federal law for the reasons discussed in Past 1I.A. Direct application of those provisions to
the casino operations is foreclosed by IGRA. Their request m e r asks the C o w to ignore the
Ninth Circuit's determination that, since "[tJhe Coeur dJAlene, Icootenai, and the Nez Perce
Tribes all legally operate tribal video gaming machines" by virtue of the authorization in

$4 67-

429B and -429C, the most-favored-nation provision in Section 24.d entitled the SBT to engage in
the same form of gaming. SBT, 465 F.3d at 1098. Consequently, whether measured by its literal
terms-which

results in IGRA-based preemption-or

with reference to IGRA's requirements as

embodied in the SBT decision, the mandatory injunction relief sought by plaintiffs plainly is
foreclosed.
Although the mandatory injunctive relief as currently pled in the complaint is
unavailable, the result here would not change even if plaintiffs had taken into account the
limitations imposed by federal law on this Court's remedial authority. The exclusive process for
the State to assert a dispute over the use of l~ibalvideo gaming machines, as explained above,
lies in Section 18.a. The question thus becomes wlletller mandatory injunctive relief could issue
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against the Governor compelling him to initiate that process for the purpose of modifying the
compact. See Idaho Code 5 67-429A.l o Under settled standards, such relief "will issue to a party
who has a clear legal right to have an act performed if the officer against whom the writ is sought
has a clear duty to act and if the act be ministerial and not require the exercise of discretion."
Savier v. Richey, 96 Idaho 413, 415, 529 P.2d 1285, 1287 (1974)."

The Supreme Court

additionally has held that where a decision-maker possesses discretion, mandamus may be
available in unusual circumstances-i.e.,

where it is shown both that "such abuse [is] clearly

apparent" and that "'such officer. . . has so far departed from the line of his duty under the law
that it can be said he has in fact so far abused such discretion that he has neglected or refused to
exercise any discretion."' Kolp v. Bd. of Trustees, 102 Idaho 320, 323 n.l, 629 P.2d 1153, 1156
n.1 (1981). The Court thus stressed that "the standard of proof is high and this exception to the
rule is severely limited." Id.; accord Rogers v. Goodingpub. .Jnt. Sch. Dist., 135 Idaho 480,483,
20 P.3d 16, 19 (2001); Brady v. City ofHomedale, 130 Idaho 569,571-72,944 P.2d 704,706-07
(1997). Here, even were this Court to determine that $5 67-429B and -429C conflict with Article
111, Section 20, the Governor would have no clear, nondiscretionary duty to invoke the dispute
I0

Neither the Secretary of Slate nor the Attomey General has any statutory duties relevant to compact-enforcement
decisions. No relief, whether declaratory or injunctive in nature, may issue against them.
" The Idaho Supreme Court does not appear to have reached the issue, but other courts recognize that where a court
is asked to require a public officer or ageucy to perform a specific function for the purpose of altering the status quo,
mandamus standards apply. See, e.g., AlliedSignal, hzc. v City ofPhoenix, 182 F.3d 692, 697 (9th Cir. 1999); Or.
NatumlRes. Council v Harrell, 52 F.3d 1499, 1508 (9th Cir. 1995); FaNini v. Ifonel, 783 F.2d 1343, 1345 (9th Cis.
1986); Naf? Wildlfe Fed'n v. UnitedStates, 626 F.2d 917,918 (D.C. Cis. 1980); see generally 43A CJS Injunctions
5 4 (2002) ("[MJandamus, and not an injunction, is ordinarily the proper remedy where nothing is sought but the
enforcement of a legal duty. Under some circumstances, however, a mandatory injunction will issue to compel the
performance of a duty of this character if, for any reason, mandamus is not available. Thus, a mandatory injunction
is equivalent to mandamus and governed by the same considerations") (footnotes omitted). The key consideration is
whether the injunction seeks to restore or maintain the status quo or whether, as is the situation here, the
complainant seeks to undo it. 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injuncfio~zs5 6 (2004) ("While injunction is a remedy to restrain the
doing of injurious acts or, in its mandatory form, to require the undoing of injurious acts and the restoration of the
status quo, mandamus commands the performance of a particular duty that rests upon the defendant, or respondent,
by operation of law or because of official status. . . . A court may nonetheless sometimes issue an injunction that is
mandatory in form and that may be equivalent to, or more nearly approach, the common law writ of mandamus,
such as when an injunction directs an officer or board to perfo~man act required of the person or entity by law")
(footnotes omitted).
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resolution process in Section 18.a. Several considerations dictate that conclusion.
First, regardless of how the merits of plaintiffs' claim are decided, under the SBT
compact with the State, tribal video gaming machines are a lawful form of gambling at the Fort
Hall Casino. The Secretary of Interior approved the compact under I G R h in 2000, and the
federal court litigation terminated with a judgment allowing the SBT to modify that agreement to
include video gaming machines. This Court possesses no power to undo either the Secretarial
approval-which

is subject to challenge, if at all at this time, ollly pursuant to the judicial review

procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. $ 701-706-or

the Ninth Circuit

judgment insofar as it established the legality of the tribal video gaming machines under the
compact upon amendment. The Governor has no obligation to seek amendment of an otherwise
lawful agreement.
Second, a final judgment in the federal court litigation holds that tribal video gaming
machines are a permissible form of gaming under the SBT compact. Res judicata in the form of
federal-common-law claim preclusion would apply to any legal controversy between the State
and the SBT over that issue because "the earlier suit: (1) reached a final judgment on the merits;
(2) involved the same cause of action or claim; and (3) involved identical parties or privies."
Leon v. IDXSystems Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 962 (9th Cir. 2006). That the validity of the Tribal
Gaming Initiative provisions under Article III, Section 20 was not an issue in the prior litigation
makes no difference in this regard, since the "claim" in question was whether the SBT was
entitled under the compact to offer 3 67-429B-authorized gaming. E.g., Sidney v. Zah, 71 8 F.2d
1453, 1458 (9th Cir. 1983); see genevally Restatement (Secondj of Judgments

3

25 (1982)

("Having been defeated on the merits in one action, a plaintiff sometimes attempts another action
seeking the same or approximately the same relief but adducing a different substantive law
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premise or ground. This does not constitute the presentation of a new claim when the new
premise or ground is related to the same transaction or series of transactions, and accordingly the
second action should be held barred")
Finally, there are public policy issues that must play an integral role in any determination
to invoke the Section 18.a process and underscore the discretionary nature of the attendant
decision-making. One issue stands out immediately. The Ninth Circuit relied on the mostfavored-nation provision of the SBT compact for its holding. The unavoidable logic of its
rationale is that, before seeking termination of tribal video gaming at the Fort Hall Casino, the
State must first secure similar termination of such gaming by the Coeur d'Alene, Kootenai and
Nez Perce Tribes. Not ~nly~significant
legal difficulties exist in achieving that condition
precedent, but very significant policy consequences-including

disruption of settled economic

expectations and planning premised on those expectations-also

could play an important role in

the Governor's decision. It is precisely these types of discretionary policy choices that have led
the United States Supreme Court to reject, on prudential grounds, efforts to have ihe ledera1
judiciary control prosecutorial or other statutory enforcement discretion. Heclcler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821, 831 (1985) ("an agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or
criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion"); see also
Sierra Club v. Whitman,268 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2001) (declining to review agency decision

not to take enforcement action under the Clean Water Act because, inter alia, "[tJo leave
enforcement decisions to the discretion of the Administrator is not to relieve the [Environmental
Protection Agency] of its mission to achieve compliance with the Act; it simply means that the
EPA must decide, within the limits set by Congress, the most effective way to accomplish the
objectives of the Act as a whole"); Clementson v. Brock, 806 F.2d 1402, 1404 (9th Cir. 1986)
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("[als a general rule, when an agency determines not to start enforcement proceedings, there is a
presumption against judicial review of the decision"). The Governor is entitled to weigh the
costs and likelihood of success of such suits and cannot be compelled by mandamus to order the
pursuit of such suits.
Under these circumstances, the prerequisites to issuance of a mandatory injunction are
absent. Any decision concerning whether to seek modification of the SBT compact through the
procedures in Section 18.a is unquestionably discretionary in nature, and a determination to leave
otherwise legal gaming activities in place, particularly in light of years of litigation over and final
federal court judgment concerning the permissible scope of those activities, can hardly be
characterized as "depart[ing] from the line of. . . duty under the law."
CONCLUSION
Defendants' motion to dismiss should be granted.
DATED this 24th day of April 2008.
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
STEVEN OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Civil Litigation Division
MICHAEL S. GILMORE
Deputy Attorney General
Civil Litigation Division
DAVID F. HENSLEY
Counsel to the Governor
Office of the Governor
By:
Deputy Attorney General
Natural Resources Division
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CURT R. THOMSEN, ESQ.
T. JASON WOOD, ESQ.
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
2635 CHANNnVG WAY
IDAHO FALLS ID 83404

X

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
C1 Facsimile: 208-522-1277
17 Statehouse Mail
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STEVEN OLSEN
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Chief, Civil Litigation Division
MlKE GlLMORE
ISB #1625; mike.gilmore~ag.idaho.gov
CLAY R. SMITH
ISB #6385; clav.smithiii),ag.idaho.gov
Deputy Attorneys General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2400
Facsimile: (208) 854-8072

Attorney for Governor Otter
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Case No. CV-2008-667
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CLAY R. SMITH

v.

1

STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel. C. L. OTTER,
Governor; BEN YSURSA, Secretary of
State; and LAWRENCE WASDEN,
Attorney General,

)

1
1

1
1

Defendants.
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I, CLAY R. SMITH, being of lawful age and first duly sworn, state as follows:
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DAVID F. IiENSLEY
ISB # 6600, d h e n s l e v @ g o v . i d a l 1 o 0 g ~ d
Counsel to the Governor
Office of the Governor
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0034
Telephone: (208) 334-21 00
Facsimile: (208) 334-3454
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I am employed as a Deputy Attorney General for the State of Idaho. I am

1.

assigned to the Natural Resources Division of the Attorney General's Office and represent the
defendants in this matter.
Attached as Exhibits 1 through 5 are documents referred to in the Brief in Support

2.

of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss filed simultaneously with this affidavit. Each exhibit has been
talcen from judicial records, is a true and accurate copy of the document that it purports to be, and
contains facts subject to judicial notice under Idaho R. Evid. 20 1 (b).
a.

Exhibit 1: Affidavit of Miren E. Artiach dated February 18, 2004 (filed on
February 20, 2004 in Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. State oflduho et al.,
Nos. CIV 01-52-E-BLW & CIV 01-171-E-BLW (D. Idaho)).

b.

Exhibit 2:

Order dated June 2, 2003 (filed In re Matter of the

Petition/Action to Determine the Constitutionality Idaho Code Sections
67-429B and 67-429C, Enacted in the Indian Gaming Initiative,
Proposition One, No. 29226 (Idaho S. Ct.)).
c.

Exhibit 3: Order dated October 16, 2003 (filed in In re Matter ofthe

Petition/Action to Determiize the Constitutionality Idaho Code Sections
67-429B and 67-429C, Enucted in the l~zdian Gaming Initiative,
Proposition One, No. 29226 (Idaho S. Ct.)).
d.

Exhibit 4: The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes and the State of Idaho Compact
for Class I11 Gaming dated February 18, 2000 (filed on January 3 1, 200 1
in Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. State of Idaho el al., Nos. CIV 01-52-EBLW & CIV 01-171-E-BLW (D. Idaho)).

AFFIDAVlT OF CLAY R. SMITH-Page

2

e.

Exhibit 5: Memoralldum Decision and Order dated April 9, 2004 (filed on
April 12, 2004 in Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Slate ofldaho el al., Nos.
CIV 01-52-E-BLW & CIV 01-171-E-BLW (D. Idaho)).

This concludes my affidavit.
DATEI) this 23rd day o f April 2008.

CLAY R. SMITH
Deputy Attorney General
Natural Resources Division
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this 23rd day of April, 2008
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JEREMY C. CHOu (ISB NO. 5680)
Deputy Attorneys General
Stalehouse, Room 2 10
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2400
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

1

SHOSHONE?-BANNOCK TRlBES, a
federally recognized tribc

)

1
Plaintiff,

)

)
VS.

)

STATE OF IDAHO and IDAHO STATE
LOTTERY,

)
)

1

Plaintiffs,

AFFIDAVIT OF
IkEREN E. ARTJACH

1
1
1

Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO and IDAHO STATE
LOTTERY,

Consolidated Case N o 3
CIV
0
1 -528-E-BLW
C~vol-171-E-Btw

)

1
1
1

1
j
)

VS.

SHOSHONE-BANNOCK 1'RIBES; and
the FORT HALL BUSINESS COUNCIL;
and the SFJOSHONE-BANNOCK 'I'RTBAL
CiAMWG COMMISSION,
Defendants.
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*STATE
OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

1, Miren E. Artiach, being first duly sworn, depose and say:
1 am employed as a Dcputy Secretary of Stale for the Idaho Secretary of

1.

State's Office.
Pursuant to Idaho Code 9 67429C(2), any tribe in the Statc of Idaho which

2.

wishes to anlend its cxisting state-tribal ganing compact must deliver to thc Secretary of
State a tribal resofution signifying the tribe's acceptance of the ternis of the amendment.
1 am the custodian of those records submitted to the Secretary of State's Office under

Tdaho Code § 67-429C(2).
3.

A.ttached heroto are truc and correct copies of the following records in the

Secretary of State's Office:
n.

Exhibit 1:

November 6, 2002, letter &om Ernest L. Stensgar,

Chairman, Coeur d'Alene Tribe, to idaho Sccretary of State with enclosed Coeur d'Aicne
Tribe Rcsolutian 37-03 and Amendment to 1992 Class 111 Gaming Compacl By and
Between the Coeur d'Alene Tribe and the State of Idaho.
b.

Exhibit 2:

Novenlber 6 , 2002, letter f?om Gary Aitkcn, Sr.,

Chairman, Kootenai Tribe of Idaho, to Idaho Secretary of Statc with cncloscd Kootcnai

Tribc Resolution 03-03 and Amendment to 1993 Class I11 Gaming Compact By and
Between the Koatenai Tribe of Idaho and the State of Idaho.

c.

Exhibit 3: November 6, 2002, Ielter from Samuel N. Pcnney,

Chairman, Nez Pcrce Tribal Bxecutive Committee, to Idaho Sccretary of State with
enclosed Nez Perce Tribe Resolution 95-595 Amended and Addendum to 1995 Class 111
Gaming Compact By and Betwecn the Nez I'erce Tribe and the State ofldaho.
lll

I11

AFFJDAVJT OF MIKEN E. ARTTACH - 2

%%a

This concludes my affidavit.

&@&
Miren E. Artiach

mo this @ay

AFFIDAVIT OF MIREN E.AR'SLACIi

-3

052

of February, 2004.

REFERENCE:

COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE
0150 A STREW
P.O. BOX 408
PLUMMER. IDAFIO X3851
(208)686-1800 Fax (208) 686.1 182

,

.

Idalla Secretary of State
Slatchotrse, Room 203
Boise, Ida110 83720-0080

1 :

Cocur d'Alenc Trilpc's Amclldrnc~ltto 1092 CCss 111 Gaming Compact
i'ltrsuani tu Proposiliun Onc

snc]osed herewith i s a copy of C!oucr d'Alene Tribe Resoiulion 37-03 and an Amebdnlent to ihc
current 1992 Ciass 11'1Gan~jngCom,pactBy and Between the Coei~rd'Alane Tribe and the Stille
of. Idaho, aimending the above-referenced ganting ~t>~llj>act
in accordance with the terms us set
Forth i n Section 4 of Proposition One, codified ns Idaho Code 67-429C, by the addition i.o the
comnpact of a new section -, Article 6.8.
The compact amcndment is deemed effective up011 ihc aulflorizcd sig~~amre
hy the Cveur
d ' ~ l e n eTribe which isafixed to ike Amendment and Resolution cnclosed. Pursuant to Idaho
Code 67-429C(2) this ci>mpactarncildment adding a new section Arlicie 6.8 is deemcd effective
i~ntnediatelyupon delivery of the cnclosed rcsolt~tionto the Secretaly of State.
With this delivery, the terms and conditions of Idaho Code 67-429C are hereby mct and tile
'Tribe's currel>tCiass IIT (laming Compact is dcemed im~nediatelyamended by the addition of
new,scction Article 6.8 and is deemed immediately approved by the State of Idaho pursuai~lto
Idaho Code 67-429A. There is no need for any furtllcr signature or action by the executive or the
legislative br~nchcst~fstategovernment to effectuate ibis amendment.

v

Erncst I.. Stensgat

Exhlbit 1
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GAMlNG/CASXNQ
APPROVINE AMENDMENT TO
GAMING COMPACT AS PROVIDED
CDA RESOLUTEON 37(2003)
BY PROPOSITlON ONE

6.8.3 Not withstanding any other provision ofthis compact, and to the extcnt

such contributions are not already reauired under the tribe's existing
comvacl. the ttibe anrees to contribute 5% ofits annual net gamin^ income
for the supoorf of local educational oroprams and schods on or near the
reservation. The tribe may elect to contribute additional sums for t b e s g s
pther educational puxuoses. Disbursements of these funds shall be at the
sole direction of the tribe.
6.8.4
Nothwith~tandinr.
anv other arovision of this compact. the tribe agreos not
to conduct aaminn outside of Indian lands;

PROVlDED THAT, Proposition One, having been passed by a majority of the voters OF the State
of Idaho is not hereinafter substantially amended or repealed; and

BE IT FURTmR RESOLVED, that this Compact Amendment is deemed effective upon the
signature by the Coeur d'klene Tribe on November 6,2002, and approval by the Secretary of the
Interior or her designated representative if necessary, as pursuant to Idaho Code 67-429C(2).
There is no need for further signature or action by the executive or the legislative branches of
state government to effectuate this Amendment.
CERTIFICATION
Thefore~oingresolution was adopted at a mooting ofthe Coeur d'Alene Tribal Council held at Tribal
Administration Building, 850 A Street,. Piummer, Idaho on October 31, 2002, with the required
quorum present by a vote of 6 FOR 0 AGAINST 0 ABSTAIN,

@55
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l'bc 1992 Class 111 Cirinling Co~~ipact
Uy a~)'lI~C~WUCII
the Coeur d7Alencl'ribc tuntl the
Stalc of Idahu h & kc11
~ approved for amc?ndmcnl by Idaho ballot memure i'ropositinn One, the
Indian Gaming tnd Self-Rcliance Act, which received a majority of the votes in the November 5 ,
2002 Idaho slale election. I'roposition Onc is the law of tho stale of Idaho, and as set forth in
Section 4 of Proposition One and us codified at Idaho Code § 67-429C, the 1992 Class 111
Gaming Compact By and Betweon the Cocur d'Alcne Trjbc and the State of Idaho is hereby
anlendcd bv the addition of g n:w Article 6.8 as filows:
Article 6.8

I

Gaming Machines Permitted; fi:mansion Limitation: Education Punditrg
6.8 1

Notwitfistandlnn my other provision of this compact, the tribe i s pcrnlitted
machines as described in
to conduct namina using tribal video
Section 67-429B, Idatlo Code.
6.8.2 not withstand in^ any other nrovision of this compact. in the 10 years
following incorooration of this term into its compact. the number of tribal
video gaming machines thc tribe may possess is limited Lo the nurnbcr~f
tribal vidw gaming machines nc)ssessed by the tribe as of Januam 1.200L
plus 25% of that number: provided, however. thnt no increase in any.&&
as of January 1.2002year shall exceed 5% of thc number
Thereafter, the tribc may operate such additional tribal video earning
machines as arc agreed to ,,ursuant to good faith nepottations between the

6.8.3 Notwithstanding anv other oyovision of this compact. and to the extent
suc11 contributions arc not already reauired under the tribe's existing
comnact, the tribe agrees to contribute 5% ofits annual pot rramina income
for the sun~oriof local & i t ~ c ~ t pi ~ ~ g&r a~m
and
s schools on or near Ole
reservation. The tribe may elect to contribute additional sums for these or
other educational pumoses Di$bursemcnts
of these funds shall be at the
sole direction of the Gibe.
6.8.4 Notwithstandinn any herpr provision of this compact, the tribe agrees not
to conduct mimine; outside of Indian lands;
--

This Amendment is deemed eflective upon the signature by the Coeur d'Alcne Tribe, and
approval by the Seorotn~of the Interior or her designated representative. Pursuant to Idaho
Code 67-429C(2) there is no need for further signature or action by the executive or the
Iegislative branches of state govcrnmenk to effectuate this Amendment.

Errlest L. Stnlsgnr
Dated this &>lay of Novemhes, 2002.

Exhiblt 1
Page 4 of 4

1

I

i

November 6,2002

Secretary of State
Statehouse, Room 203
Boise, Idaho 83720-0080

RE:

Kootenai Tribe of Idaho's Amendment to 1903 Class Ill Gaming Compact
Pursuant to Proposition One

Dear Mr. Becreta~:

-

Here is a copy of the Kootenai Tribe of Idaho's Resolution 03-03 adding an Amendmerlt
to its 1893 Glass 111 Gaming Compsct with the State of Idaho. The amendment adds a
new section, Article 6.8,to the compact in accordance with the terms of Section 4 of the
recently passed Proposition One.
Siricerely,

u

Gary Aiiken, Sr.

Chairman
Enclosures

Exhlbit 2
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R E S O L U T I O N
KQOTENAI 03-03

WHEREAEi, the Kootenai Tribal Council has b w n empowered to act far and on behalf

oftbsKootenai Tribe of ldaho pursuant to the Constitution and Bylsws ratified by t h e
adult members of the Kootenai Tribe of ldaho on April 10, 1947 and spprovedlsigned
by the acting commissioner of lnd~anAffairs on June 16, 1947; and

WHEREAS, the Kootenei Tribe of ldaho has participated in tribal efforts l o develop and
promote proposition One, the Indian Gaming and Self-Reliance Initiative for inclusion
on the November 5, 2002 ldaho general election ballot to clarify ldaho law regarding
tribal gaming; and

WHEREAS,Proposition One received a majority of the affirmative votes in the
November 5, 2002 ldaho state election;

WHEREAS, Proposition On.@amends existing ldaho Code to confirm the right of tribes
to use tribal video gaming machines as defined in ldaho Code 674288 and authorizes
the Tribe to amend Its ID93 Class ill Gaming Compact By and Between the Kootenai
Tribe and the State of ldaho pursuant to the terms of the initiative by tribal resolution
submitted to the ldaho Secretary of State;

NOW,THEREFORE BE iT RESOLVED, that the Kootenai Tribe of Idaho hereby
amends its 1993 Class Ill Gaming Compact pursuant to the terms set forth in Section 4
of Proposition Qne, codified as ldaho Code @ 67-4296,-whichshall thereafier become
effective by operation of law, by adding to the compact a new section Article 6.8 as
follows:
Article 6.8

Tribal Video Gaming Machines: Expansian Limitation; Education Funding

.I

.2

Not withstanding any other provision of this compact and as
clarified by this compact amendment, the tribe is permitted to
conduct gaming using tribal video gaming machines as descFibed
in Section 67-4298, ldaho Code.
Not withstanding any other provision of this compact, in the 7 0
years following incoiporation of this t e n into its compact, the
number of tribal video gaming machines the tribe may possess is
iirniied to the number of tribal video gaming machines possessed
by the tribe as of January 1, 2002, plus 25% of that number;
provided, however, that no increase in any single year shall exceed
5% of the number possessed as of January I,2002. Thereafter,
the tribe may operate such additional tribal video gaming machines
asare a g W to pursuant to goad faith negotiations between the
state and the tribe under a prudent business standard.
Page 7 of 2
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.3

Not withstanding any other provision of this compact, to the extent
such contributions are not alrealJy required under the tribe's
existing oompact, the tribe agrees ta contribute 5% of its annual net
gamipg income for t h e support of local educational programs and
Schar;ils on or near the resenration. The tribe may elect to
contribute additional sums for these or other educetionat pulposes
Disbursemants of these funds shall be at the sole discretion of t h e

tribe.

4

Not withstanding any other provision of this compact, the tribe
agrees not to conduct gaming outside of Indian lends.;

1

CERTIFICATION
The Foregoing resolution was duly adopted at a Tribal Council meeting duly called,
cangiiuted and held at the Kootenai Trjbal Complex, near Bonners Fany, Idaho on the
3lst day of October, 2002; with t h e required quorum present by a vote of
for and
2against, and fiabstention.

a

Kootenai Tribal Council

ATTEST:

Secretary, Tribal Council

Page 2 of 2
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AMENDMENT
.

,

The Class Ill Gaming Compact By and Between the Koot.enai,Tribeof
.Idaho end the State of ld3ho,, dated September 23, 1993 and approved pursuant
to kdeml law by the @ppointed:'repreentativeof the Assistapt Secretary, Indian
AFairs. Department of the Ititerior, on October 29, 1993, is hereby amended.
Idaho ballot measure Proposition One, the Indian Gaming and Self-Reliance Act,
which tiaving received a majority tyf the votes in the November 5,2002ldaho
state election is the law of the state of Idaho. The terms set Forth in Section 4 of
Proposifian One are now codified at Idaho Code 3 67-429C and create a new
sedbn, Article 6.8, which is hereby added to the Cornpa& and states as follows:

Article 6.8

Tribal Video Gaming Machines; Expansion Limitation; Education
Funding
.?

.2

Notwithstanding any other provision of this compact.and as
clarified by this compact amendment, the tribe is permitted
to conduct gaming using tribal video gaming machines as
described in Section 674296, ldaho Code.
Not withstanding any other provision af this compact, in the
10 years following incorporation of this t e n into its compact,
the number of tribal video gaming machings the tribe may
possess is limited to the number of tribal,video gaming
machines possessed by the tribe as of January 1,2002, plus
25% of that number: provided, however, that no increase in
any single year shall exceed 8% of the number possessed
. \.
I , 2002.Thereafter, the tribe may operate
as of January
such additional tribal vidso gaming machines,.ss.are agreed
to pursuant to gaod faith negotiations between the state and
the tribe under a prudent business standard.
N i t withstanding any other provision of this compact, to the
extent such contributions are not already required under the
tribe's existing compact, the tribe agrees to contribute 5% of
its annual net gaming income for the support of local
educational programs and schools onor near the
resewation. The tribe marelect to contribute additional
$urns for these or other educational purposes.
Disbursements of these funds shall be at the sole direction
of the'tribe.
Not withstanding any other provision of this compact, the
tribe agrees not to conduct gaming outside of Indian lands.
,

.3

.4

Exhiblt 2
Page 4 of 5

,

This Am@r?drnsntis effective upon the apprcyal by tle Secretary of the
Interior or herdesignated representative. Pursuant to ldaho Code 6714?9C(2)
there
is no need for fuither signature or action b y the executive or the legislative
. . ..
branches of state government to effectuate this Amendment.
. ..

,

KOOTENAI TRIBE OF iDANO

Gary itk ken, Sr., Chairman
Dated this @ day of Novamber 2002.

Amendment to Class Ill Gaming Compact
Kootenai Tribe of IdahofSCate of ldaho - 2
Exhlbit 2
Page 5 of 5

..

.

i

, .,

,..

..

'

Enclosures

'

.

.

,

, , ., . , ,

.

.

.
,

.

... . ..
>..... ., ,
. . ..,
,

.

062

. ,

..
.

.

.

..

,.

.,.

Exhibit 3
Page 9 of 4

.:
. I

NP 75-59!?
Amended

WHEREAS, the Nez Perce Tribal Executive Committse hos been empowered to act for and
on behalf of the Nez Farce Tribe pursuant to ?he Revised Constitution ond By-Lows,
adopted by the General Council of the Nez Perce Tribe, on May 6, 196 1 and approved
by the Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs on June 27, 1961; and
WHEREAS,

&oposition One, the Indian Gaming and Self-Reliance, has received a
majority bf the affirmative votes in fhe November 5, 2002 ldaho hate
election; and

o
the
WHEREAS, Proposition One automaticaJly amends existing ldaho C o d e ~ authorize
use of tribal video gaming machines as defined in Idaho Code 67-4298
and authorizes 1.h~Nez Perce Tribe to amend its current 1995 Class Ill
Gaming Compact By and Between the Nez Perce Tribe and the State of
ldaho by Tribal Resolution submitted to the Idaho Secretary of State;

NOW, THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, fhat the Ner Perce Tribal Executive Committee
(NPTECJhereby amends its 1995 Class 111 ami in^ Compact pursuantto the
terms as set forth in Sedion 4 of Proposition One codified as Idaho Code
5 67-429C, by the oddition to the compad of the new section Ariicle 6.4
'as follows:

Article 6.4

Tribal Video Gaming Machines; Expansion Limitation; Education Funding

.I

.2

Not withstanding any other provision of this compad and as clarified
bythis cornpod amendment, the tribe is permitted to conduct gaming
using tribal video gaming machines as described in Section
67-1295, ldaho Code.
Not withstanding any other provision of this compact, in the 10 years
f~llwwingincorporation of this term into its compact, fhe number of
tribal video gaming machines the tribe may possess is limited to the
number of tribal video gaming machines possessed by the tribe as of
January 1,2002, plus 25%of that number; provided, however, that
no increase in ony single year shall exceed 5% of the number
possessed as of January I , 2002. Thereafter, the tribe may operate
such odditional tribal video gaming mochines as are agreed to
pursuant to good faith negotiations between the state and the tribe
under a prudent business standard.
Page 1 of 2
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I

I

NP 95.595
Amended

.3

Not witllstanding any other provision of this compact, to the extent
such ~ontributionsare not uiready required under ihe tribe's existing
compact, the tribe agrees to contribute 5% of its annuol net gaming
income forthe support of local educational programs and schools on
ar near the reservation. The tribe may elect to contribute addirional
sums forthese or other educational purposes. Disbursements of these
funds shall be at the sole direction of the tribe.

.4

Not withstanding any other provision of this compacf, the tribe agrees
not to conduct gaming outside of Indian lands,;

I

PROVIDED THAT, Proposition One, having been passed by a majority of the voten of the
State of Idaho is not hereinafter sub~antiallyamended or repealed; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, fhat this Compad Amendment is deemed effective upon the
signature by the Nez Perce Tribe on November 6,2002, and approval by
the Secretary of the Interior or her designated representotive if necessary, as
pursuant to ldoho Code 67-429C(2)there is no need for further signature
or action bythe execufive or the legislative branches of stote government to
effectuate ?hisAmendment.
CERTIFICATION
The foregoing resolution was duly adopted by the Nez Perce Tribal Execufive Committee
meeting in Special Session, October 22,2002, at the Richard A. Halfmoon
Council Chambers, Lapwai, Idaho, a quorum of its members being present
and voting,
.*?.

I

.

A. ~avis-whdelar,Secretary

ATTEST:

xY2
i Lm-w
Samuei N. Pennay, c h a i A u n

I
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The 1995 Class IT1 Gaming Conijact By and fietween the Nez Pcrce Tribe and the Statc
of Idaho, on August 22, 1995, find approved by Ada E. Deer, Ashistairt Secretary of Indian
Affairs, Depnrtment of tile Interior, on October 20,1995, and amended onDecember L2, 1998, i s
hereby amdnd& by Idaho bgllot mcasure Proposition One, thc'111dian Ganling and Self-Rcliancc
AG~,
whicli b&ing rcceived a majority of the votes in the November 5,2002 Idaho state eiecliun
is the law ofthe statc oflcieho, us set forth in Section 4 ofPraposition One as codified at Idaho
Code 5 67-429C, by thcatldition of n new conlpact section Article 6.4 as follows:
Tribal Vidco Ca~ningMachines; Expansion Limitation; Education Funding

Articie 6.4

.1

.2

.3

.4

Not withstanding any other provisioil of this compact and as clarified by
[hi:, compact amcndmcnt, tile tribeis permitted to conduct gan~ingusing
tribal video garning tllflchincsas described in Section 67429B, Idaho
Code.
Not withstanding any other provision of tl~iscompact, in the I0 years
of illis tcrm into itr, compact, the number o f tribal
following i~~corporatioti
the ttibe may possess is limited to tilo number of
video gaming ~nachin~a
tribal video gatning machines possessed by the tribe as of January 1, 2002,
plus 25% of that nunlber; provided, however, that no increasc in any
single year shall exceed 5% of the number possessed as of January 1,
2002. Tilereafter, thc tribe may opcrate such additional tribal, video
gsming machinks as are agrcerl lo pursuant to good faith negotiations
between the statc and the tribe under a p~udentbusiness standard,
Not withstanding any other provision of this compact, to the extcnt such
contributions are not already required under the tribe's existing conlpact,
the.trih..agrees Lo contribute 5% of its annual net gaming incallle for the
support of local educational programs and schools on or near the
reservation. The tribe may elcct lo contribute additional sums for these or
other educatiohal pitrposes. Disbursements of these funds shall be at the
sole direction of the tribe.
Not withstanding any other provision of this compact, the tribe agrees not
to conduct gaming outside o.f Indian lands.

This Amendrnenf i s deemed effective upon the signature by the Nez Force Tribc, and
approval by the Secretary of fhe Interior or her designated representative. Pursuant to Idaho
Code 67429C(2) there is no nced for furil~ersignature or action by tile executive or the
legislative branches of state government to effectuate this Amendment,

NEZ PERCE TIUBE

Datcd this ,&'ddeyof l.iovember, 2002,

Exhibit 3

CERTIEIC TE OF SERVICE
1 HCKERY CERTI~Y
that on thls

U%

A.
ay o I' February, 2004, I caused to be served a m e

m d coneot copy of thc foregotng by the folollowb~lgmethod to:

Brtlndellc Whitworth
Office ol'Reservation Attorney
Shoshone-Bm~ockTribes
PO Box 306
Port Hall, 11) 83203

Scott D. Crowell
Crowell Law Offices
1670 10th Strcet West
Kirkland, WA 98033
Conly J. Schulte
Montcau, Peebles and Crowell
12100 West Center Road, Suile 202
Omaha, NE 68 144-3960

@ U.S. Mail

C]Hnrtd Delivery

a
Cerhfied Mail, Return Recwpt Requested
C]Ovemigl?:
M&l

Facsimile: (208) 239-9276

@ US.Mail
Hand Delivery
Certified Mail, Return Receipt Rcquesled
Overnight Mail
153 Facsunile: (425) 828 9978

U.S. Mail

C]Hand Delivery
Certified Mail, Rctuni Receipt Reqiiestcd
Oveniigllt Mail

@ Facsimile: (402) 333-4761

ORDER DATED JUNE 2,2003
(filed In re Matter of the Petition/Action to Determine the
Constitutionality Idaho Code Sections 67-429B and 67-429c Enacted in
the Indian Gaming Initiative, Proposition One, No. 29226 (Idaho S. Ct.))

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
IN THX MATTER OF THE PETITION1
ACTION TO DETERMINE THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF IDAHO CODE
SECTIONS 67-429B AND 67-429C,
ENACTED IN TIFE LNDLAN GAMING
INITIATIVE, PROPOSITION ONE.

1
1
)

1
)

1
1
1

-----------------------------------------*----------------

MAXINE T. BELL; LAIRD NOH; PAUL
CHRISTENSEN; and BRYAN FISCmR,
Petitioners,

1

)

ORDER
NO. 29226
Ref No. 02s-3 85

1
1

v.

)
PETE T. CENARRUSA, in his capacity as Idaho )
Secretay of State, DIRK KEMPTHORNE, in
)
his capacity as Idaho Governor, ERNEST L.
1
STENSGAR, and THE COALJTION FOR
INDIAN SELF RELIANCE, real parties in
)
interest,
1

Respondents.

1
1

The Petitioners have filed a petitionlaction asking this Court to exercise original
jurisdiction or inherent jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of Idaho Code $9 67-429B
and 67-429~.The Petitioners assert several grounds upon which they contend that this Court has
original jurisdiction to hear their petition.
First, they contend that this Court has original jurisdiction based upon that portion of
Idaho Code 9 34-1809 that provides: "Any qualified elector of the state of Idaho may, at any
time after the attorney general has issued a certificate of review, bring an action in the Supreme
Court to determine the constitutionality of any initiative." This Court's original jurisdiction is
set forth in the Constitution. The legislature has no power to extend this Court's original
jurisdiction. Neil v. Public Utilities Comm 'n, 32 Idaho 44, 178 P. 271 (1919). The Petitioners
contend, however, that pursuant to Article J
II,9 1, of the Idaho Constitution, the legislature has
the power to grant this Court original jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of initiatives.

The portion of Article DI, $ 1, upon which the Petitioners rely states that "legal voters
may, under such conditions and in such manner as may be provided by acts of the legislature,
initiate any desired legislation and cause the same to be submitted to the vote of the people at a
general election for their approval or rejection." They contend that this provision authorizes the
legislature to grant original jurisdiction to this court in matters regarding initiatives. There is
absolutely nothing in the wording of this provision that could reasonably be so construed. It
merely authorizes the legislatxre to determine the conditions and manner in which the voters may
exercise the power to propose laws by the initiative process.
The Petitioners next contend that this Court has originaljurisdiction to hear their petition
pursuanl to that portion of Article V, $ 9, of the Idaho Constitution, which provides: "The
Supreme Court shall also have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari,
prohibition, and habeas corpus, and all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction." They argue that by their petition they are requesting a writ of prohibition.

A writ of prohibition "arrests the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board or
person, when such proceedings are without or in excess of the jurisdiction o f such tribunal,
corporation, board or person." h

o CODE$ 7-401 (1998). The Petitioners seek a declaration

that Idaho Code $5 67-429B and 67-429C are unconstitutional. They are not seelcing to arrest
the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board or person.
The Petitioners next contend that this Court has original jurisdiction under the Uniform
Declaratory Judgment Act. This Court has jurisdiction to grant a summary judgment only in
connection with the proper exercise of its original jurisdiction as granted by the Constitution.
See Mead v. Amell, 117 Idaho 660,791 P.2d 410 (1990). We do not have original jurisdiction to

hear actions seeking a declaratoryjudgment that are unconnected with our jurisdiction under
Article V,

5 9, "to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, and habeas corpus."

Finally, Petitioners contend that this Court has original jurisdiction to hear this
declaratoryjudgment action pursuant to Article V, $2, of the Idaho Constitution, which
provides: "The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a court for the trial of
impeachments, a Supreme Court, district courts, and such other courts inferior to the Supreme
Court as established by the legislature." It is $$ 9 and 10 of Article V, however, which define

this Court's original jurisdiction. Dewey v. Schreiber Implement Co., 12 Idaho 280, 85 P. 921
(1906). Indeed, if 6 2 were construed to provide that this Court has original jurisdiction in all
cases, then $3 9 and 10 would be superfluous. Under neither section do we have original
jurisdiction to hear the Petitioners' petitionlaction. Therefore, after due consideration,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petitionlaction to determine the constitutionality of
ldaho Code 53 67-429B and 67-429C, enacted in the Indian Gaming liutiative, Proposition One,
be, and hereby is, DISMlSSED without prejudice because this Court does not have original
jurisdiction to decide the matter.
DATED this z & d a y

o

2003.

By Order of the Supreme Court

ATTEST:

cc:

Counsel of Record

I, .Stephen W. ,~e,nyon,
Clel~;~f:~~~upmme..&urt
of the Slate of Idaho, do hereby certify Met the
above is a true and conwt copy of t h e - f k k ~
entered in €he.above entitled cause and .now on
record in my offim.
YlTNESS my hand and the Seal of this ~ w r t L C I ~ o g

4:

-k&dAkh-

*%

Deputy

EXHIBIT 3
ORDER DATED OCTOBER 16,2003
(filed in In re Matter of the Petition/Action to Determine the
Constitutionality Idaho Code Sections 67-429B and 67-429C, Enacted in
the Indian Gaming Initiative, Proposition One, No. 29226 (Idaho S. Ct.))

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION1
ACTION TO DETERMINE!. THE
CONSTITUTIONALlTY OF IDAHO CODE
SECTIONS 67-429B AND 67-429C,
ENACTED EY THE INDIAN GAMING
LNITIATIVE, PROPOSITION ONE.

)

1

..........................................................
MAXWE T. BELL; el al.,

?

ORDER DENYING PETITION
FOR REElEARING

1
1

Petitioners,

NO. 29226
Ref. No. 03RH-25

)

v.

1

PETE T. CENARRUSA, in his capacity as Idaho
Secretary of State, et al.,

1

Respondents,
and.
BRUCE NEWCOMB and ROBERT L.
GEDDES,
Intervenors.

1

)
)
)
)

I, Stephen W. Xenyon, Clerk of the Supreme ~ & r l
of the State of Idaho, .&,.hireby certify that the
above i6.a true and c ~ & , ~ o p iof theentered in t h e , a h entitled",mu@and now on
word in myoffice,
;~/~R&Ess
myhand end m.Ssal.of
*ls !Ajtrt!&!oog

1)

STEPHEN fff. KENYON

)

?

BY:

..

Clerk.

%uaw
,

T6

On June 2, 2003 the Court issued an ORDER dismisskg the PETITIONIACTION
.
DETERMINE T m CONSTITUTIONALITY OF IDAHO CODE SECTIONS 67-429B AND
67-429C, ENACTED IN THf? INDIAN GAMING INITKTIVE, PROPOSITION ONE without
prejudice because this Court does not have original jurisdiction to decide the matter. The
petitioners filed a PETITION FOR REHEARING and supporting BR.IEF o n June 19, 2003 and
the Intervenors filed a BRIEF EY SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING August 15,
2003. The Court is fully advised; therefore, after due consideration,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's PETITION FOR REHEARING be, aid
hereby is, DENIED.
DATED this /bG day of October 2003.

cc:

-il

Counsel of Record

072

.,.

EXHIBIT 4
SHOSHONE-BAiVNOCK TRIBES AND THII STATE OF IDANO
COMPACT FOR CLASS m GAMING DATED FEBRUARY 18,2000
(filed on January 31,2001 in Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. State ofIdaho
et al., Nos. C N 01-52-E-BLW & CIV 01-171-E-BLW @. Idaho))

THE SHOSHONE-BAMNQCK TRIBES
and the
STATE OF IDAHO
COMPACT FOR CLASS III GAMING
TILlS TRIBAL-STATE COMPACT made and en:nlered into by and hetween the
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes (Itereinafter the "Tribes"). a federally recognized Indian Tribe.
arid the State of Idaho (hereinaficr the "State") pursuant to the provisions of the indim

Ciaming Regulatory Act (hereinafter the ",Aci"). Pub. L. 100-497. 25 I.I.S.C. 5s 1701. cr
scq.. and 18 U.S.C.

$8 1166-1 168.

Titie

I,

'This document shall be rererred to as "'The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes and the

Stale ol'ldaho Compact for Class III Gaming."

.7

Definitions
For purposes of this Compact:
a.

"Act" menns the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Pub. L. 100-497. 35

I.I.S.C. $$2701.~.iseq..and I S U.S.C. $9 1166-1168.
b.

"Business Council" means the Forr Kall Business Council. which is the

elecled governing body of'the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes.
c.

"Class 111 gaming" rneans all forms of gaming set Sorth in Sections 4 and 5

of this Compact tha~a x nor Cltlss I or Class II as defined in Seclions 4(6) and 4(7) of the
Act. 25 U.S.C. Ef: 3703(6) and (71.
d.

"Compact" mcms the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes and the Slate o f ldaho

Cornpacr for Class I1J Gaming.
e.

"Distribuior" means n person who distributes my machines or devices of

my kind used for any gaming activity in the gaining facility.
A

i:

"Finding ol'r;uitabili~)~"
m a n s an approval gmled to a person or enterprise

directly or indiroctiy involved with the gaming operation and rclates only to Lhe specified
involvemenr for which it was made, if tile nature OF the involvement changes Sro~nthat

for which the applicant is found suitable. the Tribal Gaming Azency may require the
person or enterprise to submit for a determination of suitability in the new capacity.
f.

"Gaming employee" means my person employed in the operation or

management of' the gaming operation. whether employad by the Tribes or by any
cntcrprise providing onsite services to the Tribes within tbc gaming facility.
)I.

"Gaming facility" or "gaming facilities'. means the land togelher with all

buildjngs, improvements and facilities used or maintained in connection with Ll~econduct
of CIass I11 gaming on Indian 1,ands as provided by this Compuct.
I.

"Gaming operation" lneans the Tribes' operation of Class 111gaming in my

gaming facility.
.I

"Indian Lands" metins thost: kinds within the Tribts' jurisdictional limits

that meet the definition ol' "lndian lands" as defined in the Indian Omin_rReguiauor~,
Act.

k.

"License" inems an approval or certifica~ionisstled by the Tribal Caning

Conmnission ro my person or enrity involved in the gaming operntjon or in the providing
of gltming services to the gaming operation.
1.

"Licensee" means any person or enxity who has been approved, licensed,

certified or found suitable by the Tribal Gilmlng Co~lunissionto he involved in the
gaming operation or in the providing of gaming services in the gaming operation.
m.

"Net gaming revenue" means gross revenues of an Indian gaming activity

less arnounts paid out as. or paid for. prizes and rota1 operating expenses, cxcluding
management fees.
n.

"NIGC" means the National Indian Gaming ~omnission estilblisl~ed

pursuant to 15 IJ.5.C. $8 7704.

1

,

/-,,

:P-

>
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"Ordinance" meacts the ordinance adopted by the 'Tribes and approved by

0.

the NICK.
"Srate" means the Slate oi' Idaho. irs authorized officials, iigents and

P-

representatives.
4.

"Stake Gaming Agency" incans the Idaho agency desipated by the State by

wriaen norice to the Tribes as the singe stare agency primarily responsible fbr fulfilling
the obligations of this Compact.
r.

"Tribal Gaming Cornmission" nleans rhe agency of the Tribes primarily

rcsponsiblc For regulnlory oversight of Clws 111gunins.
S.

"Tribal law enforcement agency" ~ n w n sthe police Sorce of the Tribes.

es~ahlished and tnaintained by tile Tribes. pursuant to the Tribes' powers of selfr

-government. to camJ out law enforcetnent on India11 Lands.
t.

"Tribes" or "Tribal" means of or stemming from the Shoshone-Bmnock

Tdbes. its authorized officials. agents and representatives acting on the Tribes' behalf'
pursuant to Trihnilnw.

3.

Recitals
n.

WI-TEREAS. the Trihcs and the State recognize and respect the laws and

authorin, oftlie re:spcctive parties: and
b.

WIEREAS. it is the intent of the Tribes and the State thal the provisions of

this Compact, including but riot limited to the resolution process outiined hErein: apply to
and control only the issues arising from the terns md provisions of this Compact..
h.

WXEREAS, the Congress of the United States has enacted into law thc Act.

Pub. 1.. 100-497. 25 U.S.C*ji$ 1701. at seq., rtnd 18 L1.S.C.

$8

1366-3 168. which

provides in part that o iribal slate compact may be negotiated herween n tribe and a state
to govern the conduct of certain Class

within the stale: and

III gaming actjvjties on Indian Lands of tribes

WHEREAS. tile Tribes and the State have negotialtd the fenns and

c.

condirions of this Compacl in good faith so as to provide fi)r mutual governmental

purposes and to provide a regulatory framework for rbc operation of certain Class I11

.aming. ~vhicl,is iniended to: la) ensure !he fair and honest opem1:ion of such gaming
acrivities: (h) maintain the intepjry of all activities conducted in regard to such gaming
octivilies: (c) prevent unsavory and unsuitable persons from having any direcr or indirect
involvomcnt with gaming activities at any time or in any capacity; ( d ) establish and
~naintainresponsible accounting practices and procedures: (e) maintain effefec~ivecontrol
over the financial practices rclated

10

gaming aciivities. including cstahlishing the

minimum procedures for internal fiscal arfairs and thc saleparding of assets and
revenues and reliable recorctkeeping: (f) prevent cheating and fraudulent practices: and
(g) pwecr ihc llealth. welfare and safety of the citizens of the Trlbcs and ofthc State: and

d.

WHEREAS. the Act provides that an indian tribe may co~lductClass III

~ a i n i n gus provided in IGRA: and

e.

WHEREAS. the Shoshone-Bannock T r i b ~ sand tile State of Idaho have

mutually agreed tf~atthe conduct of Class )I1 gaming under the terms and conditions set
forth hclvw will benefit the Tribes and protecl the citizens of the 'I'ribes and o f the Stale
consist en^ with the objectives ofthe Act: and

i:

WHEREAS. the parties hereto deem it to be in h e i r respective best

intcreuzs to enler into this Compact; and

-E.

WHEREAS. a principal goal of i'ederal Indian polic): is to promote tribal

economic developmenr, tribal selEdetermination and a strong government to government
relationship: and

I
naming
e
i.

WHEREAS. the State recognizes the Tribes' sovereign rights to control
activities on hdian Lands as provided by the Act and this Compact: and
WI-IEREAS. i t is t l ~ epolicy ofthe Tribes to exercise and retain its ridlts to

regulate gaming acrivi~iesupon its lands and reservation fbr the purposes ol'enco~*raging

.'

r"

.
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Tribal employment, economic and social development. and finding csS Tribal .services
while cnsuring the fair and lawful operation of gaming and the prevenrion of conypt and
criminal influences. 'I'he 'I'ribes will utilize net revcnues generated by gaming to h n d
progains that provide in~portanlgovernmental serviccs to 'Tribal members and reservntion
residents. These progams include education. health and human resources. housing
development, road construction and maintenance. sewer and water prqjects. police. fire.
,judicial services. economic dcvelopmen~.and any other purpose authorized under the Act;
and
j,

WHEREAS.

il

is a

smlofthis Cotnpaa that positive ccoi~oiniceffects of'

such gaming will extend beyond lndian 1,ands to the 'Tribes' neighbors and surrounding
corninunities and help lo foster mutual respect and undersrandjng among Indians and nonIndians: and
k.

WHEREAS, this Compact shall govern the licensing. regulation and

operation of Class 111 gaming conducted by the Tribes on Indian Lmds located within the
State: and
I.

WHEREAS. the State and ihc Tribes are empowered t o enter into this

Comp~ictdue to their inherent power lo contract and pursuant to tile lndian Gaming
Regulatory Act: iuld

m.

WIGIEAS. il is also understood that prior to hecoming eflective the State

shall obtain legislative authorization

LO

wtive its immunity as provided under the

Elevventh Amendment of' the United States Consrirtition and the Tribes sllall obtain
authorization

;o

waive their sovereign immunity. The signatories will certify that this

authorizalion has been obtained: and

n.

WI-JEREAS. the parties have heen unable to a g e e upon the types of Class

Ill games permitted hy the Act to be pitdyed by the Tribes: and
o.

WFfEXEAS. The Stare takes the position that the Indian Gaming Replatory

.4ci au1horiz.e~Class

TI1 gaming acriviries on Indian Lands only if such activities are

. .

..

..

,

,

r., .

/%,
"

,
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provided for in a compact such as lhis and if other persons or enrities in rhe Stctte of ldaho
are pennittod by state law to engage in sucll activities. Accordingly, the only rribai Clws

111 gamjng activilies that are legal in Idaho under federal law are those Class III gaming
activilies permitted by article 3. secljon 30 of'the ldaho Constitution and not otherwise
conrrary to the cri~ninallaws of the State of Idaho. Therefore. pursuant to federal law.

.

tribal Class 111 gaming in idaho is contrary to public poiicy and is strictly prohibited
excepl lbr a lottcy. pari-mutual betting and bingo or raffle games conducted in
confonniry with enabling iegislarion. Furthermore. no gaming activity shall employ any
I'orm of casino gambling includii-rg. but not limited to. blackjack. craps. roulene, poker,
baccarilr. keno and slot machines, or employ m y elecrronic or clecuomechanic~rll
imitation or simula~ionof any fbnn of casino gambling: and
p.

WHEREAS,

il

is the position of the Stale that the electronic gaming

currently conducted by the Tribes in Idaho is an imitatiol, of casino games and prohibited
h ? ~id&o and federal law: and

q.

WEREAS, the Tribes ~ a k eihe position that under f'ederal law. the Tribes

are enritled to offer any gaming activily thal is otherwise permitted by any person.
orgniza~ion.or entity for any purpose. 'Given the range and scope of gaming aclivities.

wirh tin emphasis on a multi-faceted state-sponsored entity? thc State of idaho cannot
establish [hat any gaming activity, properly regulated to ensure the i n ~ e g i t yof the game
and proioct the gilll~ingpatron. contravenes the State of Idaho's public policy for gaming.
Further. in light of~rilditjonalunderstandings of the context and legislative history of AcL
the State cannot establish t h a ~i t bns reasonably characterized the relevant state laws as
completely prohibiting a distincl form of gaming. Accordingly; the Tribes are entitled to
offer and regulate all Ibnns of gaming except sports-betting; and

r.

WEEREAS, the Tribes take the ultemative position that if the State does

establish that it has inw the above-stared burden through the application of the ldaho State
Consritulion. article 3. section 20, the Tribes are entitled to offer electronic facsimiles of

,

.
*

. .
(p.
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any lotten; game which can be reasonably defined us gaming owned and operated by
government entities. or as games w11erei11the c;tate/owner docs not have n stake in the
outcome ofthe g m e of chance; and

s.

WHEREAS, both the Tribes and the State acknowledge that these are legal

jssues thal should he resolved. Xn recopirion of this. the Tribes and the S~atea p e in
this Colnpact to resolve issues ll~arcan be agreed upon and agree lo estnbllsh a process

for resolving the disputed matters.
NOW. THEREFORE. in consideration of the mutuaf undcflakings and agreements
l~ereinailerset forth. the Tribes and the State enter inio the Soilowing Compact.
4.

Autlrorized Cfass ill Gaming

Class III Gaming shall be authorized consistent with the following:
a.

Galnine Authorized. Foilowing approval of this Compact as provided in

rhe Act. the Tribes may operate in its gaming facilities iocated on lndian Lands. any
gaming activity rhar the State of Idilbo "permils fbr my purpose by any person.
organization. or entity." as the phrase is. interpreted in the contea of'fhe Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act. Tile Tribes rnny not operate any ori~crform of Class 111gaming activity.
b.

&ation

ol' Class 111 Garnine Ac~ivitiec. Class TI1 gaming activities shall

only be conductcd on Indian Lmds locatcd within the cxterior boundaries oi'tlte Fort Hall
Indian Reservation as ii existed as of the date of ewactment of the InCLian Gaming
Regulatory Act or upon other ir~dianLands as defined in the Indian Gaming Re~alatory
Act with the approval ofthc Governor. Nothing herein shall he interpreted as precluding
a Governor from deciding whether lo concur with The findjngc of the Secretary of the
Irtlericrr thal gami~igon newly acquired lands tvouid be in the best ititerest of the
Shoshone-Bannock'rribes and not detrinental to the sl~rroundingcommunity.
c.

C.ertificalion. Subseyuenr to a final non-appealable jud-ment in fhe inirial

Deciaratory .JudgmentAction pursuant to Section 5. no gamjng device shall he placed in
Lhe gaming ihcilitj [or use until approved by the State. The Tribe shall make a good faith

"

/"-' ,
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effort ro re~novcany dovices thgt we in play u the rime of the final non-?ppea!able
.
,

judpenr thaz do nor comply with the Declnntory Jud3menr. ':"he State sllall ln,&e a
good f'aitli effon lo certify those games that are in play at the time of'tlle non-appealable
,judgmen! Jhat do comply with The Declaratory Judgment. If the parties disagee over
,

prneslhar'.sre~n"pl&mfhe~~imeee~Pt1ip:Ryia~~6~ppc'd~~6~~j~Bgiiii:~i~h~-Tr'ibs
may
continue to operate the g m e s pending dispure resolution pcr Section 18.
d.

Forms of Pavment. AII payment for wagers made in gaming conducted by

the Tribes in their caming operation shall be made b j ~cash. chips or tolcens. The gaming
operation shall nol wtend credit. Chips or tokens may only he purchased using cash.
chech or travelers chcctcs.
e.

Prohihited Activities. The Tri'ies shall limit their Class 111gazing activities

to those permitted by this Compact. in the even1 a dispute arises after the completion of
the declaratory,judgnent action, and the implementation thereofas ctgreed to in Section 5,
ovcr whether an acrivip is or is nor pennitted under this Compact. tho dispute shall be
resolved pursuant to Section 18.
i'.

Advertising of Authorized Cinmins. 'The Tribes may advertise their

authorized gaming activities within the State of Idaho in an honest and truthful manner
pursuant to federal law.
5.

lnitial Declaratory Judgment Action
The Tribes md ttw Slate agree thal issues of what garnin2; the 'Tribes may conduct

undcr the Act and what restrictions on the operations. if any, may be imposed by the
State. are ultiin.atcly questions of' law. However. the parties beiieve that presentation of
facts regarding the actual gaming activity thal does occur in the State and on Indian Lands
and the machines that are at issue is necessary for the Coun
law.
a.

Posi~ionsof Parties as to Jurisdiction

to

resolve tile quesiions of'

[

1)

I1 is

tbc Tribes' position t11al the Act has vesled exclusive jurisdiction

in the L;~litedStales Uistric: Courts to resolve disputes under the
,. . Act.

.1.he $rare does no1 consent to jurisdiction

(21

ofthe federal courf ov&

any claims under 25 LtSC 3710(d)(7)(A)(i). 'l'lle State does reserve the right to consent to
federal courl Jurisdjction over claims arising under this compact on a case-by-cafe basis.
.4.flcement to Particinate in Initial Dcclaraton, Judmenl Action.

h.

Notwithstnnding Lllese positions, the Tribes and the State agree ihat either or both purties
nri$y file suit for declaratoy jud&ment in the IJnited States Districr Court for che District

oi'ldaho naming the other as a defendani und seeking a declaration o f t h e legal issues
disputed in this Section. In pursuing this acrictn:
Both parties agree thal they have obtained the necessary legislative

(1)

and legal authority to bring the initial declaratory jud-pent action. merge declaratory
jud*pent actions. or talce other steps as map he necessary to participate in sucii an action
on ifsmerits, This agreement shall not in any way prejudice any right to appeal or seek
review tit'nny jud,ornenl.

Rotti parties agree to expedite the proceedings and any appeal or

(3)

revie\+,of any final order or,judgment entered in such inilia1 declaratory judgnsnr action.
Should the 'I'ribcs refuse lo consent to jurisdicrit)n as provided

(3)

above. this Compact shall be nu11 and void.
Should the State rcfuse to consent to jurisdiction us provided above.

(4)

any issue relating to the provisions of this Compact presented by the Tribes in their
compluint o r pleading shall he deemed to have been decided in favor of the Tribes'
position on the issue.
(5)

The 'Tribes agree to limit the scope ol'their gaming aclivities lo those

sel forth in Section 4.
((5)

This provision shall not be construed as a consent by the Stele to

iederal courtJurisdiciion in any action brought pursuam to 25 U.S.C.2710(d)(7)(A)('i).
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Imnlernentation
.. . .
of' Initial Decliiraton2
.Tuda,meril Decision.
.,.,,. >
.
.. .- ... ,,- , ..:,, ..,
. ..

,

.

..

.

. . : ., .
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i : (
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'

.

LJpon tile

'

conclusion of all legal prote+dings
. , in [be initiil d@ckaralo~
,judgment action broughl
,

,

pursuanr to Section 5. including the uonciusion of' all appeals or rcview, the appropriate
provisions below sl~allapply:
(1)

In the event the court(s) detennines Ulat cenain g m i n g auivities are

nor "pcrmined" in the context o f ' the Act. the Tribes shall be precluded frotn offering
Illose gaming activities in any yamingkcilities on indian Lands.
(2)

in the Event the court(s) detennines that cenain gaming activities are

'.!,enniilcd gaming" in the contexr ol' the ACI. lhe Tribes shall be entitlcd to cxpcdiled
iinple~nentationol'such games

i s consistent with the ,judgnent. For this purpose. the

'Tribes rnqv conduct such games as arc consisken! with lhat jud-mcnt upon conclusion of
the cxpediled negotiations andlor arbitration sct forth below.

(A)

The parties agree to expedited negotiation of any issues which

are proper subjects of' negotiation under the Act consistent wit11 fhe judicial resolulion.
Sucir issues shall be negotiated for thirty (30) days. For purposes of this section. "dqy"
shall incall calendar day. A$reemenls reached in inedialion shall have dxc same ci'iect us
ifti part ofthis Compact. and are incotporated in full hcrein.
!B)

if apoelnenr cilnnol bc rencl?ed. sucii issues shall be

submittecf to binding iirbiira~ionas follows:
ci)

Either party shall scrve writren notice of intent to

arbitrate on the other puny on the final day of negotiation. The party serving notice ol'
intent to arbitrate shali identie the specific provisjon(s) of this Compact andlor issues.
which shall he suhrnitted ibr arbitralion.
(ii)

Both parties shall wihin live ( 5 ) days of noiice oi'

intent 10 arbitratc provide a 1is1of five ( 5 ) names of individuals availableas prospective
;nbitriltors. Each p3rN shall. within five !5) days of the receipt ofthe other party's list.
seleci a person from that list as an arbitrator. Within ten ( 10) days of lhcir selection.

'.

-1
..
,

\
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shall select a third arbitrator from a list of not less t h q Qve (5)

nominees &orna;u, ir~dependcnr.arbiaazors' or alternative dispute rcsolutioo orgtgi~&tion.
.
,

11' the iptiividuais do not a&?e,?ecupon such organization. il shall be the American

Arbitration Associa~ion. Tile Statc and the Tribes agree that the arbitriltors shall be
required lo submit their decision within ninety (90) days of'the selection of the third
arbitr:itor.
iiii)

The arbitrators shall iteve authority to issue such orders

and decisions us shall be reasonably n e c e s s q or desirable to bring about an expeditious
decision consistent with the ,judicial decision madc in the initial declaratory judgment
action brought pursuant lo Saction 5.
(iv)

Except as provided by Section 4, t.he 'Tribes apee not

to conduct games pursuant to Section 4 unfil t.he completion of arbitmtion. flowever, if'
conclusion of'thc arbitration process is delayed Tor ;my reason. thc arbitrators

permit

gmiog on such tcrms as tl~eydetermine pending conclusion of arbitratjon.
(v)

.&biv+tion wpenses will be billed equally to the

(vi)

if,iudicial review of an ilrbilration decision is soughl,

respective parties.

thc arbitration decision shall be effective unless and uiltil dctemined olhenvise by a
federal court.

(vii) Except as may be determined by a federal court,
arbitration decisions shall have ihc sunc elTecl

if a part of this Compact. and are

incorporated in full herein.
(viii) Nofhing herein shall preclude thc pturties from agreeing
to an altcrnatc ibnn ofdispute resofution.
(C)

To ensure inlegrity, l'he Tribes agree that il'nddiliond games

are pern~ittedpursuant lo the inixial declara~orjljudgment action, such games shall be
conductcd in sccordtce with the operational. security, casli control and other srandards

,

.

,

R

.
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established in ll~isCoinpact together wit11 pdditionaf negotiated stan$mds a restrjcliveus
. .
those o r h e Nationill Indian Oaming Commission as set ibnh ai 1 5 CFR 547 as

in the 2:ederal Register. i a n i ~ a ~5.y 1099. or the Nevada Gaming Comnission for thai
par~iculargame. Such restriclions shall be negotiated and/or arbitrated in the manner
provided in Section j(c!,

6.

Regulations rnd Ordinances Regulating thc Opemtion and Management of the
Gaming Operation
Thc Tribal Ciming Commissjon or the Businass Cou~lcilmay, itom time to Lime.

ndopt. m e n d or repeal such r~gulationsor ordinances consislcnt with the poljey.
ohiec~ives.purposes and tcrms oi' this Compact as ir may deem necessary or desinble in
the interests of' the Tribes i111d the State in carrying out the policy and provisions of this
Colnyacr.

'The 'Tribes have enacted an ordinance re$ulating !.he operalion and

management of the Gaming operation.
7.

Baclcground 6nvestigations of Gaming Employees
a.

Raol~mund.~~nvcsrianrion.Prior,ro..Emnlovme~:llt.
('I)

Prior Lo hiring or licensing n prospec~ivegaming employee. the

Tribnl Gaming Commission shall obtain sufficieul informalion and identification from the
applicant on forms to be iurnishcd by the Tribal Garning Commission ro pennil a
thorou+gh background investigation, together with such fees as may be rcquired by the
Tribes. The information obtained shall iilclude.

&I

a minimum. name [including any

aliases). current address, ddte and place of b i ~ criminul
,
arrest find convic~ionrccord.
social security number. two sets of fingerprjnts, sex. height. weight. and two current
photographs.

Upon written request by the State. m e and corrccr copies o.f illis

information shall h e provided to ihc designated Slate agency. whicl~may conduci an
independent background investigation ar the Statc's own expense and provide a written
report to the Tribal Gaining Co~nlnissionregarding eqch application.

,

.

. '. .

(31

The Trilxtl Gluning Commission may license on a temporary
. . ,
hasis
..

,

rtny prospeclive Gaming employee. cxcept case and counting room p~rsoDnel.vfho

represents in writing that fir or she does not fall within my of the criteria set forth below
and who has passed a preliminag~ criminnl background investigation by the Tribal

(;tuning Commission. until such time ns il~efinal written report on the applicant's
hackpound investigntion is completed. For purposes of lhis paragaph. the Tribal gaming
investigator. in conjunctjo~,with the designated law enfbrcement agency, shall notify the
Ganiiig operation in writing of' the preliminmy criminal background check within fen
I 10) d,1>1sofsubmission of such

(3)

requcst.

The Gaming Operation shall not hire

(17

conxinue ro employ

Gluning employee. arid sIi&Il terminaie ,an\,probationary Gaming employee. if the Tribal
(faming Commissjm determines that the applicant or employee:
(A)

has been convicted of any offense related l o gambling, fraud,

misrepresentation. rlcception or thefi. within the past icn i 10) years:

(B)

has providcd tna~eriallyfalse sratenlents or infonndio~ion his

or lier employment application or misstated or otherwise atternpled lo inislcad ihc Tribes

or ihe Slote with rcspect to any inaterial hct conrained i n the eniployrncnt applicarion:
(C1

is u member or ossociale ul'org~mizcdcrirnc or is of notorious

or urlsavory reputation: or

(D) has a reputation. habits or associations t h a ~might pose a
threat to the public interest or 10the effective regulation and control ofgaming, or create
or enhance the dangers of unsuililble, unfair. or illegal practices, rnetliods and activiries in

the conduct of' gaming or thc c;mqing on 01' tjle business und tinancia1 arangemenIs
incidental i;hercto. It is intended tliai applicanis and e~nployeeshave Lhe continuing
burden

ttr

satisQ

811

doubts as to their fitness. Where doubt remains, an applicnnl or

employcc is not eniitlcd to be hired or to relnnin employed.

8
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Raak~wound
Investirations
Ermnlovees. During ~ m p l o
.
.
;,
:,,,..
.
.
. . oSGamine
.

.

I

.

Tribes and the State Gaining ,4gency shall retain the right ro conduct s
hac@goundinvc$tiga~jonsof any Gamjng employee at any tirne during the
:.. renn of that
person's employme~~t,
A1 any time, any Craming employee who does not establish that he
or she satisfies all ofthe crilerin set forth above shall be dismissed.
3,

On-sitc Regulation of Gaming Operation
2..

Tribal Gamins Coinmission. The primary responsibility fbr the ondsile

regulation. control and security of the Gaming operation and faeiiiiy negotiar~dfhrough
this Cc~mpacishall be thnt ol'the Tribal Gaming Commission. Tile Srilte Gaming Agcncy
rnay panicipate in replatory obligations of the Ciming operations and may work closely
with the Tribal Gaming Commission, iiowwer. this shall only occur after the Tribal
Gaming Cornmissiorl requests in writing that the State Gaming .4gency participate. or the
State Ciming Agency provides written rationale ro thc Tribal Gaming Commission as to
the need for the Stm Gamins Agency to pmicipale in the regulatory obligations. Such
stale assistance shall not include rraditiorial securily and law enlbrcctnent functions.

As parl of its responsibilities, the Tribal Ciaming t:omrnissinn shall ensure
tllai tilt Oiuninf operation and manages will:
(I)

Comply with all relevant 1a.n'~:

(3)

I'rovide tor the physical safety of personnel employed by the

Ciaming operation:
(3)

Provide for the physical safety ($,patrons in the Gaining facility:

(4)

l'rovide for the physical safeguarding of assets triinsponcd to and

kom the Gaming facility and cashjer's cage d~panment:
(5)

Provide Lor the protection of the pauons nnd the Gaming facility's

property fiom illegal activity; nnd
(6)

Ensure the integiry of ibe gaming operation.

.

.
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'The Business Council shall empIo:? the (3pping
,

.

mangger.
Tile gaming
~ n a,n, ~ g shall
e r serve at rhe pleasure of the Business Council
grid
,
,
.
,
,

shall have overall responsibility Sor the adminislralive hnctions of the 'Tribal gaming
operarions.
C.

Identification Cards. The Tribal Gaming Commission shall require all

(3nming e~nployeesto conspicuously wear identification cards issued by the Tribal
Ga~ning C!txnmission which shall include the employee's photograph, first name.
e~nplovecnumber. Tribal scal or signature. and a date of expiration.
d.

Insneaions.

'The Tribal Gaming Commissio~) shall retain qualified

inspectors or agents under thc authority of ~ h cTribal Oaming C~omtnissionas needed.
Said inspectors o r ngenls shail be independent oi' the Chning operation and shall be
supervised and accountahlc only to the Tribal Caning Commission.
e.

Renortine of Violations. During ail hours of Gaming operation, the Tribal

Gaming Commission shail.* ensure hot its systems of' internal control are in full rorce m d
ef&cl. Tribnl gaming inspcc~ors
. .. ..
or ~ g ~ n r s s h ahave
l l unrestricted access to ihe Gaming
fbcifiiy during a11 t~oursof(inming operalions and shall bavc inimedizlte and unrestricted
access lo any and all areas oj.'lh~Gaming facility for the purpose of ensuring complimcc
with the provisions of this C:o~npacr and the ordinance, Tile Tribal Gaming Commission
shall require that all inspectors, agents and Gaming employees repor[ immediately to the
T~ibalGaming Conmission any suspec~edviolation(s) of the provisions of this Compact

or of'lhe C)rdinance or regulations. Upon written request which shall he submitted not
more frcquenrly then quarterly. Ihe Tribal Gaming Commission shall submit to the Skate
Gaming Agency

8

list of C i t i n g employees who have been found lo have commirled

acn~alviolations while ibey were employed Tor the Gaming operation and norification ro
the State as to nny ii)rmal action taken by the Tribal Gaming Commission, m.d any civil
or crimind actions thal were Laken against the employees

'
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R, w s df. '. the Grimes,
Thc Tribal
Guming Commission shal~notifytht?:s@te
-,
. . #
,.>;;+.
,

,

,
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Oaming
,
~ -:n i n..i i of
l the rules
.
ofeach Knme operated by the Trill~s
.
und o f,.' k $ c.h a, ~ g e , i n
.,

,

,

such rules. ~umlnariesof the rules of each ggme relevant &>.ther n c ~ o d o ~ ' ,and.ndds
,~. i a ~
,

,,,

,

paid to winning hels shall be visibly displayed or availtitile in panphiel lbrm in the
Gaming facility. Betling li~nitsitpplicable lo any gaming station shall be displayed at
such yarning srtion. Rules for games identified in Section 4 oPthis Compact or changes
to sucli mles shall be based upon such games a colnlnoniy practiced in other ganing
,iurisdictions in the Uniied'Stutes with such variations in the manner of wagering or play
as do not fundamentally alter (he narure of the game

:IS

rhe Tribni Gaming Cornmission

may approve. Rulcs for g m e s identified in Secdon 4 oi'tllis C~>mpact
or changes to such

rules o r h i s Coxnpact shall be submit~edc~o
the State Gaming Agency for review. in the
event the Slate Gaming Agency has concrms in regard

to

a change in the mles. it sl~ali

submit such concerns lo the Tribal CSuming Commissioll Tor its review and comment.
The Tribes will provide the Sratc Gaming Agency with ten (10) days' advance notice of
inodificptioll
..
thered and will providc adequue notice to
the rules or each ga,me....,and
..
any
. ,..
patrons ofthe Gtiming'lkcility to advise rhem of the applicable rules in effect.
,

Annual Meeline. In order lo Sosicr a posilive anti effecrive relationship in

carrying oul iu,d cnforciig the provisions of this Compact. represcn~ativesor the Tribes
(including the X b a l Gaming Commission and the Craning manager) and the Srate
Gaming Agenq shall meet, nor less than on an annual basis. to review past practices and
exalnine methods to improve the regularory progzam created by this Compact. T h t
meetings shall rake place or a locatjon ~nutuallyagreed upon hy r11e Tribal G m i n g
Commjssjon and the State Gaming Agency. The Srate Gaming Agency and the Tribal
Cituning (:ommission shall disciose 10 h c h other at such tl>eetings any and all suspected
activities or pending mallers reasonably believed to constirute violations of this C:o~npact
by any person or enterprise.
9.

Gaming License Procedure

.

:,
>
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Document 1

.Gamin:
... . Operations. The qaming operarions negotiated
bhy 'this Compact
. . ,. .~
.., .
ii

,

. :,.,,

.

,

sllall be licens,ddby the Tribal Gaming, Commission pursuant to thereqyjrcni~ntsof the
~unlinglicensing procedures of lliis C o m p a ~privr
~ to tile ccirnn~ence~nent
.
of. operations.
...:
,

Thelicensing of' the Gaming operation shall include thc lioensing of each principal and o f
each 1:ey employee.
I).

Manufacturers and Distributors of (iunli~irDevices. Each n1anufacturer

and distributor of gaming devices permitted and defined under this Compac~n d their
principals shall be required to he licensed by the Tribal Gaming Co~nmissionpursumt Lo
Lhe requirements ofthis Compact prior to the distribution of any gaming device for use or
play in the Gaming licilirp; provided. however. illat the 'T'ribal (.kilning Co~nrnissionmay
determine suitability o f u n~anuracrureror distributor througk verification of' its good
standing in axnother jurisdiction where ga~ablingis legal.
c.

Persons Fumishlne Craminn Services. The Tribal Gaming Commission may

require a finding of suitability or require the licensing of' any other person o r enti~ywho
furnishes gaming services. property or an exrension of credit to the Gaming operation or
who has other material invnlvernenl with the Gaming operation. Any agreement between

the Gumins operation and a person or enterprise that has been found unsuitable. has been
ticnied n license, or has had a license revoked by tile Tribal Ciaming Coxnmissio~~
si~allbe
i~nrnediat.elyrendered null and void without liability to the Tribes.
d.

m. All

npplications for each principal, key omployee. vendor.

manufacturer and distributor ol'gaming devices shall he made on Corms furnished by the
Tribal Ga~ning Co~nmission and shall he accompanied by the application and
investigative fees ser forth in the 'Tribes' published schedule of' fees. Such application
Soms shall require. but not be limited lo. complete infinnation and deta41s with respect lo

the applicant's habjls, characrer, crimi~ialrecord, business activities. financial affsirs and
business associutes. covering at icasr a I 0-ycir pcriod immediately preceding ihe date of
filing of the applicalion.
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~6ti%cation
::_. :_
..
lo State
of Ciamine
En~piovees. 'Re Tribal
Gaining
. ,:..,.
, ,
, , .
.
.,.< , ..'

e.

:.,;

8 , ' .

C:oinmission shill
..
submit
, ,

:i

I

c1nl7ioyces

LO

]is\ ol' the licensgd and tviq?orarily
licensed 5zad2i?,g
,..
.

rhc Slate Ciaming Agsncy on a inonthly basis. The Tribal Chninb

Cynmission allull include tile iicensce's co~npletename. A.K.A.. social security number
and dale oi'birrli in its .submission to the Statc Gaming Agency. In the event the State
Cioming Agency has il concern aboui a particular temporarily licensed gaming empioyce.
t11e State Gaining Agency shall submit in writing to the Tribal Gaming Commission a
requesl for the licensee's epplicaiion so rl~arthe State Gaming ' ~ g e n c ymay complete irs
ow11 hackgro:rortnd investigation on

21

paniodar individual.

Tl~e Tribal Gaming

withir) ten (10) business days of
Commission shall submit the requcstad applicatio~~

reccipl of' the request. The State Gaming Aiency may. at its sole ens1 and expense.
commence an investigation and

ir i(tloes so, the results

of the investigation shall be

sublnitled to the Tribal Gaming Commission in a timely manner. The 'Tribal Gaming
~oinmissionm q grant. deny. condition. limit or revoke ally license or finding of
s u i t & i d i , ~ for r y cause it. deems
,
,
reasonable.

1:

.

Notification of Appiicant. The 'Tribal Gaming Cotlunission shall establish

reasonable time lines in regard

LO

rrotificmion

to

an appIilic<m~ol'the action taken in regard

~o a licerlsing decision rnade by rile Tribal Gaming Commission. The applicanl shall nor
he entitled lo receivc a copy of the Stale Gaming Agency's invesliptive report or m y

repons c!r material developed by thc Tribal Gaming

in conneclion wilh the

application. The Tribal Gaming Commissior~shall not grant an application for a license

or n iinding of sui~abiliryunless it is salisfied that:
(I)

The applicant is of good chwucter. honesty and i n ~ e ~ t y :

(2)

' h e applicant's prior activities, criminal record (if' any), rcputatiun.

habits and associa~ionsdo not pose 11 threat to the public interest oftile Tribes or the State
or thc clTective regulation and control of' gming pursuanl lo this Compttct. or create or
cnliance the dangers of unsuitable. unfair or illegal practices. metlmds and activities in thc

.
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conduct of $pxj.in$
or tlic carrying or1 of the t)usiness and lipancial
arriiq@nenrs
., ,.
..
incidental tilereto:
:?

<

5)

In all other respects. Lhe applicant is quafifiod lo be iicensed or found

suitable with the provisions and policies set fitrth in this Compact: and
(4)

The nppiictdnl has adequate l,us~ness probity, competence snd

experience in gaming.

g.

Renorl oSChanm. Afier an entity is licensed and found suitable. it shall

file a report of each change of its corporale officers m d mcmhers ofits board of directors
with the Triha! Gaming Commission.

..Use,

the enrity shall maitltain wilh thc Tribal

Ciarning Commission a1 all times a list of ail persons holding or owning

51 icasl

Len

percenl ( 10%) oi'th'e equity of the entip and lenders or credirors trwed tlz least len percent

(10%) of the book value of the entity. The same process shall kc i'ollowed that is listed
above at "e" for changes in-corporate oficers and ~narnbersof its hoard of directors in the
event there is a change.

1U.

, G o n ~ ~ n t j a I i f y .Information:
,.*..
of
Privilege

a.

Conlidentialjrv. The Tribal Galmius Commission and the SliLle Gaming

Agency shall mainiain

it

file of' licknsed ilppiicanrs obtained pursuant to and in

co~nplicmcewith [hc provisions of' this Colnpaci. including iindings of suirztbility and
employmnt under t11is Compact. together wilh a record ofall action taken with respect ro
those applications. Such file shall include. but not be limited lo information:
(1)

Required by the Tribal Gaming Cormnission or the Stale Gaming

he
Agency to be furnisl~edlo then] under this Compact or the regulations or wl~icl~.may
otherwise obtained relative to the finhnces. earnings or revenue of a manager or any
applicant. person or enterprise that is employed. licensed or round suirabie:

(2)

Pertaining to m applicant's criminal record and background. whjch

bas been funxished to or obtained by t!~eTribo! Gaming Co~mnissionor the State Gaming
Agency from a q source:

,
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the. members of the Tribal Churning Copn"iissi0n or the

Stale (iaming Agency o r the (jamling mtjna,ger by a ~ovcmmentaiqg!ncy.
,.

.

ail

iriformcr. or

on the :Issurance that the idormation will he held in co~ifidence and treated as
confiden~ial:and
14)

Obtained by tile Tribal Gaming Colnmission or rhe Stale G m i n g

Agency Oom a ~nanufslclureror distributor relating la the manuftlcturing of gaming

devices.
h.

Sharing of Inl'omation.

The 'Tribal Gaming Commission and the State

(,-iainln~_.
Age~lcjlmay reveal such inSonnation and d a t ~lo an authorized tigent. oi' any
agency of the united Stnles government. any authorized Stute agency

1)T

any other duly

aulhorized regulatory or law enforcemen1 agency of another stare or tribe.
c.

Noticc or Relc:~se. Notice oi' the release of ini\)rrnation pursuant to the

above provisions may be given to the applicant. person or enrevrise prior lo being
Iicenscd or being h a n d suirable.
d.

-

,Files. The files. records and repons concerning the Tribd

G@n?.i.ne

Cornmission and the Slate Gaming Agency shall be open during regular business hours to
inspeclion b>ieach agency.s authorized agents.
c.

Absaiutc I'rivilege of Required Communications and Docun~ents. Any

conununiculjon or document of n managy. an applicant or a licensee which is required by
this i:hmpact or the Ordinance to he made or truns~nitted to the Tribal Gaming
Coinmission or the' S r m C'riuning Agency. or any ol' their agents or employees. is
absolulely privileged and does not impose liability for defunlalion or constitute a ground
for rccovery in uny civil itction. If sucll a docurnel~lor com~nunicationconrains ;my
infonnorion ihat is privileged pursuant to the laws ol'the State. rhat privilege will not be
waived or l o s ~because the document or com~nunicationis disclosed to thc Tribal Gaming
Cwnmission or State Gaming Agency. or any

or

.

their agents or employees.

Norwifhstnnding the provisions ol' this subsection. the Tribal Gaming Commission and

.

\

the S6~i.eCjamigg .Agency shqll ,n@intain ?I privi1c~d:idf~malion.do.cumex~ts
.
and
,

c~qmnnications
,.
in a ,gecure
. . .,
piice accessible
..:.
onf)) to members of the 'Tribal Cxmnh~g
.
~.
.
:>

,

,

:.

"

Commission and the Sfate @o~n&
". ,.:

i.

Agency
,.
and [heir.nuthari,z?d agents and employees.

I -. . .~
~ l ,i c, > . .a. . ' i cif
l Statc
Puhlic Disclosure Laws.
,r,
. . ..
,

All infbrmation

.. ,

provided hy thi Tribes to the $rate pursuant lo tlie remx or this Compact is provided in
confidence and is LO be kept stricily confidenvial unless disclosure is specifically aqecd lo
I?

the Business Council.

The State will seek to protect the coniideniiality of such

informa$ion. To rlie extent the State is unable to protect the confidentiirlizy of such
inibnntuion. the Tribes' obli$atjori ro provide such infonnation under ihe ternls of this
Co~npaclshall he voidable

11.

the Tribes until suc11 lime as the State is able to protect ihc

Management Contract
The Tribes have no intenlion of hiring an outside management company to manage

the Gulning opwaric)n, in inhe even1 the Tribes choose to engage an ouuide manageme1:llt

campany. the :I%bes and the, $,@!? sh,alinegotiate nmendme~ltsro this Compnct in good
faith pursunnL to the AcL.
12.

Operational Requirements
a.

Internal Control Svstern, in addition lo coinpiiancc with the Qrdinance.

regwlntions and the provisions of this Compact. the Gaming facility shuti be operated
pursuant to an internal control system approved by the Tribal Gaming Commission. The
internal control system shall he designaled ro reasonably ilssure iha~:

(I)

Assets are saf'eparded:

(2)

Fjnsncial records are accurate and reliable:

(3)

'l'ransactians

are performed only in

:iocordance with

the

rnanapernent's uuthorizntion:
(4)

authorization:

Access to assets is permined only in accordance with management's

Record~dacc?untabili(y for qscts
, , is compared with uctvgl assets at

(5)

.

.

reasonuhle intervais at16 uppropriate
,,,.
,
. action is laken with respect to +ny discrepancies; md
,

Functions. duties and responsibiIities are appropriately segregared

(6)

and performed in uccordancc with sound practices by conlpctel)l, qualified personnel.
Required Provisions oi' Internal Control Svstcnl. T l ~ cinternal control

h.

system shall include:

i 1)

An organization chart depicting appropriate segregation of functions

and responsibilities:
(3)

A description of the duties and responsibilities ol' cach posili~)n

shown on the organizational chart: and
(3)

A detailed narrative descriplion of the udrninistrativt: and accoun~ing

procedures desiped to satis& the rcquiremcnts of'subseclion (a).
13.

Public Health and Safety; Fees and Psyments in Lien of Taxes
a.

C:ornnliance. The consrruction. maintenance and opcrillion of the Ciaming

f'acility sl~alicomply with ail federal cmd Tribal codes. laws and regwlations governing
buildings, safety, maintenance. plumbing. firc safety. electricity. cnleriainmcn~.:11cohol
and handling oil food and beverages. The applicable federal nnd Tribal o?ficials charged
with enforcement ot'such codes. lmzsand reguliltionu rnusr he provided access Lo inspect
and ensurc compliance.

in.

Eniergcncy Service Accessibilitv. The Tribes m d the .l'ribal Gaming

Co~nmissionshall make provisions ibr adequaLeemergency accessibili~yand service of
rite Gaming facility.
14.

Tribal Reimbursement for Expenses incurred by the State Canting Agency
ti.

. s-

The Tribes shill1 reimburse the Statc Sor

only iltose expcnses the Stnte incurs as the result oS CullilIing a wrjttcn request of the
Tribes relating to currying oui the responsibilities under This Compact. The Tribes shall

l7.c
, responsible
, ,,;..
IIOL
.
....
.,,:

.

ibr
cqpqnses .(Jlc$late
ma? incur in conneciiori wifh this Compact .tliar
.
,
.
,

,

have no1 been r.~qocstedhy the Tribes.
..
,

Siate'Sha~lSl~bmit
,.
Slatement
. ,
.
ol'Expenses. 'i'lle State shall submil a dctailed

11.

,

statememenl of expenses on it monthly basis lo the Tribal (;timing C?ommission. The Tribes
shall reimburse the Stute within thin? (30) days afier llle receipl o f the statement of
oxpenses
c.

Notice of Obiection ro Expenses. if the Tribes believes that it has been

assessed a charge for services that llavc no1 been requested by the Tribes in writing. or
dial they have heen :lsscssed a charge for services that are not related to the Tribes'
gacning or tha~the charges are not rcasonablc or necessary, they shall notify the State lhat
it ol>,jectsto the chase, if rhe parlies are aoi able

LO resolve

such a dispute. (hey inay

resort to ;~rbitrationas provided in Section 18 of'this Cornpact and tile arbitrator may
allow or disallow the disputed charge.
d.

lnf'on~lulionRegardin., the Stare Budgetine Process, T11s State Gaming

Agency sl~alladvise the Tribcs of its.requ&stsfbr appropriations dealing spmificnlly with
tribal gaming.

Excepr where impracticable due lo exigent circumstances. such

inli)rma~ionshall he provided at leasr two ( 3 ) months prior to sub~nissionof 21 proposed

.4t Llle close orthe iiscal yem (commencingwith the current Tribal fiscal year), the

Tribes shall engage an independent certified public accountam to audit the books and
records oS all Gaming operations conducted under this Compact. The audit shall he
completed within one hundred twenty ( 120) days after the close of the fiscal year. Upon
completion of the audit. the Tribes sf.itlll lorward copies ol' any audit reports and
manqement letters to the State Gaming Agency and shall make. copies of all current
internal accounting nod audit procedures available lo the State upon wrjtten request.
16.

State Oversight of Compact Provisions

11.

Monilorine
..
and inspection. . 'The State Craming Agency. pursuant to thc
.

./, ..., .
<

,.

'

i

provisions of this C:ompact. has the limited :~uthority to monitor qnd inspect the Gaming
operation to ensure thai tl~ei j a m i ~ goperation is conduclod in co~npliancewith the
provisions of this Compact. the Ordinance and applicable rcylations.

In order

10

prope~.iymonitor the Cxa~ningoperation. no more than two 13) agents of' rile State (>aming
.4gency on any given day tilong wirh at feast one member of the 'Sribai Oarning
Cornlnission or ott~ertribal designee shall review and exa~nincany area of the Gaming
operaljon that is directly related to Class 111 p ~ n i n g .Said review and examination shall
no1 interfere wit11 the normal functioning of'thc Gatnjng operation. Said smze agentts)
sl~allhe previously identified as suc11 in writing to rhc 'Tribal Gaming Commission and
shall provide proper identification :IT the time of.' inspection to the appropriare Tribal
represen~atives.
b.

Review and Exmination of Reed, lJpon the completion of any review

nr~dexamination by lile Tribal Gaming Commission or the State Gaming Agency. copies
of'the findings shall he maintained hy both pm'ies and shall be shared iFsn requested.
c,

indewendent Comniiance .4udit.

The Srate Gaming Agency shall be

supplicd with the federally required lndepet~denr .Compliance Audit annually as is
submiutd to the NIGC hy the Tribes. In the event rhe State Gaming Agency has a
concern with the I'ederully required Independent Compliance Audit, the Slate Gaming
Agency shall noti* the Trihui Gaming Commission in wriring and then a j ~ j n Tcffnrt
hetween thc State C.?arninpAgent:' and thc Tribal Gaming Commission shall take place in

the selection of' an independent audilor. Copies ofthe results of the Compliance Audir
shall he submitted lo both gsrning agencies within ten ( 10) days of' completion if possible.
d.

Good Faith. The State shall exercise its rights under this Compact in good

faith und in a manner ihat does not interfere with the day to day operations of the Gaming
facili~y.
17.

Criminal Jurisdiction

a.

Tribiil Criminal
. . .iurisdiction. Except as $limitedby subsection (c) below. in
:,

>

>:,

enforcing the terins find provisions ol'this.Compect and any

ordinance imilementi~gthe

C:ompact. the Tribes shall exercise exclusive criminal Jimsdiction over Indians.
State Criminal Jurisdic~ion. Except as limited by subsection ic) bclow. tn

b.

cnfi)rcing rhe negotiated terms and provisions of' this Con~pact.the SLatc shall exercise
exclusive criminal ,jurisdiction over non-Indians. Tile 'i'ribes ugee to cooperalc with the

State in any criminal investigatioi~being conducted pursuant to this suhsecrion and to
provide any infonnalion in the Tribes' posserrsion ~.elativeto n crilnjnal proceeding being
conducted i ~ ytile State. For purposes of' State cnrorccment. all State crilninal laws and
such laws as hereafter amended pennining

LO the

liccnsing, regulation or prohibititm ol'

gallling and gambling which are not incortsis~ent with this Compact. including the
sanctions associated with such laws. are adopted and incorporated herein by reference.
c.

Federal Criminal Jurisdiction. Nothing contained herein shall bc deemed in

modi@ or ljlnjt existing federal criminal jurisdinion over the Ganing ctperarion
negotiated under this Compact or over individuals who commit gaming-related offenses.
I,$.

General Dispute Resolution

'Thc I'ollowing resol~~tionprocess. iucludi~lg b u ~not limiied

to

the judicisl

resolution irrocess. si~allapply exclusively for the resolntion of issues {arising under the
pn~visionsof Illis Compact.
a.

Com~iiance. If eitllkr party believes the designated rcprcsentarive of' the

orher party hus ihiled to comply wit17 any of the provisions ol' this Cornpdct, it shall
invoke the following procedure:

(I)

Informal Dispute Resointion.
(.4)

The pwty asserting noncompliance sllall serve wrinen norice

upon the other party. Tlle party asserting the noncotnpliance shall identi& the specifk
provision of this Compact alleged to have heen violared and shall specif), the factual basis

thereof.

'Phc: Stare and the Tribes shali thereafter meet withill ren I::]0) days in an efton to
..

rcsolve tho dispute.
IS the dispute i s nor resolved to the satisfaction of the parties

iB)

within thirty (30) days atier the service ol'tile notice set forth above, either party may
pursue the remedies below:

(3)

.bbirration,
If'ageement canno1 bc reached. such issues shall he submitted to

hinding arbiuation us follows:
(A)

Either party shall serve written notice of inient lo arbitrate on

the olbcr parry on the final day of negotitltion. The party serving notice of intent to

arbitratc.shal1 identi8 the specific provision(s) of this Compaci and/or issues. which shall
bc submitted for arbit~ation.

(B)
arbirate provide

:I

Both parties shall witllin five (5) days of' notice of intent to

list of five ( 5 ) names 0.l' individuals svailable as prospective

arbitrators. Each party shall. within five ( 5 ) days of the receipt of the other party's list.
select

3

person from that list as an arbitrator. Within Len (10) days of their selection.

hese two individuals sl~allselecl a third arbitrator from a iisl of not less than five (5)
nominees kom an independent arbitrators' or alternative dispure resolution organization.
If the individuals do not ilpte upon such organization. it shall he tlte American
Arhitrarion Association. The State and the Tribes agree that rhe arbitrators shall be
required to submil their decision within ninety (90) days of The seidction of the third
arbitrator.
(C)

The arbilrators shall have authority lo issue such orders and

decisions as shall he reasonably necessary or desirable

10

bring about an expedirious

decision consisran1 with the judicial tlecisior~made in the initial declaratory jud-ment
action brougl~tpursuant to Section 5 ,

('D)

Except as provided by Seclipn 4. ttie ~ r i b e s,,
.,

...

.,

POL

to

conduct. ga~oespursuanl to Secrion S(c)(?) until the completion of&bitra~6n.However.

if coaclasion ol' the. arbitration process is deiilyed for uny reason. the arbitrators !nay
permil gaming on such ierms as they determine pending conclusjon of' arbitration.

IE)

Arbitration expenses will be billed equally to tile respective

parties.

(F) Except as may bc delcrmined by a federal court. whitration
decisions shall have the silme effect ns if a part of this Cotnpact. and are incorporated in
full herein. 'They sI1u1l be in effect unless and until detortnined otherwise by a federal
coun.
(G') Nothing herein shall preclude the parties S~omagreeitxg to an

alternate I'onn of dispute resolution.
(3)

&ial
(A)

Resolution.
Ilpon completion of the informal dispute resolution process of

suhseclibn ( I ) and (3). both the Sfate and ~tlreTrihes consent lo the Jurisifiction [if fhe

LJni~edSlates Federal Court. District of Idaho. Ibr the resolutjon of any dispute arising
rrom waivilies governed by this C O ~ ~ B C I .

(B) If the Tribes do not consent lo Sederal court jurisdiction with
respect to any ac~ionbrought by the State of Idaho to enforce the provisions of this
Compact. tile State shall notifv the Secretary of the Interior of that fact and shall mdil a
copy of'said nolice to the NTGC and the Tribes. This Co~npilctshall be nufi md void five

(5) business drys afler the Tribes' receipt of sucli notice. unless the Tribes consent to
federal courtfurisdiction within thwt time.
(C)

wid) respect

to

IS the State refuses to consent to federal cowl jurisdiction

any action hrought by the Tribes to enforce the provisions of this

Cornpila. the Tribes shall notify the Secretary of the lnterior of that fact and sllall mail a
copy ol'such noticc' to the Natiorlal Indian Gaming Co~nmissionand to h e Staee. Unless

the Starc c$nses?ts
.
coun juripdjctkjp ,within five f Sj days o.f7,r$,Gcipt
..
qf such
to .,federal
.,
.. ..
, ..)I

1

...

.

.*.

_

g

..

,,.

,

notice. lilt reiief requested by the Tribcs h ils ~ o m $ i a i ntiled
~ with the iizd$&i:courtshall
.,, . ...

be dcerned frdnled ilnd incblp6rilted inlo this
.. C ~ n p t i cas
t iSfuilp set. ibrth herein.
,

(4)

No ~ h i r dPnflv &hts.

States to bring an nclion for enforcement.ol'the terms ol'this C:omnpact.
Post Compact Meetinxs. The Trihes and the Statc a p e lo Ineel

periodica~l~
as may be needed in an eeffor~to enhance good relations and to facilitate [he
orderly.operarion ctl'lbe nlatlers addressed in this Compact
1'9.

Reservation of Rights ilader the Act
a.

Status o f Class 11 Gaming. Nothing in this Compacr shall he deemed to

affect the operation by r.he Tribes ol'any Cluss il gaming as defined in the Act. whether
conduc~edwithin or without the Ganing fhcilit), or gaming facilities. or to confer upon
the Stale any Jurisdiction over such Class II gaming conducted by the Tribes.
b.

No Aulhorixation to Tax. Except 8s provided in Section 14. nothing in this

Compact shall be deemed to authorize the Sate or any polilical subdivision thereof' to

irnposc cny tax. fee. chnrge or assessmen1 upon the Tribes or the Gaming operarion.
Nothing in this Compact shall authorize or pennit the colleclion and pdymenl ol' any
Idnho tax. or contrihulion in lieu of'taxes or fees on or measured by gaming rransaclions.
l~arninpdevices permitted under this Compact. gross or net Gaming revenues. or the

.2

Trihes' nct incoinc. Nothing in his Scction is intended co affect the State's right lo lax
income as perrnittcd hy law.
c.

Preservatjon or Tribal Self-Government. Except as set forth in this

Compact. nothing shall be deemed to authorize the State or any political subdivision
thereol' to regulate in any manner thc govcrnnlent of the Tribes, including the Tribal
Gaming Coinmission, or to interfere in any manner with dte Tribes' seleclion of' its
cvovernlaent ol'iicers. including n~embersof the Tribal Gaming Commission.

C

!

Nothing hercin shail be inf&pyeted as

providing standing to any person or enliy other ihan the Tribes. thc State, or the Uni~ed

(5)

i

i

1i

1
!

j

20.

~ ~ * ,,..r g $ iofnS ~ t ~0tter-y
e
,

?

.

..:

.

.,,,.

Tile idhho ~tnte~htrery.
.,, ..,
which includes Idaho State Lofiery vendois. nigy operate
,.
,. .. .,

, .

.,

,

.,

.

within tlie Fort ililll Indian i';~s'enrationsubject to the terns and conditions listid beiow:
The ldallo Statc Lottery tnay operate only with tlic Tribes' permission, and

a.

the Tribes inay rescind permission aL the sole discretion of the Tribes:
The Idaho State Lottery must honor any requirements or conditions that the

b.

Trihes may require: and
c.

The Tribes will provide the Idaho State Lottery thirty (30)days' wrinen

notice ol'any requirements. condilions. or withdra~valof permission io opernte in order lo
allow the ldaho Stake Lonery adequate time to fully coinply with any 'Tribal requirements.
21.

Consent does rot constitute a waiver'

Consent by either ptrty to jurisdiction of the ikderal courts in any one action shall
not constitute a waiver offuture ri-ghts to assert a lack of.jurisdiction in any other action.
2 .

Severability
Each provision. section und subsection of this Compact shall stand separate and

independent of evcv oilier provision. section and subsection. In the cvenr that a federal
court finds anv provision. section or subsection ol' this Cornpact to he invalid. the
remaining provisions. sections and subsections of this Compact shall remain in full force
and eficc~.
23.

Notices
All notices requiced or authorized to hc served under this Co~npucrshall be served

by certified mail. rcturn receipt requested. by co~nmercialovernight courier service or hy
personal delivery at the foliowing addresses:
Statc:

State Gaming Age~eecy
c/o Director. Idaho State Lottery
1199 Shoreline Lane. Suite 100
Boise, ID 83702

Tri h:s:

($l~airm&n,i;orl I.lal1 Busir>essi'cluncii

.$l~iisf&&
, . .'. . . .:,:. ,J&&iifiock
Trihes
,,

,?:dl. I 3 2 ) ~306
FO;~

I-r*lf. ID 83203

Chairman. Shosl~one-L3annockGaming Com~nission
P.O. Box ion1
I:oflri. l-iall. 1U S3'03
Effective Date and Duratio~l

54.

a.

Efi'eclivc Date. This Compact shall hecome effective upon execution hy

the C+:i-avernorof the State snd the Chairman of the Tribes. and upon certification by the
Governor !ha( the legislature has n~tiiiedlhc compacc and authorized waiver of tbc State's
Eleventh Amcndmcni immurlify. upon cenificarion hy the 'Tribal Chairman t11al Ihe Tribes
have adopted a resolution authorizing wajver of sovercigc i~nmonityand upon approved
hy rhe Secretary oi' tile Interior and puhlica~ionin the Federal Register pursuant lo thc
Act.

.

I.

Renerolimion. 'I-he Slate and the Tribes may, by appropriate itnd lawful

means. request nego~iationsto mnend or repiace this C:omp:~ot. in the cvenr of a request.
Sor rcnegotiation:tliis Con~paclslitill rem:~in i n erect until renegotiated or replacod. Such
requesn shall he in writing itnd shall be sent by certified mail lo the Governor oi'ihe Siate
or the C h a i m a i oSthe'Tribcs al the appropriate goveminental office.
c.

Chanresin Fcderal E~IM'.111 the .event federal law resarding guming on

Indian Lwds shall ci~dnge~
any provision of'this Cornpila which may be inconsistent with
such changc s11nli be void only to ihc extent necessary to confhrm to said change.
d.

Garncs Conducred hv Orher Trihes irr Idaho.

111

t l ~ cevent my other Indian

tribe is permitted hy compact. or li~lalcourf decision lo conduct iiny Clms 111 games in
Idaho in nddition lo those famcs perrnincd by ~rlisCompncr. this Compact shall be
amended to pennir

tile

'l'ribcs lo conduct those same additional canes. A final courl

linnl
,..,
dqcision
..,
of a Scderai coun or Idaho court once it is no longer
decision sl1qj1 lileon,s
.
,

, . ,

..

c@p$bleof: ch~nge
by recon'sidetation. appeal. rtrvieu..or rcrciorc~r;.
.:
?

25.

.4meniIments
This Compact cannot he amended excepl in writing by the State and the Tribes as

provided in Secticm 23.

2.

Entire Agreement
'This Compact contains the entire agreemen1 ol' the paflies hereto with respect to

rhe matters covered by this Compacl and no other statenlent. agreement or promise made
h!. any party. officer or agency

of any party sl~allhe valid or binding. 'rile Tribes and the

Stale sliall not enter irito any other coinpact affecting ihe Gaming operation. excepl as
a~nctiriedto this Cornpiict us provided hereinabove.

27.

Governing Law
This Compact shall be governed by and construed in accctrdance with the lnws of

the Ilnited States
28.

Triplicate Originals
This Co~npac~
shall bc cxecuted in triplicale originals. ol~cfor cach of the

s i p n ~ ~ ~ r[Tach
e s . and ail are equaliy valid.

29.

Authority to Exccutc
Each ot'lhe undersigned represents that 11c or she is duly authorized and 11% the

aulhorji?

LOexecute this

Compact on belrr~lfol'lhe pany for whom he or shc is signing.

IN WTTNESS WHEREOF. the parlies have executed this Co~npiicton the day and

year set forth hclow.

SHOSHONE-BANNOCIC TIUBES

Daicd: F e b r u a ~18.
~ 3000

Dated: I'ebrt~ant 18. 2610
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Case 4:Ol-cv-00052-BLW Document "Filed

01/31/2001

Page 43 of 44

Dated: ?'ebruanr 18,3000

CERTIFICATION OF AI.ITHORIZATION TO
WAIVE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
1 I-IEREBY CERTIFY the( the Tribes have adopted a rcsolutio~lauthorizing waiver
oi'sovereign immurti~as contcmpla~edin this Colnpact.

Dated: Februiw 111.3000

CERTIFICATION OF I,EGlSLA'ITVE IWrIFICATION
AND
AUTHORIZATION TO WAIVE ELEVENTI4 AMENDIUIEN'I' IMMUNITY
1 HEREBY CERTIFY dial the Legislalrrre of the State oi'ldaho has cnactcd u
statute rati%ing this Compact iutd authorizing the waiver oS Eleventh Amendmen!
immunity as conletnpiated in this Compact

Daied: Februarv 18.20QO
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EXHIBIT 5
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DATED April 9,2004
(filed on April 12,2004 in Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. State of Idaho et
al., Nos. CIV 01-52-E-BLW & CIV 01-171-E-BLW @. Idaho))
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Case 4:01-c"-

6

fjHQ$MQ,NE-BARNQCK
, ,: . . . .
TWES, 1
a f&aerallyre&gnii$d. tribe,
)
)

1

Plaintiff,

)

t'

Filed 04/*~04

.

.

.

,. .,.

p a g e 1 of 19

J
Case Nos. CV-01-052-E-BLW
C V - O ~~, . I~ - E ~ L W
(Consolidated Cases)

1

v.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

)
STATB OF IDAHO and the IDAHO )

1

STATE LOTTERY,

)
)
)

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO and the IDAHO )
STATE LOTTERY,
1
Plaintiffs,

1
1
1

v,

)
)
SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES, )

a federally recognized tribe; the
FORT HALL BUSINESS
COUNCIL; and the SHOSHONEBANNOCK TRIBAL GAMING
COMMISSION,

1
)
)

1
)

Defendants.

1

Pending before the Court are Plaintiffmefendant Shoshone-Bannock
Tribes' ("Tribe") and DefendantsIPlaintiffs the State of Idaho's and the Idaho

-

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 1

.

'.,

.

.

.

.

,

.

.$he jsjuetd;be
...
decide$ in this.
.. case
.
is wh@&r:the
. .
..
~rib,e:@fidth$:Stateiof
.. .
.;..
,:.
....: . .
.,:

:

.

,

,,

(

,

..

.

Jd.&o must reegotiate their existing ~ r i b a i - ~ t ~. t e ' ~ ~ m ~ ~ ~ t .before
( ~ ~ othe
~pact")
,

Tribe is permitted to operate tribal video gaming machines, as defined by 1.C. -$
67-429B. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that the Compact does not
require. the Tribe and the State of Idaho to enter into renegotiations before the
Tribe is authorized to conduct gaming using tribal video gaming machines.
Therefore, the Court will grant the Tribe's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
and deny the State of Idaho's Motion for P~artialSummary Judgment.

BACKGROUND
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1Yg8 ("IGRA"), 25 U,S.C. $5 27012721, provides a comprehensive Eramework for regulating gaming on Indian land.
The IGRA divides Indian gaming into three classes, each subject to varying
degrees of tribal, state and federal regulation, Class I gaming is defined as social
games for prizes of minimal valuc?, and traditional forms of Indian gaming
conducted as part of tribal ceremonies and celebrations. 9: 2703(6), Class I gaming
is within the exclusive jurisdiction of Indian tribes and is not subject to state or

federal regulation. $2710(a)(l). Class I1 gaming includes bingo and related

-
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gaming or class U gaming."

II

2703(8). Class I11 gaming activities may be

conducted on Indian lands only ifit is conducted in conformance with a TribalState compact.

5 27XO(d)(l).

I

On February 18,2000, the Tribe and State of Idaho entered into a Compact

II

pursuant to the IGRAq2The Compact governs "the licensing, regulation and
operation of Class I11 gaming conducted by the Tribe[] on lndian Lands located

I

within the State [of Idaho] . . . ." Complaint Ex. A at 5 (Docket No. 1). The
parties "agreed that the conduct of Class I11 gaming under the terms and
conditions set forth [in the Compact would] benefit the Triben and protect the
citizens of the Tribe[] and of the State [of Idaho] . . . ." Id at 4.
Section Four of the Compact authorizes the Tribe to conduct: any Class I11

gaming activitjl "that the State of Idaho 'permits for any purpose by any person,
organization, or entity,' as the phrase is interpreted in the context of the Indian

' The parties do not dispute that the tribal video gaming machines at issue in this case fall
under the definition of Ciaas 111gaming.

On September 8,2000, the Compact was approved by the Secretary of the Interior as
required by $2710(d)(8). See 65 Fed. Rog. 54541 (Sept. 8,2000).

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3
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I

c gaming [i.e. Class I11

specifically, I&hotook th

gaming] currently conducted by the Tribe[] in Idaho is an imitation of casino
games and prohibited under Idaho and federal law .

. . ," See id. at 6. The Tribe

disagreed. See id As a consequence, the parties included in the Compact a
provision allowing either party to seek a declaratoryjudgment to determine the
types of Class TI1 games authorized by the Compact. See id at 8. Accordingly, on
January 3 1,2001, and on April 18,2001, the Tribe and the State of Idaho
respectively filed suit in this court seeking declaratory relief. See Shoshoute-

Bannock Tribes v. Idaho,CV-01-52-E-BLW, Idaho v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes,
CV-01-171 -E-BLW.On May 4,2001, the Court consolidated the two cases
pursuant to a stipulation between the parties. See Scheduling Order (Docket No.
12).
Shortly aRer the Tribe filed suit, the parties notified the Court that if Idaho
Senate Bill 1211 (2001), then pending, was passed, the Court could either dismiss
this case or stay the action, Senate Bill 1211 would have allowed Indian Tribes to
operate "tribal gaming devices" if the Tribe had a valid Tribal-State Compact in

-
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focus of this case, Compare S . 1211 jj 4,56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2001); with
1.C. jj 67-429B. The pasties stipulation to dismiss the case if Senate Bill 1211 was

passed included a provision requiring the Tribe to limit the aggkgate number of
tribal gaming devicesJmachines to that of certain other Idaho tribes. This
ageement never came to fruition however, as Senate Bill 1211 was defeated by a
vote of 15 to 20 in the Idaho Senate on March 26,2001. See S . 121I, 56th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2001); see also Declaration of Scott Crowell, Ex. D (Docket No.

32).
A little over a year later, on June 26,2002, the parties again informed the
Court that pending legislation could render this entire action moot. See
Stipulation at 3 (Docket No. 15). On May 9,2002, the Idaho Secretary of State
certified a voter initiative that included a provision authorizing Indian Tribes to
conduct gaming using "tribal video gaming machines." The initiative was placed
on the November 2002 ballot and was referred to as "Proposition One." Section
Two of Proposition One, the findings and purposes clause, noted that Tribes have

suffered from a disproportionate amount of unemployment and poverty and that
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5

reservations." See Proposition One, Indian Gaming and Self-Relimce Act,
(November 5, 2002), available at
http://www.idsos.state.id.ua/electlinits/02init01 .htm; see also Declaration of Scott

Crowell, Ex. F at 1-2 (Docket No. 32); Stipulation Att. A at 3 (Docket No. 15).
Section Two went on to state that:

Due to differences in opinion over the interpretation of
Idaho law, , , , tribes face legal uncertainties about the
types of gaming machines they can operate on Indian
lands. This uncertainty threatens the future of lndian
ga~l~g1~~.d~6~-d.th't?"abilit.Y~~rF.tfie8e~~ibes-to
continue
their progress toward economic self-reliance.
Attempts by the tribes and the governor to resolve these
legal uncertainties have failed, jeopardizing the future of
tribally-funded education, health care, and social service
programs. Therefore, the citizens ofIdaho desire to secure
the future of tribal gaming on Indian lands in Idaho
themselves through this ballot measure.
This ballot measure clarifies that it is the public policy of
the State of Idaho that Indian tribes can continue to operate
the types of lottery-style gaming machines currently used
at Indian gaming facilities on Idaho reservations under the
terms of this act.

Id. As is evident by Clause Two of Proposition One, voters were aware of the
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6
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I

I

Section 429B of Title 67 of the ldaho Code allows "Indian Tribes , . . to
conduct gaming using tribal video gaming machines pursuant to state-tribal
gaming compacts which specifically permit their use." I.C. ij 67-429B(1). This
section also defines what a "tribal video gaming machine" is. See id. Section

429C of Tifle 67 of the Idaho Code provides a mechanism for Tribes to amend
their Compact to lLspecifically"permit the use of tribal video gaming machines.
See 1.C. $ 67-42%. Shortly after Proposition One was passed the Coeur d'Alene

Tribe, the Kootenai Tribe, and the Nez Perce Tribe, followed the procedures
outlined in 4 429C in order to amend their Tribal-State Compacts to specifically
authorize the use of tribal video gaming machines, See Affidavit of Miren E.
Artiach, Exs. 1-3 (Docket No. 36). Those tribes' compacts now provide that the

tribes may conduct gaming using tribal video gaming machines. See id; I.C. 8

'

Shortly afier Proposition One was passed, it was challenged as unconstitutional under
the Idaho State Constitution. The Supreme Court however, declined to rule on the matter
holding that it did not have original jurisdiction to hear the case. See Bell v. Cenurrusa, No.
29226 (Idaho Junc 5,2003), available at http:!/www.isc.idaho.gov!opinions/29226.pdf
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7

114

I

,.

:

~fhy+$jt0
,

.

,

.

e d f &aho:no<longertakes the
ly precludedfi~musing
tribal video gaming machines. Rather, the State says that before the Tribe may
utilize such machines the Tribe must submit to renegotiations concerning the
terns of the Compact, Presumably, the State of Idaho would like to amend the
Compact to provide more regulations that specifically address tribal video gaming
machines, The State of Idaho relies upon Section 24(d) of the Compact to support
its argument. Section 24(d) is a "most favored nations" clause that states: "In the
event any other-Indian-tribeis-pemitted~bycompaot or-final court decision?^
conduct any Class 111 games in Idaho in addition to those games permitted by this
compact, this Compact shall be amended to permit the Tribes to conduct those
same additional games." See Complaint Ex. A at 30 (Docket No. 1 ) (emphasis
added). The State of Idaho argues that Section 24(d) requires that the Compact be
amended before the Shoshone-Bannock Tribe is authorized to use tribal video
gaming machines. The State also argues that the amendment process necessarily

The Shoshone and Bannock Tribes is a single federally recognized Indian Tribe; hence,
the reference to "Tribes" although plural at first glance, is a reference to a single entity.

-
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any other tribe in the State #Idaho is allowed to conduct. Therefore, the Tribe
argues that, regardless of Section 24(d), no amendment is necessary given the fact
that other tribes located in the State of Idaho are permitted to usetribal video
gaming machines, Alternatively, the Tribes argue that even if Section 24(d)
requires the Compact to be amended before the Tribes are allowed to offer tribal
video gaming machines, it does not require the Tribe to submit to renegotiations.
Rather, the Tribe argues that at most, Section 24(d) requires a brief amendment
clarifying that the tribe is authorized to conduct gaming using tribal video gaming
machines. The Tribe asserts that such an amendment should be adopted
automatically and is not contingent upon renegotiating other pafls of the Compact.

DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the afidavits, if

any, show that there i s no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). This
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1
!

A tribal-state compact is ehujvalent to a contract. See Texas v. New Mexioo,
I

482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987) ('"a Compact is, after all, a contract") (quoting Petty v.

Tennessee-MissouriBridge Comm 'n, 359 U.S. 275,285 (1959)); Crow Tribe of

Indians v. Racicot, 87 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying contract law to
tribal-stat0 compact), Summaryjudgment is an appropriate device for resolving
the issues presented by the parties as issues relating to contract interpretation are
generally questions of law, See DiamondFruit Growers, Inc. v. Krack Corp.,794
F.2d 1440, 1442 (9th Cir. 1986). Only if the contract in question is ambiguous,

does it present a question of fact. See Nat '1 Union Fire IBS.Co. of Pittsburgh

Penn,v. Argonaut Ins.Co., 701 F.2d 95,97 (9th Cir. 1983). "The fact that the
parties dispute a contract's meaning does not establish that the contract is
ambiguous; it is only ambiguous if reasonable people could find its terms
susceptible to more than one interpretation." See Klamath Water Users Protective
Ass 'n v, Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9h Cir. 2000).
Section Twenty-Seven of the Compact contains a choice of law provision
that states: "This Compact shall be governed by and construed in accordance with
the laws o f the United States." Hence, the Court finds that federal law governs the

-
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1

Unitedstates, 880 F.2d 1018, 1032<(9thCir, 1989).
"Contract terms are to be given their ordinary meaning, and when the terms
of a contract are clear, the intent of the parties must be ascertained &om the
contract itself,'' See Klumuth Water Users Protective Ass 'n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d
1206, 1210 (9th Cir, 2000). In addition, "'[a] written contract must be read as a
whole and every part interpreted with reference to the whole."' See id. (quoting
Shakey 's hc.v. Covalt, 704 F.2d 426,434(9th Cir. 1983)). "[Aln interpretation
which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is
preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawhl, or of no
effect." Restatement (Second) of Contracts 6 203 (1981). However, "when
provisions are inconsistent, specific terms control over general ones." S. Caf. Gas
Co. v. Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885,891 (9th Cir. 2003);see also Restatement

(Second) of Contracts S; 203 (1 981)
As was stated above, the issue presented to the Court is whether the Tribe
and the State of Idaho must renegotiate their existing Tribal-State Compact
("Compact") before the Tribe is permitted to operate tribal video gaming

-
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dispute the fact that the Coeur d'Alene Tribe,the Kootenai Tribe, and the Nez
Perce Tribe legally operate tribal video gaming machines within the State of
Idaho. Hence, both parties agree that Section Four authorjzes the Tribe to also
operate tribal video gaming machines. The real dispute centers upon Section
24(d) of the Compact. Section 24(d) states:

Games Conducted by Other Tribes in Idaho, In the event
any other Indian tribe is permitted by compact or final
coirt decision to conduct any Class 111games in Idaho in

. . @ d d ~ ~ i @ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t k ~ ~ ~t i i~s g ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Compact shall.be amended to permit the Tribes to conduct
those same additional games. A final court decision shall
mean a final decision ofa federal court or Idaho court once
it is no longer capable of change by reconsideration,
appeal, review or certiorari.
Complaint Ex. A at 30 (Docket No. 1). The State of Idaho argues that this
provision explicitly requires the Compact to be amended prior to the Tribe being
authorized to operate tribal video gaming machines. In response, the Tribe argues
that Section 24(d) is moot in light of the Ninth Circuit's recent ruling in Artichoke

game dffered by another tribe located in Idaho regardless if the TGRA was
interpreted such that thephrase "any person, organization, or entity" did not
include an Indian tribe. The Tribe asserts that ifArtichoke Joe's had been
decidedly differently, Section 24(d) would have provided the Tribe with the means
to amend their Compact to offer any Class III gaming offered by other tribes
located in Idaho. However, given the decision in Artichoke Joe's, the Tribe argues
that Sectibn 24(d)is moot. 'Hence, tfie Tribe argues that Section'Fdur'is the only
provision relevant to the present issue.
The Court, however, cannot accept the Tribe's argument in the absence of
evidence that this was the meaning attached to Section 24(d) by the parties. See
Restatement (Second) of Contracts fj 212 Comment (b) (1981). As a consequence,
the Court must decipher the meaning of Section 24(d) from the text itself. See
Klamath Water Users Protective Ass 'nv. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir.
2000).

-
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lass 111gaming conducted by
o'fher tribes in the State oFIdaho, why would an amendment ever be necessary
under Section 24(d)? The Court can decipher no reason other than that the parties
intended that any enlargement of Section Four be expressed in writing. Section 25
of the Compact provides that the "Compact cannot be amended except in writing
by the State and Tribe[] as provided in Section 23." Complaint Ex. A at 3 1
(Docket No, I), Section 23 provides that "all notices required or authorized to be

tEig,compa6 .gh&IIII
be.SeNc,,, upoh .sKe'.18~ State Cariiihg Agemy
and the Chairman of the Fort Hall Business Council. Complaint Ex. A at 29-30
(Docket No. 1). Section 23 does not outline any other procedures for amendment.
See id, Noticeably absent from Sections 23,24(d), and 25, are any requirements

that, prior to an amendment, the parties must renegotiate any part of the Compact.
Therefore, the Court finds that Sections 23,24(d), and 25, are merely
administrative provisions requiring the Tribe to serve upon the Idaho State
Gaming Counsel a brief amendment clarifying that the Tribe is authorized to

-
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certainty as to the type of gaming allowed under the Compact. This interpretation
is consistent with $ 203 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts as it gives
meaning to every provision of the Compact.
Furthermore, the Court finds that Section 24(d) is not ambiguous such that
the Court would be required to consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent
behind this provision. Rather the Court finds that, because Section 24(d) states
that an amendment "shrall" be made and there being no language to the effect that
such an amendment is conditioned upon renegotiation, Section 24(d) clearly does
not require the parties to enter into negotiations prior to adoption of a Section
24(d) amendment. As a consequence, the State may not decline to accept the
amendment on the grounds that the amendment was not negotiated. Had the State
of Idaho desired that amendments pursuant to Section 24(d) be conditioned upon
negotiation, it could have easily inserted langaage to that effect. Inasmuch as the
State of Idaho invites the Court to write such a condition into the Compact, the
Court declines the offer.

-
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The Court must also disagree with the State of Idaho's argunlent that
Seciion 24(b) of the Compact requires the parties to engage in negotiations prior
to adoption of a Secrion 24(d) amendment. Section 24(b) provides Piat either the
. .
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Compact. Nowhere in Section 24(d) is there a reference to Section 24(b). Section
24(b) addresses only those situations where either the Tribe or the State of Idaho

would like to m e n d the Compact, not where they must amend the Compact.
Pursuant to Section 24(b), the State may request that the Tribe negotiate additional

regulations concerning the tribal video gaming machines, but the State may not
delay adoption of a mandatory Section 24(d) amendment because negotiations
entered into under Section 24(b) are ur~resolved.~

CONCLUSION
After carefully reviewing the record and the law, the Court concludes that
no genuine issue of material fact exists which precludes entry of partial summary
judgment on behalf ofthe Tribe. In sum, the Court finds that as a matter of law
the Compact does not require the Tribe and the State of Idaho to enter into

"

Interestingly, the Court's interpretation of the Compact is similar to that of the Idaho
Attorney General's initial review of this matter. See Declaration of Scott Crowell, Ex, G at 4
(Docket No, 32). The Cow however, disavows any reliance upon tho Attorney General's initial
assessment for purposes of the Court's decision.

-
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arlthbfiied
. .
tb operate "tribal video gamingm&chi&3" 's:th&errn is '&flr&din
1.C. $ 67-429B.

ORDER

NOW TWEREPORE IT IS HEMEBY ORDERED that the ghoshone-

Bannock Tribes' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket No. 29) is
GRANTED.

j

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the State of Idaho's and the Idaho State

Dated this

A day of April, 2004,
tates District Court
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OF TEE! SEVENTH JUDICIALDISTRICT OF THE

IN THEDISTRICT

AND FOR THE C O N Y OF BINGHAM

I
WENDY KNOX, and RICHARD

I1

DOTSON,
Plaintiffs,

1
1
1
1
1

v.

STATE OF JDAHO, ex rel.

Case No. CV-2008-GG7

NEMORANDLM IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFEIWANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS

Governor; BEN YSURA,
and LAWRFBCE
General,

I

Defendants.

"a
1

1

COME NOW Plainti ,by and through counsel of record, and submit the following to the
Court i n respoilse to the Def dants pending Motion to Dismiss.

I

j'

INTRODUCTION

In November 2002, th cltizens of Idaho passed an Initinrive known as Proposition One, or
the Tribal Gaminglnitiative. he Initiative allowed "tribal video gaming machines" to be operated

I

must therefore be dismissed.
not necessary or indispensable parties to this action. In their

However, the tribes
Amended Complaint the Plai

do not request relief in the form of compelling rhe Defendanrs

to tnke any siecific action nor

cchaenging or seeking to invalidate any tribal-state compact,

but are merely seek a

The tribes are not part@ and will not suffer direct prejudice from 8 declaratoryjudgment.

Ifthe tribes beliere that the/? intarest mybe inpalred then t k y have Br ability to petition
!

2
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p-=----.
I

STANDARD OF REVIEW

v. Dep't. u f ~ a t e Ar ~ S O ~ ~ /W1 J9 ,Idaho 676, 677, 809 P,2d 1155, 1156 (1991). The grant of

I

a

1Z(b)(6)motion will be affirmr/dwhere there are no genuine issues of material fact and the case can

be decided as amaner of law. eeM0.r~i? Mid-Anaerjcun FiredMurinelns, Co., 103 Idaho 298,

302,647P.Zd754,758(1982); Eliopu!os v. IdahoSrateBank, 139Idaho 104,107-08,922
Pq2d401,
404-05(Ct. App. 1996). Wh -reviewingan order of the district c o k t dismissing a case pursuant

I

t

to I.R.C.P. lZ(b)(d), thc non- owng patty is entitled to have all inferences from the record and
'

pleadings viewedinitsfavor;afld only chen may the question be asked whether aclsim for'relief has

bwn stated.

i

See ~duho'Schs.or Equal Educ., 123 Idaho at 578, 850 P:2d at 729; Miles e Idaha

Power Co., I16 Idaho 635, 63 ,778 P.2d 757,759 (1989). "The issue is not whether the plaintif[
i

3-
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ARGUMENT

the matter must be dismissed I

1

Whiteit is true that d e s are generally immune from unconuentedsuit and cannot bejoined

I.

even if they are necessary pqles, m the present case the tribes are not necessnry or indispensable

jI

parties. Because the Plaintiff are requesting a declaratoryjudgment, the standard found in LC. 6
10-1211 is the applicable stohkd forjoinder of pnrtiesmdmabriallyaffects the inquiry under Rule.
I
I
19. Under the language of 10-1211, the tribes are not necessary or &idispensable parties.

I

Additionally, even assuming for the purpose of argument only, that Rule 19 is the applicable

I

standard, the tribes are still no1 necessary or indispensable parties.
i

The Plaintiffs seek a &claratory judgment that LC. 54 67-4293 and 67-429Cviolate the
I

i

Idaho State Constitution, Conpequently, Idaho Code Title 10, Chapter 12, Declaratory Judgments,

is the applicable statutory stanlard. LC. 5 10-1201,which authorizes the Court to issue declaratory
!
j u d p e n ts, states:

j

i

P -6--

under a dqd, will, written cont'r&t.or other
, .,:*
.w
. ..,
bt..in
.b
or any ord conkact, orw$ose,rigbts, shtug,~r
. . . other
. .
statutg,m~icipal,or$nance, contr4~t:or
any question of bonq@cfj6n, bF.i~6dity
ordinance, c o & ~ c t kfp$ichise and
of rjghts, s'tatusor other legal relationsthereunder.
, ,

,

,

,

,

7id Iegalrelations are affected by the statutes listedaboveandtherefore

The Plaintiffs' rights, status

t
i

are permitted to bring this d e aratory
~
action. LC. 8 10-1211 describes the parties asainst whom a
declaratoryjudgment action u der the statute may be brought:
reliefis sought, all persons shall be made parties who have
which would be affected by the declaration, and no
declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties lo theprocoediqg.
I
Thus, the Act requires 'oinder only of pallet2 "who have or claim my interest which would

i

be affected by the declaration"/ not those whose interests are mereiy uncertain or speculative. This
I

action is directed ar the Stare s/lr the unconotitut~onalrurutes enscied. and seeks only a declaration

dIi

that thestatutes are unconstitn iona!. Theeffects oofsuch.adeclarationare not addressed by or apart

of che Amended Complaint. ?T/letribes' interesz in their compact righis are not effected as they are

I . .. :
not parties and "no declaration sllall prejudice the rights of persons not parties t o the
I

1

proceeding."

I

Furthermore, the abov statute, unlikeRule 19,ensures thatthis acrion"shal1 [not] prejudice

"i

the rights ofpersons not parties,Ito the

such as Idaho Indian Tribes. Thus, bystatute m y

rights under an IGRA compact with the State of Idaho, cannot

Indian tribe's rights,

i

be prejudiced .If they are not jotned. Consequent1y;even if such trjbes were necessary parties, as a
I
matter of Idaho Statute they not "indispensable" within the meaning of Rule 19.

4
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ASSUMING THAT' I.R.C.P. 19 IS APPLICABLE. THE TRIBES ARE NOT
NECESSARY OR INDISPENSABLE PARTIES.

ij. .

Evenif the Court wer to ignore the plain language and effect of Idaho Code 5 10-1211, the
tribes are still not necessary o rndrspensable parties.
I
I

k

me Cwes ~ i t k dBv The Defendants Are Inau~licable.

I

In their supporting b 'ef, the Defendants rely on two cases regarding necessary and
i
indispensable paties in suppofl of their argument. These cases an:clearly di stinguishable from the
present rase. First.theclefendintsrely on WNbyrv b i k e , 423 F.3d 1105 (PY Cir ZOOS). I.Witbur

aI

the plaintiffs sought toenjoin c impiemcntation of a cigarette tax compact with a tribe. The A-inth
Circuit found that the tribes w41e necessary parties becauge of the fundarnentidl principle that a party
1

i

to a contract is necessary and indispensable to litigation seeking to void the contract. The present

1

case is distinguishable. ~ n l i $ in Wilbur, the Plaintiffs are not asking the Court to prevent the
I

government or any other entiiy from forming a compact with a tribe nor are they attacking the
i

compwt entered into between &e

and the tribe. The Plaintiffs Knox andDotson sinlpi'y

i

seek a declmatoryjudgmentth t certnin Idaho statutes are unconstitutional, Whether ornot the State
!
of Idaho chooses to abide by ik tzibaJ compacts if Plaintiffs are successful is not at issue here.

1

The same analysis and reasoning applies to the second case cited and heavily relied upon by
the Defendants, American ~ r ~ j ~ h o r r~, tad r i rInc.
~ ~rr ,.Hull, 146F. Supp 2d 1012 (D. Ariz. 2001).
I

hAmericmz Greyhound, the p[aintiffs challenged a starute which empowered the Arizona governor

1

to negotiare new, orextendexi$tingclass a,
gaming compacts with various tribes. Thedistrictco~ut

b

found that the statute embodie an unlawful delegation of legislative power and that various types
of casino gamingwere unlawd,ui under Arizona law and enjoined the governor from engaging in
i

6
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1

either action.

On appeal, the Ninth dircuit concluded that the tribes werr:necessary patties underRule 19.
I
I

The court found that the injudction orbred by the district court required the governor to terminate
;

the present compacts and shuf: down virtually the entire Indian gamingindustry in Arizona. In the
I

present case, Plaintiffs are nof seeking injunctive relief nor will a declaratory judgment require the

j
termination of any particularaompact or have the immediate effect of shutting down tribal gaming

i

. .

activity, They seek only a ded~arationthat aforesaid gaming statutes are unconstitutional.

!

The Tribes ~ d Not
e Necessarv Parties.

B,

I

Applying the factors if I.R.C.P. 19, it is clear that the tribes are not necessary parties. Rule
I

I

19(a)(l) discusserjoinder of+ons
'

if feasible. It states:

!

A p ~ who
o ~ suaject a ser&e oipmies8 ahdl be joined a8 apanym the
aofion if (1) i j the person's abseacecomp1ete relief cannot be accorded
among those alpeady parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to
e action and is so situated that the disposition of the action
may (i) as a practicnl matter impair or impede the
that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already
..
partiessubject 6a~ubstantialriSkof i ~ c ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ n gmulti$e,
d ~ u b ~l er ,o t b e r w i ~
inconsisrcnr obligations by kason of the c l a h c l interest.

In the present case, co&ete relief can be accorded among those already parties in the tribes
absence. The Co&t3sdeclaralory judgmint would afford Plaintiffa everything they seek in their
I

amendedcomplaint, and &'deci/iiondenying such ajudgment wouldgive the State ofIdaho precisely
what they seek by their motioi, which is as "complete" as can be.
i

Plaintiffs simply see; a judgment declaring that LC. $$ 67-429B and 6 7 4 9 C are
"nco~titutional. ~he,dis~osi$on
of the instant action in the tribes' absence would not impair or
/

impede W tribe#' ahuity to p[otect their interest in their l G M compacts with the state ofdaho.
Plaintiffs .are not seeking injunctive or mandamus relief. They are not directly challengirig,
i

attacking, or seekingto resci(d any tribal compact. No declaratoryjudgment would immediately
!

endanger or threaten tribal compacts. The defendants' postulatal threats a l l involve future action

i

by the state authorities. Plaintfffs do not, in the Amended Complaint, seek any such relief, nor are
the Plaintiffs empowered to dd so. Plaintiffs arenot the government authority. It is at best unclear
I

whether the state of Idaho w b l d be successful in a possible future attempt to avoid the tribal
i

compacts if this Court grants )?laintiffs their requested declaratory judgment. However, if some
authority otherthanPlaintiffs doestake some action, the tribes wouId obviously have the full ability

a

.

.

toproLecttheirownjntemstin court of law at that time and would not beprejudicedundertheplain
I
I
terns of the Declaratory Judg@ent Act.
!

In addition, the defendnts who are aiceady partjes to the action would not be subject to a
substantialriskof incurring, d&le, multiple, or otherwiseinconsistentobligations. The defendam
i

argue that any declaratovjud&ntbY
,, ... ....
:

the court that 88 67-429B and 67-429C are unconstiNtionel

wouldimpose obligations on them which would conflict wi& &Ninth Circuit'sjudgmentinSrate
i

of Irlaho v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes,465 F.3d 1095 (9" Cjr. 2006) authorizing the tribes to add
i

tribal video gaming machine@to its IORA sanctioned class Ill gaming compact. This creative
1

interpretation of Rule 19 fails !For several reasons. First, this Court lacks authority to impose m y
obligations inconsistent with &e Ninth Circuit's decision cited above. The reason is that Plaintiffs
i

have not requested that the C ~ L Uimpose
?
any obligations at all on the defendants; the amended
complaint seeks only declara&ry relief, not mandatory relief. Anotha reason is that there is a
serious qucstiori whether mandamus relief js even available, as Plaintiffs am unawnre of any statute

orr&gu$ti.w imposing a clear4 affirmative legal duty on the ,&fendants tor
with Indian tribe$uddercircu+tances likc thosepresent here. Saviers v.
I

529 P.2d 1285,1287 (1974) ('iA writ of Mandate will issue to a party whohas R c l e ~ l e g dght
d
to
have an act perfonnedif the 04ficcragainstwhorn the writ is sought has acleardutyto act and if ihe
act be ministerial and not regiire.the exercise of discretion").
Second, contrary to t h defendants'
~
representations, the Ninth Circuit in the above case
imposedno obligationat all upbn the defendants. The court simply interpretedthe exi8ting compact
between the State and the tribd as allowing the tribe certain gaming privileges given to other rribes
I

without having to renegotiafi, rheir current compaci

The decision does not address the

constitutionality of LC. $8 67-429Band 67.429C, nor was that an issue in the case.
Third, the defe'endanw' argument confuses Rufe 19with the doctlineof resjtuz'iccata.In order
to obtain thepreclusiveeffect t8ey seek from the Ninth Cinuit'sdecisioncitedabove,the defendants
must establish all the elemen&required by the doctrine of claim praclusion or issue preclusion,

which the defendants have not snd cannot. See A.R., inc. v. Sheffer, 134 Idaho 141, 144,997 P.2d

602,605 (2000) for a clear statiment of the legal requirements necessary to obtain preclusiveeffect
from a priorjudgment under both doctrines. The effcct ofprior judgments on current proceedings

:

is the subject of Rcs judicata; Rule 19 addresses the likelihood that a future judgments or
i

obligations will conflict.

B.

.

Assumine the Tiibes are Necessarv Parties, They are Not Indisnensable Parties.
Assuming for the purposes of argument only that the tribesare necessaryparties, underRule

19(d)(2) the tribes are not indispensable parties. Rule 1P(a)(2) stares:
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After considering the factors listed above, the Court, in equity andgood conscience, should

determine to poceed with partiesbeforeit. With respectto the first Factor, no party already involved
in the instant cnse wjll suffer

any prejudice if a judgment is efitered in the absence of the hibes. As

sit forth above, pursuant to t& language in LC. § 10-1211, it is legally i&ssiblc
.

for the tribes'

.

rights to be prejudiced. A decl&atoryjudgment entesedin the tribes' absence will not preclude them

from protecting their interest: even if any future action is brought d a t i n g to such declaratory
judgment. As a matterof law they sfillmaintjin the &iiijty nndright to defend.thdiiidtet'eSt3 bEfbre
a court of law, and are not bodlld as parties in this action.

r
Rule 19(a)(l) disoussea avenues by which the prejudice can be
The second.f ~ t o under
lessened or avoided. By simp]) asking for a declmatojjudgmeat and not injunctive or mandamus

relief, prejudice to tribii interells haye been lessened and avoided. unlike injunctive or rnandiunus
relief, the tribes will sdffer minimal orno.direct prejudice because a declaratoryjudgment will not
immediately or directly threaten the tribal oompaots; it willnot void my compact and the tribes still
maintain the ability andright to'protect any interest in theircompacts in thefutture if the need arises.
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As to rhe lhird factor, a declaratoryjudgmentrendered in che tribes' absence clearly will be

ffs are not seeking my specific prohibition or mandatory action on the part of
ment offtcials, Thus, a declaratory judgment findiqg thatSg67-429B and 67-

429C are unconstitutional will afford the Plaintiffs ail the relief they seek.
The fourth factor weighs heavily in the Plaintiff's favor. If the hibes are considered
jndispcnsable parties, all the Plaintiffs' rights as Idaho citizens to seek a declaration are effectively
closed off, if the tribes' conibnt is somehow required to adjudicate the matter of the statutes'
constitutionality under Idaho :law. In essence the State is arguing that the matter of Idaho's
Constitution and its applicatidjl to these statutes is nor, a matter for the Idaho Courts and is now
r
I

1

exclusively in the hands of the'tribes (an assated separate non-Idahonation) who must consent to

Iy

adjudicate the matter. This is absurd. This Court has the full and unrestrained right and ability,
indeed &&, to declare the conbtitutionality of Idaho statutes. See Powers v. Canyun Coz~nnty,108

Idaho 967,982,703 P.2d 1342,;1357(1985) ("Under the Constitution, our courts'havethe authority
to interpret
legislation or to deblare unconstitutional
those legislative
acts which do not meet the
,., \....
.,,, ,.....,.,>.
. .
,..,
.
standards of the state orfederaliconstitutions,'3. This is a well-establishedand cherished prjnciple

of American jurisprudence sidce See ~ i r b t v:r Madison,
~
5 U.S. 137 (1803). A declaratory
..

judgment by the Court declaring the statutes unconstitutional is the only remedy available to
Plaintiffs. This Coun cannot abd should not eliminate that right.
Moreover, if the Courli determines that the hibes are indispensable parties, it will have
undesireable and absurd practical, policy, and constitutionaI implications. It will amount to a
determination that the tribes' cumpact rights take precedence over the Idaho Constitunon and snip
the Idaho judiciary of its constitutional duty to determine the constitutionalityof ac$ of the Idaho

11 -
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Legislature. According to the,defendants,Idaho statutes that violate the Idaho Constitution cannot
be challenged in the Idaho Courts without the tribes' consent, and citizens of Idaho who have
suffered particularized harm have no means of challenging the constitutionality of such statutes.
Such a result wouldrender theIdaho Constitution meaningless in this context. Constitutionalrights
andproscriptions that cannot be enforced might as well not exist,

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs request that the Court deny the defendants' Motion to
Dismiss and
DATED this

toadjudicatethe matters on the merit8 as requested in the Amended Complaint.

aday:of June, 2008.
THOMSEN STEPMEIVS LAW OFFICES. PLLC

hf,

J u n 02 2008 4:36PM

--
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I ha duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and with
my office in Idaho Falis, Idaho; that on June 2, 2008, f caused n true and conffit copy of the
fpregoing to be smed upon ;he following persons at the addresues below their names either by
depositing said document inithe. United States mail witb the correct postage thereon, by hand
delivery, by transmitting by facsimile, orby placing said document in the attorney's courthousebox,

as set forth below.

[,~u.s.
Mail

L A W N C E G WASDEN
STEVEINL OLSEN
MICHAEL S GILMORE
CLAY RRSMI?*H :
PO BOX83720
:
BOISE ID 83720-0010

[ ] Hand Delivery

~Facaimile

pj'U.S. Mail

DAVID P WENSLEY!
PO BOX 83720 '
BOISE ID 83720-0034

$;;,s;"eTy

THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OPFICES, PLLC

n

By:
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Curt R Thornsen, Esq., ISB #2072
T. jason ~ o o d~. s q .is^
, 45016
THOMSEN S'.lWEENS LAW OFmCES, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls ID 834W
Telephone (208)522-1230
Pax (208)522-1277
Attorney for Plaintifh

M TNE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRIm OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE C O U N n OF BINOHAM

1

WENDY KNOX,and RICHAFXl
DOTSON,

Case No. 2008-667

)

Plaintiffs,
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO,ex rel. C. L. O m , )
Governor; BEN YSURA, Secretary of State: )
and LAWRENCE WASDEN, Attorney
)
General,
)
V.

AMENDED COMPLArNT FOR
DECLARATORY JUDGGMEv

)

Defendants,

)

COME NOW the Plaintiffs above-named. and for cause of action against the defendants,
aUege as follows:
1.

.

.

.

ThePlaintiffs in this actionchallengetheconstitutionalityofIdahoCode 5s 674298

and 67-429C, enacted by Proposition One during the November 5,2002, generd election. Plaintiffs

a,

contend h a t Idaho Code 88 67-429B and 67-429C violate the Idaho Constitution, ~rticle $ 20.

1-

COWLM

FORDECLARATORYJUDGMENT

"Dotson") are and at atl times material were residents and citizens ofthe Bingham County, Idqho.
3.

Defendant C. L, Otter, the Governor of the State of Idaho, is charged with upholding

the Idaho Constitution and faithfully executing the laws of the State of Idaho, including Article a,
f 20 of theIdaho Constitution andIdaho Code $6 18-3808 and 18-3810. Mr. Otter is sued solely in

his Official capacity.
4.

DefendantBen Ysura, theIdaho Secretary of State, ischarged with theadministration

of elections in Idaho pilrsuant to Title 34, Chapter 18, Idaho Code. His predecessor cnnvwsed the
voting on Proposition One and concluded that Proposition One received a majority of the votes at

theNovember5,2OOZelec~on,resultinginIdaho
Code $6 67-4298 and67429C. Mr. Ysurais sued
solely in his official capacity.
5.

DefendantLawrence Wasden, Attorney General forthe State of Idaho,is also charged

with u&.nl&.ggA&eId_aho,C,on~!i.~tion,.an~faithfu~ly
cxeouting and prosecuting the laws of the State
,

,

of Idaho, including ArticleIU, # 20 oftheIdaho Constitution and Idaho Code $E 18-3808 and 183810. Mr. Wasden is sued solely in his official capacity.

6,

The Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Idaho's Unifom Declaratory

Judgment ~ c tTitle
; 10, Chapter 1'2,Idaho Code, and.Article V. 20 of the Idaho Constitution.

7.

Venue is proper pursuant to LC,$5-402(2)because this cause, or some pan thereof.

arose in Bingham county. Venue is also proper pursuant to I.C.8 5-404 because the State of Idaho
is not a resident of any particular county m the State of Idaho.
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in fact, because there is a substantial likelihood that the
redress their jnjudes, and because their injuries are djfferent from those suffered by the general
public, as established by the following facts, interalia:
a.

After enactment of Idaho Code

$5 67-429B and 67-429Cand subsequent

instaliation of slot rnnchines at ghe Fort Ball Casino near Blackfoot. Idaho, both Plaintiffs became
cornpul@ive
gamblers, driving the short distance from their homes to gamble on the slot machines
(euphemistically called a "tribal video gaming machine") at theFoa Hall Casino, about 3 to4 times
per week.

b.

. Plaintiffs gambled almost exclusively at Fort Hall Casino because of its very

shm distnnce from their respective residences, compared to the next nearest places to gamble,
hundreds of miles away.
c.

of gambling available at the Fort Hall Casino,
Of qll the., different
...,",,,.... .. types
.,

Plaintiffs played only the slot machines.
d.

Because of Idaho Code gp67-429Band 67-429Candsubsequentinstallation

of slotmachinesat the Fort NBlk Casjno, Plaintiffs bbth developedclinical anddevastatingaddictions

to gambling at the Fort Hall Casino. Plaintiff %ox estimates her slot machine losses at Fort Ed1
Casino at about $50,000.00, and Plaintiff Dotson estimates his slot machine losses at Fort Hall
Casino at about $30,000.00.
e.

Because of the slot machines allowed at the Fort KdI Casino in violation of

Jdaholaw and Idaho Constirution and their consequent gambling addiction, both plaintiffs suffered

3
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"

. .
.

Plaintiffs have standing to bring this aotio

8.

. ..

.

convicted of the crhne of forgery in order to obtain gambling funds, all because of his gambling
addiction precipitated by Proposition One, Idaho Code 88 67-429B and 67-429C and subsequent
installation ofslot machines at the Fort Hall Casino.
g. .

Both Plaintiffs have sought, obtained, and continue to receive treatmenr for

their destructive gambling addictions, &rough Gambler's Anonymous. Dotson has also obtaincd
counseling from a private licensed counselor forhis gambling addiction.
f,

ff the defendants had originally upheld the Idabo Constitution and statutes

prohibiting slot machines against Proposition One and Idaho Code B# 67429B and 67429C,slot
machines wouldnothavebeen installed at FortHall Casino andneitherPlaintiff wouldhave suffered
the harm set forth above.
g.

H this Court declares Proposition One and LC.

67-429B and 67-429Cto

bein violation oftheIdaho ~onstitution,Fart~a~
Casino maybe forced to removeits slot machines,
andauch casino stylegamblingwillbemuchlessreadilyavailabletoPlaintiffs. This will make their
recovery much easierand will prevent or minimize further harm to the Plaintiffs of the kind set forth
above.
5).

Plaintiffs have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to halt the harm they are

suffering, otherthan'tbe remedies sought herein.
10.

The cbnstitutional issues raised in this proceeding conccm Idaho State law only.

stitution, as amend

11.

gambling in Idaho. It provides, inter alia:
( 1 ) Ganrbling is contrary topuhZicpoEcy and i s stricL'lyprohibifedexcepl
jbr the faaowitrg:

a. A state lottery which is authorized by the state if conducted in
conformity with enabling legislation: and
b. Pari-mutyeI betting if conducted in conformity with enabling
legislation; and
c. Bingo and raffle g m s that are operated by qualified charitable
organizations in the pursuit of charitable purposes if conducted in
confonriity with enabling legislation.

(2) Noactivitiespermitted by subsection (1)shall employ anyformofcasino
gambling including, but not limited to, blackjack, craps, roulette, poker,
baccarat, keno and slot macfalnes, or employs any alffeftonic or
~l~cfromechanicalimitutim
orsinrulation of anyform afmssino gambling.
((Fhnphasjsadded).

The IdahoLegislature has, bystatute, likewiseprohibitedgambling,makingitacrime,

12.

seeLC. 118-3801 and18-3802, and prohibited slot machines in p d c d a r . See LC. (j 18-3810.
Idaho Code $5 67-429B and 67-429Cpurport to authorize gambling onIndian lands

13.

in Idaho in violation of Article IJI, 5 20 of the Idaho Constitution.
The gambling activities ostensibly authorized by I.C.f 8 67-429B and67429C do not

14.

fall with~nany of the three exceptions in subsection (L) of Article LI, Section 20, Idaho Constitution.
Idaho Code $8 67-429B and 67-429Cpurport to authorize forms of casino gambling

15.

which subsection (2)ofArtic10 IJI,$ 2 0 of the Idaho Constitutim, expresslyprohibits.
Maho Code # 67-429B, enacted pursuant to Proposition One, pnrportr. to authorize

16.

the use of "tribal video gaming machines" on Indian lands.

5-
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17.

The Attorney General's Certificate acknowledged that the tribal vide

g

machines as defined by LC. 67-429B "would be construed as slot machines or imitations or
simulations of forms of cssinogambfing."
18.

Piaintiffs agr& with the ~ t t & e.~eneral's
~
statement quoted above, and further

allege that the, aforesaid "tribal video gaming machines" are "electronic or electromechanica1
imitations or simulations of any form of casino gambling."
19.

Idaho Code

$5 67-429C,enacted

pursuant to Proposition One, authorizes Ule

uniiarerai amendment of state-tribnl gamiqg compacts between the State of Idaho .and thc various
tribes, to incorporate and permit the illegal gambling purportedly authorized by LC.9 67-429B. in
violation of Article III,Section 20 of the Idaho Constitution.
20.

Plaintiffs seek a judicial declaration that LC. @ 67-429B and 67-429C are

unconstitutional and i n violation of Article a,
# 20 of the Idaho Constirution.

WHEREFORE Plaintiffs respeotfully pray the judgment, order and decree from the Court
declaringthatIdahoCode $8 67-429B and 67429Care unconstitutional,unlawful. andinvalid under
Ihe prohibition on gambling contained in Article JII; 5 20 of the W o Constitution:

4

DATED.this 2day of June, 2008.

THOMSEN STEPKENS LAW OFFICES, put

By:

J:U~UI\CRW~WLMDINOSW
Aminhd ComplilLilwpd
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho,resident of and with

my office in Idaho Palls, Idaho; that on June 2, 2008, 1 caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to be served upon the following persons at the addresses below their n m s either by
depositing said documenr in the United 5tates mail with the correct postage thereon, by hand
delivery, by transmi~ngbyfacsimile,or by placing said document in the aaorney's courthouse box,
as set forth below.

U.S.Mail

LA\VRJ?,NCE G WASDEN
STEVEN L OLSEN
MICHAELS GlLMORE

[ ] Hand Delivery

pd Facsimile

CLAY R'RSMITH

PO BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0010
@ U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery

DAVID P HFlNS~Y
PO BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0034

fl Facsimile
. ~ O b f S $ i Q . ~ P H E P \ LAW
' S Q ~ C & i SPLLC
,

n
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Deputy Attorneys General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208)334-2400
Facsimile: (208)854-8072
Attorneysfor Defiadants

M THEDISTRICT COURT OF TI3E SEVENTH JUDICIAL DLSmCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, n\r AND FOR THE COUNTY 01F BWGHAM

WENDY INOX, and R I C W
DOTSON,
Plaintiffs,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel. C.E. OTTER,
Governor; BEN YSURSA, Secretary of
State; and LAWRENCE WASDEN,
Aaorney General,

1
1
1
1
1

1
1
)

Case No. CV-2008-667

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMiSS

1
1
)

1

Defendants.

i

Plaintiffs respond to the motion to dismiss in two ways. First, they filed an amended
oornplaint. It is subsfmtively identical to the original except for modifying the title from

"Complaint for Declaratory a d Other RelieP' to "+bandedComplaint for D~eelaratosyRelief,"

-
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1

Con~titution.~
Second, plaintiffs argue in a memorandum opposing the motion that they "are not
seelung injunctive reIieEnor will a declaratoryjudgment require the termination of any particular
compact or have ~e immediate effect of shutting down tribal gaming activity" but, instead, that
"[tjhcy seek only a determination that [§# 67-429B and -429CJare unoonstirulional," Nem. in
Opp'n to DefsPrMot. to Dismiss ("Opp'n Ma.")at 7. They stress the limited nature of the relief
sought throughout their memorandum. Eg., id at 2 ("[iln their Amended Complaint fhe
Plain~iffsdo not request relief in the form of compelling the Defendants to take any specific
action nor are they challenging or seeking to invalidate any tribal-state compact, but are merely
seek [sic] a declaratory judgment'l); id. at 6 (I1Plaintiffsare not asking $his COWto prevent the
government or any other entity from forming a compact with a tribe nor are they attacking the
compact entered into between the government and the tribe"); id. at 8 ("Plaintiffs are not seeking
injunctive or mandamus relief. They are not directly challenging, attacking, or seeking to
rescind any tribal compacts'').
PlainMs' tactical maneuveriag, which is aimed at attempting to negate the status of the
several Idaho gaming tribes as indispensable parties under I.R,C,P, 19, places them in no more
defensible position than before, The limited relief that hey seek does not redress the injury-infact alleged in the amended complaint-the

proximity of ''slot machines'' at the Fort Hall Casino

to their residences-since a mere declaration of Tribal Gaming Initiative's constiNtionality will
not remove those machines. Plaintiffs thus advance, at most, a "generalized" and quite academic
claim that a conflict exists between Article U[11, Section 20 and the Initiative. No jusiiciablo

14 8
REPLY BNEP n\r SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS-PAGE 2

emphasis added)-vividly

underscore their inability to satisfy the redressability prong of

standing through the declaratory relief sougllt.

Even were standing present? however, plaintiffs' claim still would Ebunder on M e 19.
The Uniform Declaratov Judgment Act, Idaho Code §§ 10-1201 to -1217, does not dilute that
rule's rquirements, and no legitimate question exists that Idaho tribes have an interest in the
constitutionality of an initiative that was adopted to authorize a specific form of gaming in which
only they could of& to the public, Pow tribes, including the Shoshone-Bannock, have benefited
from that authorization, and no doubt exists that plaintiffs have as an ultimate objective

prejudicing their ability to oontinue such gaming. Their interest, together with plaintiffs'
unvarnished hostility to it, leaves no doubt that the gaming tribes are necessary parties which, by
virCue of immunity from suit, cannot be joined and should be deemed indispensable.'

I.

PLA.WTIFBS LACK STANDING TO MAINTAIN A CLAIM LIMITED TO A
DETERMINATlON CONCERNING TEE TRIBAL GAMING INITIATIVE'S

CONSTITUTIONALITY

The Idaho Supreme Cowt has held repeatedly that the Declaratory Judgment Act does
not dispense with ordinary standing requirements, h fie fountainhead decision concerning the

I Although rhe motion to dismiss was direoted to the original oomplaint, plaintiffs respond with respect to the
allegations in tho amended complaint. Dofendants believe that approach IS appropriate for judicial efficiency
pUrposes because the amondmenrs do not alter in any significant manner the fundamentd iSsues before this COW:
the proper application of Rule 19 and the availability of relief rhat will redress plaintiffs' allogcrl injuiy-h-fact. The
moiion therefom should be deemed as addressed to the amended colnplainr insofar as it supersedss the original
oomplaint. It is the understanding of defendants' counsel rhat plahiffs concur in so proceeding.

P49
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danding dookine generally, Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 778 P.2d 757 (1989)which is discussed in the defendants' opening brief at pages 8 and 9-the

Court also leff no doubt

tbat these general princjples apply with frill force to declaratoryjudgment actions, since lhonly
relief requested there was declaratory in nature, See 116 Idaho at 6319, 778 P.2d at 759 ("[tlhe
appellant . . . filed a declaratoryjudgment action on behalf of himself and all similarly situated

ldaho Power ratepayers, seeking to have part of the implementing legislation declared
unconstitutional"). Most recently, while obsewing that "the Declaratory Judgment Act provides
authority for the courts to render declaratory judgmentsG1" tl~eCourt cautioned that the Act

n4e

"does relieve a party &om showing that it has stananding to bring the action in the first instance."

Schneider v. Wbwe, 142 Idaho 767, 772, 133 P.3d 1232, 1237 (2006). Schneider simply
exknded a long line of decisions adhering to Miles on tlzis central proposition. Van Valkenbzdrgh

v. Citizensfop Term LinaEts, 135 Idaho 121, 124-25, 15 P.3d 1129, 1132.34 (2000); Sebkirk-Priest

Basin Ass'n, Inc, v, Srate ex rel. Bart, 128 Idaho 831, 834, 919 P.2d 1032, 1035 (1996); SelkirkPriest Basin Ass'n, Inc, v. State ex rel, Atzdm, 127 Idaho 239, 245, 899 P,2d 949, 955 (1995);
see also Harris v, Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513,516,691 P.2d 988,991 (1984).
PlhtifYs ask tl& C o w to ignore Miles and its progeny insofar as they seek declaratory
relief that does not redress their alleged injury-in-fact, So, for example, even ifthey prevailed on
their contention that Idaho Code $8 67-429B and -429C are inconsistent with Article Dl, Section
20, plaintiffs would secure a determination of a legal issue but no effective redress; ire., the legal
challenge advanced by plaintiffs i s entirely academic because it does not provide any relief
against the "casino style gambling" at the Fort Ifall Casino that they contend is the source of
their injury-in-fact. Am. Comp.

'fi 8.g. It

is, again, the ready availabiliTy of such gaming,

together wirh plaintiffs1 alleged gambling addiction, that tms a "generalized grievance1'-a
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belief that the Tribal Gaming Idtiative is unconstitutiwsl-into

a particularized injury-in-fact

for standiig purposes. See Lance v. Coffman, 127 S. Ct. 1194. 1196 (2007) ("Article ID ofthe
Pnited States] Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to 'Cases' and tControversies.'
One component of f e case-or-controversy requirement is standing, which requires a plaintiff to
demonstrate the n o w - f ~ l i a relements of injury in fact, causation, and redressability.

. . . We

have consistently held that: a plaintiff raising only a generally avaiIabIe grievance about
govemment-clairning only harm to his and every oitizen's interest in proper application of the
Constitution and laws, and seelcing reIief that no more d'ieotly and tangibly benefits him than it
does the public at large--does not state an Article III case or controversy1'). Plaintiffs must seek
reliefthat will redress this particularized injury to establish standing.
The Miles Court additionally made clear that the redressability prong of the standing
d o c ~ n ecannot be satisfied by speculation or hope. Rather, "litigants generlly must allege or
demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will
prevent or redress the claimed injury." 116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763 (emphasis added)
(citing Duke Power Co, v, CaroZiMa Envrl Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 79 (1978)); accord
Troutner v. Kempthoune, 142 Idaho 389,331, 126 P,3d 926,928 (2006);Noh v. Ceerrararsa, i3'9
Idaho 798,80453 P.3d 1217,1219 (2002);Phinney v. Shoshovle Med. Cdp., 131 Idaho 529,532,
960 P.2d 1258, 1261 (1998). Here, however, the four tribes offer video gaming machine activity
pwsuaat to a federal law-sanctioned compact and will not be bound by any determination
concerning the constitutionality of &$ 67-429B and -429C. Plaintiffs properly do nor suggeg,
therefore, that the declaratory relief itself, if granted, will requi1.e the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes
to cease suoh gaming activity at the Fort Hall Casino, They also do not suggest &at the
requested declara1:ory relief will have as its likely consequence, through some chain of events
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independent of this litigation, the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes1being required to terminate video
machine gaming, ladeed, the amended complaint meekly suggests that, through the Tribal
Gaming Initiative's invalidation, the Tribes "may be forced to remove [their] slot machines"
(Am, Comp. 8.g (emphasis added))---a material change &om the originaI conlplainrs allegation

that the Ziibes !'willbe forced to remove [their] slots machines" (Comp. 7 8.g (ernphis added)),
The opposition memoraadum, as discussed above, is no less equivocal on this point, admitting

that "at best" it is "unclear" whether a llpossiblefuture attempt" to void the tribal-state compacts
would be "successful." Opp'n Mem, at 8; see also id. at 8-9 (mandamus relief is not sought
because "Plaintiffs are unaware of any statute or regulation imposing a clear, affirmative legal
duty on the defendants to rescind gaming compacts

. . . under the circumstances like those

present here"). Given the claim preclusion attendant to tbe Ninth Circuit's judgment in Idaho v.

Shoshone-Bannock Dr'bes, 465 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2006), plaintiffs' equivocation is amply

plaintiff^^ in sum, have first pled and rhen argued themselves out of court. See L4an v.

Defenders of WiZdI~,
504 U.S.555,568 (1992) ("The most obvious problem in the present case
is redressability. Since the agencies funding &e projects were not p d e s to the case, the District
Court could accord relief only against the Secretary: He could be ordered to revise his regulation
to require consultation for foreign projects, But this wouId not remedy respondents' alleged

injury unless the funding agencies were bound by the Secretary's regulation, which is very much

an open question1').

'

Plaintiffs conxend that defmdam' re8 judioata analysis improperly expaads rhe Ninth Circuir's decision because
the constitutionality of the Tribal Gaming Initiative was nox litigated. Oppb Mem, ax 9. Their criuciam fails to
recogniza that part and pawl of claim preclusion under federal common law is the binding quality of a judgmam as
to any ulaim that wuld have been raised in the proceeding, E.g., Rivet v. Regions Ba~k,522 US,470,476 (199%).
Idaho, hod it been deemed appropriate, could have questioned cho consistency of #§ 67-428B and 429C wih Anisle
111, Section 20 in rhe Shoshone-Bahnook 7Pibeflitigation.

u
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11.

IDAHO GAMING TRIBES ARE NECESSARY A m IMIISPENsAftLE

PARTIES
Plaintiffs &vote much of the opposition memorandum to the Idaho gaming tribes' sZatus
as necessary and indispensable parties under LR.C.P. 19. They begin by positing that the
Declaratory Judgment Act provides a more lax standard for determining such status than Rule

19, Opptn Mem, at 4-5. They spend the remainder of the memorandum distinguishing the
authority relied upon by defendants in their opening brief and arguing that the tribes are neither
necessary nor indispensable parties. Id at 6-12. Oiven the absence of a justiciable controversy,
the Rule 19 issue neither need nor should be addressed. See, e.g,,Steel Co. v. Citizeasfor Better

Envt., 523 U.S. 83,94-95 (1998) (Article IIljusticiablity issues must be resolved as a threshold
matter). Tne Rule 19 issues neverthe1ess

addressed in the event rbat this Court f i d s subject

matter jurisdiction,

First, plaintiffs marshal. no decisional or other support for their contention that the
Declaratory Judgment Aot, through Idaho Code 5; 10-1211, supplies the appropriate necessaryand-indispensable party standard, Section 10-1211 provides in part that "[wlhen declaratory
reliefis sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be
affected by the declaration, and no declaration s h d prejudice the rights of persons not parties lo
the proceedings." This language was part of the Act as adopted in 1933. See 1933 Idaho Sess.
Laws ah, 70, $ 11. The Supreme Court subsequently promulgated the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, including LR.C.P. 57 whioh specBcd1y governs declaratory judgrncmts and whose
opening sentence states I1[t]he procedure for ob-g

a declaratory judgment pursuant to the

sktutes of this smell sh& be in accordanoe with these rules." Rule 19 &erefore controls the
question whether ?he Idaho gaming tribes are necessary and indispensable parties,

The

comparably worded Fed, R, Civ. P. 57 has been so applied. See generally 10B Charles Alan
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W&ht et GI., Feder~IPractice atzi~uocedure $2768, at 664-65 (3d ed. 1998) ("the
requirements of compulsory joinder of {hose needed for a just adjudication set out in Rule are
fully applicablet'to actions seeking declaratory relief).

Second, plaintiffs1Rule 19 n e o e s i a ~ ~ - ~analysis
a r t ~ pivots off a single, and often-sated,
rationale: The amended complaint seeks!no relief that will affect Idaho gaming tribes' oompact
rights. Plaintiffs nonetheless do seekla detezminarion tbat the Tribal Gaming Jnitiative is
unconstihltional, and no dispute exists b a t the Initiative laid the foundation for the compaot
i

rights now enjoyed by the tibes, Evmiifthat determination would have no practical effectand on this score defendants agree with' plain&-the
tribes have a substantial economic and
!
legal stake in the validity of contractual undertakings with the State and a corresponding interept

in protecting that shke against any cf$m intended to cast a shadow over t h ~
propriety of
compact-authorized gaming, They, no less than orher entities engaged in complex oommercial
and governmental activities, cannot prebct with certainty the eventual irnpclct of a declaration
that $4 67-429B and -429C are unoon~itutionalcould have on their gaming enterprises. The
tribes, in short, have a corlcrete and important interest in any claim tbat suggests, directly or
I,

indirectly, that they are engaging in gm$ng activity not permitted under state law.

Third,plaintiffs dispute each of , ~ l 19(a)(2)
e
indispensable-party considerations. Their
assdon that "it is legally impossible &r the tribes' rights to be prejudiced" (Opp'n Mem. at
10)-the

firs1 consideration-is no

make persuasive with respect to inclispensablc party status

than to necessary party status. The suigestion that no remedial "shapiag" is required given the
limited relief sought simply re-packakes the lack-of-interest theory advanced by plaintiffs.
Conversely, a declaratoryjudgment thafis not binding on the tibes serves no practical end; it is
l

a mere academic exercise. Lastly, defendant?
reaIize-and acknowledgad in their opening
I
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brief-that

dismissal of the complaint oh indispensable party &rounds yriU. leave plaintiffs dth

no forum to litigate their oonstitutional c&Eiallenge
to the Tribal G d g Initiative. Thc: absence of
t
such ability means only that pl&tiff~i must look eliwwhere for relief against any discrete
I

prejudice they suffer from the operation bf the Port Hall Casino. No Idaho citizen, however, has
the ability to chaUe11ge the Initiative sh$ply because of a pertreived inconsistency with Article

Ill, Section 20. To the extent plWiff3 maiatain just such s challengp-and Uley do so by virtue
of the limited relief sought and its fail*

.to redress the purported injwy-in-fact-my
i
f

prejudice cannot be given significant wei&t under Rule 19(a)(2)is fourth considemtioa

Defendantsi motion to dismiss shbuld be granted.
DATED this 5th day of June 2008,

LAWRENCE Q. WASDEN
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF B I N G W

WENDY KNOX,and RIICHARD
DOTSON,

1

1

Case No. CV.2008.667
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State; and LAWRENCE WASDEN,
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Defendants respectiidly notify the COW and counsel that the sentence on page 4 of the
Reply Brief in Support

gf

Defendantsr Motion to Dismiss beginning with "Most recently"

inadverte~tlydcleted the word "notr' from rhe quoted portion of Schraeider v. Howe, 142 Idaho
767, 133 P.3d 1232 (2006). The sentence should read: Most recently, wkile observing that "the

f 57
ERRATUM-PAGE

1

Declaratory judgment Act provides authority for th.e courts to render declaratory judgments[,]"
the Court cautioned that the Act "does not relieve a party from showing that it has standing to

bring the action in the fust instance"(emphasis added to refieot omission)).

DATED this 5th day of June 2008,
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF LD-0

STEVEN OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Civil Litigation Division
M I C W L S. GILMORE
Deputy Attorney General
Civil Litigation Division

DAVID F. HENSLEY
Counsel to the Governor
Ofice of thc Governor

By:

ERRATUM-PAGE 2

LAY B.SMITH
Deputy Attorney General
Natural Resources Division

,(?ERTr]RICATEOF SERVICE

1certify that on the 5th day of Yme 2008 1caused to be served a true and correct copy of

the foregoing upon the following party by the mmethod liatsd below:

CURT R, THOMSEN, ESQ.
T. JASON WOOD, ESQ.
THOMSEN $TEPHBNS LAW OFFICES,PLLC
2635 CIWNNING WAY
IDAHO FALLS I
D 83404

X U.S.Mail, postage prepaid

U

fIandDelivcry

13 Federal Express

X Facsimile: 208-522-1277
D Statehouse Mail

~ R.ZSMITHt L
CLAY

. .

,

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DIS
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF B

1

WENDY ICNOX and RICHARD
DOTSVN,

Case No. CV-2008-667
Plaintiffs,
-VS-

MINUTE ENTRY
STATE OF IDAI-10, el re1 C.L. OTTER,
Governor; BEN YSURA, Secretary of
State; and LAWRENCE WASDEN,
Attorney General,
Defendants.

I

This matter came before the Court the 6thday of June 2008.
Mr. T. Jason Wood, Esq., appeared telephonically on behalf of the plaintiffs. Mr.
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Mr. Smith shall file a notice to vacate with the Court, and the matter will be reset
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM

WENDY KNOX, and RICHARD
DOTSON,
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1
1

)

STATE OF IDAHO, ex re]. C. L. OTTER, )
Governor; BEN YSURA, Secretary of State; )
and LAWRENCE WASDEN, Attorney
)
General,
1
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1

1
1

v.

.'

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS

1
1

COME NOW Plaintiffs, by and through counsel of record, and with the stipulation of
defense counsel, and submit the following supplemental points and authorities in opposition to the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and particularly in response to the Defendants' Reply Brief.

i
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Defendants have filed a Reply Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss inwhich
they argue for the first time that Plaintiffs lack standing to seek a declaration of the constitutionality
of I.C. $$67-429B and -429C because the relief requested by Plaintiffs does not redress an injury-infact. Defendants also again argue that the absent tribes are necessary parties. These arguments are
initiative as related to the State precludes
without merit. The prior history of the unco~~stitutional
the defendants from asserting a lack of standing or justiciable controversy defense. There is also a
substantial lilcelihood that the reliefrequested will redress plaintiffs' injuries as theDefendants have
a positive duty to uphold and enforce the Idaho Constitution as part of their oath of office and
constitutional responsibilities. The tribes are not necessary parties as their interest are not directly
affected. They are not indispensable because Rule 19 cannot be applied to bar the Court from
discharging its duty to interpret the Idaho Constitution, and because Plaintiffs seek to vindicate
public rights. Finally, thestatutes in question are palpably unconstitutional, a fact acknowledged by
the Defendants in prior dealings with the initiative, and therefore the tribes have no "interest"
recognized by Rule 19.

ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING.
Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment finding that LC. $$ 67-429B and -429C are

unconstitutional. The Defendants contend for the first time in their reply brief that Plaintiffs lack
standing to maintain a claim limited to determining the constitutionality of LC. $$ 67-429B and 429C. TheDefendants donot argue that Plaintiffs lackparticularizedinterests and a direct, concrete
injury-in-fact which sets them apart from the general public, and they apparently concede that
2-
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Plaintiffs would have standing to bring this action from that perspective. Defendants simply contend
that even though the Plaintiffs have suffered a concrete, particularized injury, this action will not
redress the issues raised and Plaintiffs should not be allowed to proceed, in essence because there
is no controversy which can be adjudicated by these Plaintiffs. The issue is thus not really one of
standing, it is a question of justiciability.

A.

Past Litbation Precludes Defendants from Asserting a Lack of stand in^
Defense.

A prerequisite to a declaratoryjudgment action is an actual orjusticiable controversy. Harris
v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 681 P.2d 988 (1984). Justiciability is generally divided into
subcategories -- advisory opinions, feigned and collusive cases, standing, ripeness, mootness,
political questions, and administrative questions. Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho,635, 639
(1989). Defendants' standing argument is, in essence, an argument that this case lacks a justiciable
controversy. However, the Idaho Supreme Court has found otherwise.
Noh v. Cerzarrusu, (in Re Action to Determine Constitutionality of the Indian Gaming
Initiative), Proposition One, 137 Idaho 798 (2002), is the first case in which the Idaho Supreme
Court first faced the constitutional challenge to the initiative that would create I.C.

$5 67-429B and

-429C. The State was the named defendant and raised defenses of lack of standing, ripeness and
justiciability - the very same defenses they raise here. In Noh the petitioners initiated their claim
directly in the Idaho Supreme Court, seelung to have the Indian Gaming Initiative declared
unconstitutional on the same grounds as asserted in the instant case. The Court found no
controversy existed because petitioners did not meet traditional standing and ripeness requirements.
Thepetitioners did not allege acurrentparticularizedinjury in fact such as those alleged by Plaintiffs

3-
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ICnox and Dotson. Instead they alleged only a possible generalized future injury. Id at 800. The
Court further concluded that the case was not then ripe because "there [was] not a real controversy
at this point because Proposition One is simply a proposal . . .If Proposition One does not pass, there
will not be a need for an adjudication as to its validity." Id at 800. The Court concluded by stating
that "This is a statewide initiative on a subject in serious controversy . . . If tlze initiative passes

there will most certainly be ajusticiable controversy." Id at 803 (emphasis added).
Clearly the initiative passed and was codified. However, unlike Noh, Plaintiffs ICnox and
Dotson case have alleged a particularized and direct injury in fact from the initiative statutes. The
harm to Plaintiffs is not a possible future harm, but has already occurred and will continue to occur
without the relief they have requested. Thus, a present controversy and need to adjudicate the
constitutionality of I.C. $5 67-429B and -429C exists. Plaintiffs have therefore passed the standing
and ripeness tests and, as unequivocally stated by the Idaho Supreme Court, there is most certainly
a justiciable controversy.
Defendants are collaterally estopped from asserting a lack of standng or justiciable
controversy defense by Noh. Collateral estoppeI may be applied to prior judgments, estopping a
person from disputing a finding or verdict that has already been rendered. Navurro v. Yonkers, 173
P.3d 1141, 1144 (Idaho 2007). The tests of when collateral estoppel should apply are: (1) whether
the party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; (2) whether the issue decided in the
previous litigation is identical to the current issue presented; (3) whether the issue was actually
decided in the previous litigation and whether the issue was necessary to the prior judgment; (4)
whether the final judgment was on the merits; and (5) whether the party against whom the prior
judgment is asserted was a party or in privity with those subject to the priorjudgment. Id.
4-
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In Noh, defendants had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the justiciable controversy and
standing issues, and didso. Whether a justiciable controversy existed was a necessary issue to the
suit and was clearly decided in Noh; the lack of standing and ripeness was the sole reason the action
was dismissed. Defendants have already addressed and lost on the issue ofjusticiability. There was
no claim by the State that the tribes were necessary or indispensable parties in the Noh case.

B.

Plaintiffs' Reauested Relief will Redress Their Injury-In-Fact.

The Defendants contend that Plaintiffs requested relief "would secure a determination of a
legal issue but no effective redress . . . [that] the legal challenge advanced by plaintiffs is entirely
academic because it does not provide any relief against 'casino style gambling' . . . that they contend
is the source of their injury-in-fact." See Def. Reply Brief, p. 4.

In order to satisfy the.case or

controversy requirement of standing, litigants generally must allege or demonstrate an injury in fact
and a substantial likelilzood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed
injury. Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635,641 (1989) (emphasis added).
In this case, although not an absolute certainty, there is a substalztial likelihood that the relief
request by the Plaintiffs will redress their injury. A statute declared unconstitutional confers no
rights, creates no liability, and affords no protection -it is void (subject to certain exceptions not
applicable here). Snzith v. Costello, 77 Idaho 205,209, 290 P.2d 742, 744 (1955); State v. Garden

City, 74 Idaho 513,524,265 P.2d 328,333 (1953); Vale~zlev. Mills, 93 Idaho 212,215,458 P.2d
84,87 (1969). Defendants have each sworn to uphold and enforce the Idaho State Constitution

when they took office. If the Court were to find that LC. $5 67-429B and -429C violate the Idaho
Constitution, the Defendants would have no authority or ability to enforce or effectuate the void
statutes, and they would be duty-bound to enforce the Court's constitutional declaration. It is highly
5-
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doubtful, if not absolutely certain, that the Defendants would refuse to uphold and enforce the
Constitution in violation of the law and their oaths of office. A declaration by the Court that the
statutes are unconstitutional is therefore substantially likely to redress Plaintiffs' injuries.

11.

T i B TRIBES A R E NEITHER NECESSARY NOR INDISPENSABLE PARTIES.
The Tribes Not Necessary Parties Under Rule 19.

A.

The Defendants alternatively argue that if there is a substantial likeiihood of redressing
Plaintiffs' concrete injury-in-fact, then the tribes are necessary and indispensable parties under

I.R.C.P. 19, and because the tribes have sovereign immunity and cannot be joined, this case must
be dismissed. The Defendants thereby attempt to throw Plaintiffs and the Court on the horns of a
dilemma, making it literally impossible for the Court to address the constitutjonality of the Indian
gaming statues uizderany circumstarzces. The defendants' efforts to bar the courthouse to any and
all lawful plaintiffs seeking redress for the unconstitutionality of the Idaho Indian gaming statutes
must necessarily fail.

I.

As u vractical matter this action will not inz~airth.e hesent Tribes' abilitv to
protect their interests.

The Idaho tribes are not necessary parties under the first prong of Rule (19)(a)(l), which
requires joinder of a party if "(1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among
those already parties." The tribes are not necessary parties because if LC. 5s 67-429B and -429C
were declared unconstitutional by the Court, Plaintiffs would receive all the relief for which they
have prayed. The tribes are not necessary in order for the Court to declare the statutes
unconstitutional.

6-
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Neither are the tribes necessary under the second part of I.R.C.P. 19(a)(l), which requires
joinder of a party if "(2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so
situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair
or impede the person's ability to protect that interest." As noted in Plaintiffs' initial Brief in

Opposition, the amended complaint seelts no relief that will affect any tribal gaming rights. A
declaration by the Court that LC. $5 67-429B and -429C are unconstitutional will have no direct
effect on any tribes' ability to protect their interest. The viability of the tribes' compacts with the
State of Idaho is an entirely separate issue to which Plaintiffs Knox and Dotson are not parties.
The Defendants admit in their reply brief that a determination of unconstitutionality by the
Court would have no practical effect on the tribes' ability to protect their interest. See Def. Reply
Brief at 8 ("even if that determination would have nopracticaleffect - and on this score defendants
agree with plaintiffs . . ."). Defendants then proceed to argue that despite there being no practical
effect, "the tribes have a substantial economic and legal stake in the validity of contractual
undertakings with the State and a corresponding interest in protecting that stake against any claim
intended to cast a shadow over the propriety of compact-authorized gaming" and they "cannot
predict with certainty the eventual impact of a declaration that $$ 67-429B and -429C are
unconstitutional could have on their gaming enterprises.'' Therefore, as stated by Defendants, the
tribes at most only "have a concrete andimportant interest in any claim that suggests . . . they are
engaging in gaming activity not permitted under state law." Def. Reply Brief at 8.
While the tribes may have a "concrete and important interest" and may not be able to predict
the effect a finding that I.C. $5 67-429B and -429C are unconstitutional will have on their gaming
activities, this is not sufficient to satisfy the rule and make the trjbes necessary parties. Rulel9(a)(l)
7-
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requires that, as apracticul matter, the ability to protect this interest not be impaired or impeded.
As plaintiffs argued in their Brief in Opposition and as agreed by defendants, any determination
of unconstitutionality will not, as apractical matter, impair or impede the tribes' ability to protect
their interests. As aresult, the tribes are not necessary parties underLR.C.P. 19(a)(l), and therefore
need not be joined.

2.

The absenr tribes have izo interest reco~nizedbv Rule I 9 because I. C. .6,667429b and -429c which created the interest are palnablv unconstitzitiorzal.

The tribes are not necessary parties because they have no protectable interest in a compact
that is based upon an obviously unconstitutional statute. The Defendants postulate that the tribes
have a protectable interest within the meaning of Rule 19 in their gaming compacts, which in turn
derive from LC. 55 67-429B and C.

However, such an interest based upon the, clearly

unconstitutional Indian gaming statutes is not the type of interest qualified for protection under Rule
19. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals discussed interests based on palpably unconstitutional
statutes in Shermoen v. United Slates, 982 F.2d 1312 (9" Cir. 1992). Shermoen invol,ved 70
individual Native Americans and a community of Yurok Indians who sought review of a judgment
from the United States District Court for the Northern Distr-ict of California, which dismissed their
suit seeking injunctive relief and a declaration that the Hoopa-Yurok Settlement Act, violated their
constitutional rights, because the Hoopa Valley and Yurok tribes were necessary and indispensable
parties pursuant to Rule 19. The Ninth Circuit stated:
We do not hold, of course, that a district court would be required to find a
party necessary based on patently frivolous claims made by that party. But
such is clearly not the case before us; the absent tribes have an indisputable
interest in the outcome of appellants' suit, and the Act, which has created that
interest, is not so palpably unconstitutional that we could readily say the
absent tribes' claims are fatuous.
8-
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Idat 1318 . See also Aladree v. Ashla~zdCounty, 818 F.2d 1306, 1313 (7" Cir. 1987). Because the
Act at issue was not nearly so obviously in violation of the Constitution as the statutes at issue in the
instant case, theNinth Circuit found the tribe had a protectable interest under Rule 19.
In contrast, the interest of the tribes in the present case as postulated by the Defendants
derives fromI..C.$5 67-429B and -429C which are in fact palpably unconstitutional, a fact admitted
and certified by the Idaho Attorney General. Idaho Code $$ 67-429B and 67-429C purport to
authorize forms of casino gambling on Indian lands in Idaho. Specifically, Idaho Code $ 67-429B
purports to authorize the use of "tribal video gaming machines" on Indian lands. Flowever, Article

m,5 20 of the Idaho Constitution, as amended in 1992, expressly prohibits gambling in Idaho. It
provides, inter alia:

( 1 ) Gambling is contrary to public policy and is strictly prohibited except
for the following:
a. A state lottery which is authorized by the state if conducted in
conformicy with enabIing legislation; and
b. Pari-mutual betting if conducted in conformity with enabling
legislation; and

c. Bingo and raffle games that are operated by qualified charitable
organizations in the pursuit of charitable purposes if conducted in
conformity with enabling legislation.
(2) No activities permitted by subsection (1) shall employ any form of
casino gambling including, but not limited to, blaclijack, craps, roulette,
poker, baccarat, keno and slot maclzines, or employs any electronic or
electromechanical imitation or sir~zulationof anv form of casirzo ganzblirzg.
(Emphasis added).

9-

Ri<PLY MliMORANljL'hl !N OPPOSITION TO L)EFliNI):\NTS' MGTION 'I'G IIISMISS

The Idaho legislature has, by statute, likewise prohibited gambling, making it a crime (see
1.C. $4 18-3801 and 18-3802), and prohibited slot machines in particular. See I.C. § 18-3810. The
gambling activities ostensibly authorized by I.C. $5 67-429B and 67-429C do not fall within any of
the three exceptions in subsection (1) of Article 11, Section 20, of the Idaho Constitution and which
subsection (2) of ArticieDI, 9: 20 of the Idaho Constitution, expressly prohibits. For these reasons,
the Defendants have admitted that the tribal video gaming machines as defined in I.C. 5 67-429B
"would beconstruedas slot machines orimitations or simulations of forms of casinogambling," that
"in light of idaho's blanket restriction on the use or possession of slot machines, it is unlikely that
attempts to distinguish Tribal Video Gaming Machines from slot machines or imitations thereof
under Idaho law will succeed" and "the argument that such a gaming statute or initiative is
permissible

be premised upon an assumption that such gaming is permitted by the Idaho

Constitution." See Attached

-

Attorney General's Certificate of Review: Proposed Initiative

Regarding Tribal Video Machine Gaming (emphasis added).
In this case, the asserted tribal interests stemming from LC. §$ 67-429B and -429C are
based solely on palpably unconstitutional statutes. The very existence of the asserted absent tribes'
interest depends on the legality and presumed constitutionality of these plainly unconstitutional
statutes. As such, any claims of the absent tribes asserted by the Defendants are frivolous, fatuous
and inconsequential; therefore, this Court is not required to find that the tribes are necessary parties.

B.

The Tribes Are Not Indispensable Under Rule 19.

Analysis under I.R.C.P. 19(a)(2)is required only if a party is necessary under Rule 19(a)(l).
Because the tribes are not necessary parties under Rule 19(a)(l), any analysis under Rule 19(a)(2)
as to whether the tribes are indispensable is not required. However, assuming urgue~zdothat the
10 -
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tribes are necessary under Rule 19(a)(l), they clearly are not indispensable within the meaning of
R U I ~19(a)(2).

The tribes are not parties and will not suffer direct prejudice from a declaratory

judgment and indeed they are protected from such prejudice by LC. 5 10-1211 ("no declaration shall
prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding.

'I).

If the tribes believe that their

interest may he impaired then they have the ability to petition this court to intervene under
Rule 24. This would require the tribal authorities to participate in and consent to the adjudication
before this Court. Whether to participate is a decision for the tribal authorities, but their deliberate
unwillingness to participate is not a consideration for this Court as related to a motion to dismiss
under Rule 19.

1.

Tile Tribes' voluntary absence does not render them indimensable uizcler
Rule 19 nor does it relieve the Court o f its d u ~to, i~zter~ret
the Constitution.

The cases cited by the defendants on Rule 19 are fatally distinguishable. They lack facially
unconstitutional statutes upon which the tribes' interest is based, lack plaintiffs who advance truly
public rights, andlor involve prayers for relief directly requesting that the tribal compacts be
nullified. On the other hand, Saratoga County Ckanzber of Conznzerce, Iizc v. Pataki, 798 N.E.2d
1047 (N.Y. 2003) is directly on point. In that case the plaintiffs, citizens and legislators opposed to
casino gambling, alleged that a compact between the Governor and the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe
allowing electronic class EIgaming violated the New York constitutional ban on gambling. Initially,
the trial court dismissed the case for plaintiffs' failure to join the tribe as an indispensable party.
However, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court, holding that the tribes were not
indispensable, and remanded the case for proceedings on the merits. The trial court subsequently
granted summary judgment to plaintiffs, declaring the gaming compact unconstitutional, and

11 -
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defendants appealed thedecision, arguing the case should have been dismissed for failure to join the
Indian tribe as a necessary and indispensable party. The Court disagreed:
The Tribe is not a party to this action. Although its interests are certainly
affected by this litigation, the Tribe has chosen not to participate. Unless
Congress provides otherwise, Indian tribes possess sovereign immunity
against thejudicial processes of states. [citations omitted]. As a result, New
York courts cannot force the Tribe to participate in this lawsuit. The State
claims that the Tribe's absence requires us to dismiss this action. We
disagree.

The Court went on to discuss the rules governing joinder of necessary and indispensable
parties under New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR). CPLR 1001(b) is similar to Rule
19(a)(2),setting forth nearly identical factors for the court to consider when deciding whether to
dismiss an action where '7ulisdiction over [the necessary party] can be obtained only by his consent
or appearance." CPLR 1001(b) states these considerations in relevant part:

1. Whether the plaintiff has another effective remedy in case the action is
dismissed on account of the nonjoinder;
2. The prejudice which may accrue from the nonjoinder to the defendant
or to the person not joined;
3. Whether and by whom prejudice might have been avoided or may in the
future be avoided;

4. The feasibility of a protective provision by order of the court or in the
judgment; and

5. Whether an effective judgment may be rendered in the absence of the
person who is not joined.
NY CPLR 1001(b); Id at 1058.

12 -
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Like the instant case, the defendants in Pataki "relie[d] principally on paragraph (2), and
argue[dJthat the prejudice to the Tribe caused by a judgment eviscerating the authority under which
it operates the casino should be sufficient to dismiss the action. In contrast, plaintiffs rely on
paragraph (I), arguing that there can be no remedy for the alleged constitutional violation if the
Tribe's absence requires dismissal." The Court concluded that "Plaintiffs' arguments are on firmer
ground," and explained:

Not only will these plaintiffs be stripped of a remedy if we hold that the
Tribe is an indispensable party, but no member of the public will ever
be able to bring this constitutional challenge. In effect, the Executive
could sign agreements with any entity beyond the jurisdiction of the
Court, free of constitutionalinterdiction. The Executive's actions would
thus be insulated from review, a prospect antithetical to our system of
checks and balances.
There are two principal purposes of requiring dismissal owing
to the absence of an indispensable party. First, mandatory joinder
prevents multiple, inconsistent judgments relating to the same
controversy. Second, joinder protects the otherwise absent parties
who would be "embarrassed by judgments purporting to bind their
rights or interests.where they have had no opportunity to be heard".
[citations omitted].
Neither purpose applies here. The Tribe has chosen to be absent.
Nobody has denied it the "opportunity to be heard"; in fact, the Oneida
Indian Nation, which operates the Turning Stone Casino, has appeared as
amicus curiae making much the same arguments we would expect to be made
by the Tribe had it chosen to participate. While sovereign immunity
prevents the Tribe from being forced to participate in New York court
proceedings, it does not require everyone else to forego the resolution of
all disputes that could affect the Tribe (see Keene v Chambers, 271 N.Y.
326,330,3 N.E.2d 443 119361; Plaut v HGH Partnership, 59 A.D.2d 686,
398 N.Y.S.2d 671 [lst Dept 19771; 3 Weinstein-Korn-Nliller, NY Civ Prac
y[ 1001.10 [citing cases]). While we fully respect the sovereign
prerogatives of the Indian tribes, we wilt not permit the Tribe's
voluntary absence to deprive these plaintiffs (and in turn any member
of the public) of their day in court.

13 -

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

We conclude that the alleged constitutional violation will be without
remedy if this action is dismissed for the Tribe's nonjoinder. We further

conclude that to the extent the Tribe is prejudiced by our adjudication
of issues that affect its rights under the compact, the Tribe could have
mitigated that prejudice by participating in the suit (ct United States ex
rel. Steele v Tunz Key Gaming, Inc., 135 F.3d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir 19981).
The Tribe's nonjoinder is therefore excused, and we proceed to discuss the
meri Is.
Patuki, 798 N.E.2d at 1058-59 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Pazner v. Doyle, 680 N.W.2d 666 (Wis. 2004), overruled in part on otlzer

grounds, Dafryland Greylzound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 719 N.W.2d 408 (Wis. 2006), the Majority
Leader of the Wisconsin Senate and the Speaker of the Wisconsin Assembly, fiIed an action against
the Governor of Wisconsin and the Secretary of Administration, contending that they viqlated the
Wisconsin constitution in agreeing to certain amendments to a gaming compact entered into with
the Forest County Potawatomi Tribe. The defendants moved to dismiss the action on grounds of
standing and failure to join an indispensableparty, namely the Indian tribe. The Wisconsin Supreme
rejected both arguments for reasons similar to Patuki:
The Tribe's decision not to participate as a party cannot deprive this
court of its own core power to interpret the Wisconsin Constitution and
resolve disputes between coequal branches of state government. The Tribe
has been aware of this litigation from its inception. This court would have
welcomedits intervention. We will not venture the delicate balance of shared
power among our three branches of government on the chosen absence of a
potential party.
The upshot of accepting the Governor's invitation to dispose of this
case on procedural technicalitieswould be to insulate this agreement and
any future agreement between a governor and a tribe from the powers
of state judicial review. For over 200 years, it has been the province of the
judiciary to interpret the constitution and say what the law is. See Wisconsin
Senate, 144 Wis. 2d at 436 (citing Marbury v. Madisorz, 5 U.S. ( 1 Cranch)
137, 2 L. Ed. 60, (1803)). We are responsible for resolving legal disputes
14 -
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among the three branches of our state government and, therefore, we proceed
to the merits of the case.
Icl at 683 (emphasis added).

Other jurisdictions are in agreement with the Wisconsin Supreme Coun and the New York
Court of Appeals that a tribe's absence due to sovereign immunity should not result in dismissal of
the actlon. See, e.g., Kurzsas v United States, 249 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir 2001); Sac and Fox Nation

ofMo. v Norton, 240 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir 2001) (later superseded by statute); Artichoke Joe's v
Nortorz, 216F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1090-1091 (E.D. Cal 2002).
The logic and reasoning of these cases are unassailable and applicable in the present case.
Sovereign immunity prevents involuntary joinder of the tribes. However, it does not require the
citizens of Idaho to forego resolutions of all disputes that could possibly affect the tribes, especially,
as in this case, where there is a clear and blatant violation of the Idaho Constitution. Nor does it
requireorpermit this Court to abdicate its constitutional duty toresolvecases and conCroversies over
the constitutionality of an Act of the Idaho legislature. This Court cannot and shouid not allow the
tribes' voluntary absence to deprive Plaintiffs of their day in court. Dismissal of this case on such
a procedural technicality would be the equivalent of ruling that any and all acts of the Idaho
Iegisiature pertaining to Indian gaming and indeed to Indians in general, are forever insulated from
judicial review, regardless whether the act is in clear violation of the Constitution, barring the
courthouse doors to citizens of Idaho suffering concrete injury as a result of such unconstitutional
acts. As recognized in Pataki and Parzzer, this is entirely antithetical to our constitutional system
of checks and balances and must be summarily rejected.
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2.

The Tribes are not "indisvelzsable" under Rule 19 bv applicatio7z o f the
"public riphts" doctrine.

Even under the distinguishable line of cases cited in the Defendants' briefing, the tribes in
the instant case are not indrspensable under the "public rights doctrine," concerning "litigation ....
[which] transcends the private interests of the litigants and seeks to vindicate a public light." Wilbur
v. Locke, 423 F.3d 1101,1115 (9" Cir. 2006). Under this exception the absent party's interests may
be impaired but will not be allowed to destroy those interests in the party's absence. Id.
The Ninth Circuit first applied this doctrine in Comer v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1012, 109 S. Ct. 1121, 103 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1989). In Corzrzer, an
environmental group challenged the issuance of oil and gas leases by the BLM on the ground that
an adequateEIS had not been prepared. On appeal, several lessees claimed that they were necessary
parties under Rule 19, but the Ninth Circuit held the public rights exception applicable:
Subsequent courts have also refused to require the joinder of all parties
affected by public rights litigation -- even when those affected parties have
property interestsat stake -- because of the tight constraints traditional joinder
rules would place on litigation against the government. [many citations
omitted] . . . Like the cases cited above, this case is amenable to the
application of the National Licorice public rights doctrine. The appellees'
litigation against the government does not purpot? to adjudicate the rights of
current lessees; it merely seeks to enforce the public right to administrative
compliance with the environmental protection standards of NEPA and the
ESA.
Id. at 1459-60.
Likewise, Plaintiffs Knox and Dotson do not purport to adjudicate any rights of the parties
under the tribes' compacts wit11 the State of Idaho. They seek to enforce the public right to State
compliance with the Idaho Constitution. The fact that they have suffered particuIarized injury does
not somehow convert this issue from a public to a private matter. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has
i
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recognized that "[tlhe general subject of gaming [is] of great public interest." Am. Greyhound

Racing,Inc. v. Hull, 305F.3d 1015, 1026 (9'Cir. 2002). As the defendants recognize, the court in
H~d1refused to apply the public rights doctrine only because "[tlhe plaintiff sought th[e] injunction
to avoid competitive harm to their own operations," and therefore "the rights in issue between the
plaintiffs in this case, thetribes and the state are more private than public." D e f s B& p. 14 (quoting

Hull, 305 F.3d at 1026). But unlike Hull, Plaintiffs Knox and Dotson are not competitors of the
tribes seeking to share in the spoils of casino gambling. They seek to vindicate the public's right to
equal enforcement of theIdaho Constitution. If there is a public right in administrative enforcement
of the procedural rules under NEPA and ESA as declared in Conner, then surely there is an even
greaterpuhIic right of thecitizens of Idahoin enforcement of thesubstantive provisions of the Idaho
Constitution.
Contrary to theDefendants' assertions, the tribes' interests arenot "destroyed" by proceeding
in their absence. The public rights exception was first recognized in Nat'l Licorice v. NLRB, 309
U.S. 350 (1940). In thatcase the Supreme Court
restricted the applicability of the public rights exception to cases in which the
third parties' interests at issue are not destroyed. That is, "the third parties
[must be] left free to assex? such legal rights as they might have acquired . .
. ." Id. at 366. While the National Licorice Court upheld the NLRB's
termination of an unlawful "yellow dog" contract, it ordered the Board to
revise its order by omitting language that the contracts were "void and of no
effect." The Court also required the Board to state that the order was "without
prejudice to the assertion by the employees [the non-parties to the action] of
any legal rights they may have acquired. . . ."

Coizizer, 848 F.3d at 1859-60(quoting Nat'l Licorice, 309 U.S. at 367). Likewise, Plaintiffs Knox
and Dotson do not request rescission or termination of the State's compacts with the tribes. They
seek a declaration that LC. $5 67-429B and -429C are in direct violation of the Idaho Constitution
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The Court can similarly craft its declaration of unconstitutionality to make it without prejudice to
the assertion of the trjbes of any legal rights they may have acquired by compact with the State of
Idaho. Consequently, the "public rights" exception applies here to prevent the trjbes from being
deemed indispensable under Rule 19. TheDefendants' motion to dismiss must therefore be denied
on this additional ground.

CONCLUSION
For the ibregoingreasons, theDefendants' motion should be dismissed and the Court should
proceed to schedule this matter for final decision on the merits
DATED this -.(!-

day of July, 2008.
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:
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Defendants hereby give notice of decisional authority that is relevant to disposition of the
Motion to Dismiss set for hearing on August 18, 2008 and was issued subsequent to submission
of their reply briefin support ofthe motion.
On Jane 12, 2008, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Bepzdbh'c of

Philippines v. Pime~te2,128 S,Ct, 2180 (2006). The Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals abused its discretion in holding that the Republic of the Philippines was not an
indispensable party under Fed. R Civ. P. 19 despite the PhiIippinesl entitlement to sovereign

immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1979,28 U.S.C. $ 1604, It found that
the corn of appeals erred in considering the merits of the plaintiffs1claim as part of the Rule 19
decision-making process, See 128 S. Ct. at 2192 ("it was improper to issue a definitive holding
regarding a nonfrivolous, substantive claim made by an absen$ required entity that was entitled
by its sovereign status to hnmity from suitr1).* The Cowt further srared that while "[d]ismissal
under Rule 19@) will mean, in some instances, that plaintiffs will be left without a forum for
defitive resolution of their claims[,]

. . . that result is contemplated under the doctrine of

foreign sovereign immunity." Id. at 2194. These holdings are germane to arguments made in
Plaintiffs1Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at pages
8-10 and 11-15.

On August 8,2008, the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in Cachil D e b Band of Vs'nran

Indians v. California, No. 06-16145,2008 W L 3169486 (9th Cir. Altg, 8, 2008). The court of
appeals held that the district c o w erred in dismissing under Rule 19 a tribe's claims which
challeaged, inter alia, the California Gaming Control Commission's calculatiop of the size of a
" Amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 became effective following the Ninth Cirouir's deoision. Most in~portantly,they
replaced the term "necessary" in subparagraph (a) with rhe torrn "mqiiired" and deleted the term ind dip ens able^' in
subparagraph (b), 128 5. Ct. at 2184. These and anorher amendment, however, "were stytistic onlyl;]" i.e., "tho
substance of and operation of the Rule . . are unchanged." Id The federal rule chsrefore remains instfuctive with
respemto propor applicazion oELR.C,P. 19.

.
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gaming-machine license pool.

The lower court reasoned that the relief solzght might affect

adversely the monetary interest of certain non-party tribes who had competed with the plaintiff
tribe for the available licenses. The district court opinion, San Miguel Band of Mission Indians
V.

CaZifPrnia, No. 06~~0988-LAB,
2007 WL 935578 (S.D. Cal, Mar. 20, 2007), is cited at page

IS of the Brief in Support oZDefendmts1Motion to Dismiss. The court of appeals stated, in part,
that "[tlhe mere fact that the outcome of [the] litigation may have some financial consequences
for the non-party tribes is not sufficient to make those tribes required parties!' under Rule 19(a).
Id., at

95.

Rather, "[tlhe absent iribes must have a legally protected interest." Id. Such an

interest could exist "if it actually 'arises from terms in bargained contracts[,]"' but the gaming
compacts in effect at the time of the license-pool determination "aXord[ed] no express or implied
protection against competition per se." Id. (quoting Am. Greyhoufid Racing, Inc. V. Hull, 305
F.3d 1015, 1023 (9th Cir. 2002)). The Ninth Circuit's analysis is germane to a t p e n t s made in
the Brief in Support ofDefendants' Motion to Dismiss at pages 10-17,
DATED this 11th day of August 2008.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL D I S T R T C ' ~ ~ ' @ # ~ @ ~ "Ho
T~,

1

WENDY KNOX and RICHARD
DOTSON,

Case No. CV-2008-667

Plaintiffs,
-VS-

MINUTE ENTRY

STATE OF IDAHO, ex reel C.L. OTTER,
Governor; BEN YSURA, Secretary of
State; and LAWRENCE WASDEN,
Attorney General,
Defendants.

1

This matler came before the Court the 18thday of August 2008 for the purpose of
Defendants' MOTION TO DISMISS, the Honorable Darren B. Simpson presiding.
Ms. Sandra Beebe, Court Reporter, and Ms. Marielle Pratt, Deputy Clerk, were
present.
Mr. Curt Thomsen, Esq., appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs. Mr. Clay Smith,
. ,. '. appeared
..:... ,.:, . .
on behalf of the defendants.
Esq., and Mr. Michael Gilmore, Esq.
,

'COurt and counsel discussed the status of the case. Discussion was heard
regarding an amended complaint received by the Cow. The amended complaint will be
considered filed as of June 2,2008.

Mr. Smith presented argument. Mr. Thomsen responded, and Mr. Smith provided
rebuttal argument.
The Court took th matter under advi
da'y
DATED this @

MINUTE ENTRY

of August 20

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a full, true and correct copy of th f regoing document
day of August
was delivered by first-class mail, facsimile or designated box this
2008 to the following:
CURT TE-IOMSEN,ESQ.
2635 CHANNING WAY
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83404

6 u . s .Mail

Courii~liouseBox

CLAY R. SMITH, ESQ.
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GEhERAL
PO BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0010

flU.S. Maii

D CounhouseBox

MINUTE ENTRY

C]

Facsimiie

0 Facsimile
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IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM
WENDY IWOX and RICHARD
DOTSON,
Case No. CV 2008-667
Plaintiffs,
ORDER GRANTING DEmNDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS
STATE OF IDAHO, ex. rel. C.L. OTTER,
Governor; BEN YSURSA, Secretary of
State; and LAWRENCE WASDEN,
Attorney General,

j

Defendants.
I.

INTRODUCTION

BEFORE THIS COURT canle to be heard the Motion of the defendants, the state of
Idaho, ex rel. C. L. Otter, Governor; Ben Ysursa, Secretary of State; and Lawrence Wasden,
Attorney General (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "State"), to Dismiss.' The plaintiffs,
~d
Dotson (hereinafter the "Plaintiffs"), oppose the State's Motion and filed
Wendy Knox ~ u Richard
briefs in support thereof.'

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Suppot'ting Brief to Be Submitted Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(C)), Knox v. Slate,
Bingham County case no. CV 2008-667 (filed April 14,2008) (hereinafter the "State's Motion").
See: Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Knox v. State,Bingham County case no. CV
2008-667 (filed June 2, 2008) (hereinafter the "Plaintiffs' Memorandum"); Supplemental Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants' Motion lo Dismiss, Knox v. State,Bingham County case no. CV 2008-667 (filed July 1,
2008) (hereinafter the "Plaintiffs' Supplement").
-- - - - -.- -.-- ---.

.

..--

This Court held a hearing on the State's Motion on August 18,2008.~Having reviewed the
evidence, the arguments of the parties and the relevant authorities, this Court shall grant the State's
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Plaintiffs failed to show a substantial likelihood that the
judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury.

The Plaintiffs, citizens of Bingham County, allege they developed "clinical and devastating
addictions" to gambling at the slot machines at the Fort Hall Indian Reservation Casino (hereinafter
the 'Fort I-Iall casino")? They filed this lawsuit to challenge the constitutionality of Idaho Code
("LC.")

5 67-429B and 5 67-429C, which code sections were enacted upon the Idaho electorate's

vote in favor of Proposition One during the November 5,2002 general ele~tion.~
Idaho Code 5 67-429B reads as follows:
(1) Indian tribes are authorized to conduct gaming using tribal video gaming
machines pursuant to state-tribal gaming compacts which specifically
permit their use. A tribal video gaming machine may be used to conduct
gaming only by an Indian tribe, is not activated by a handle or lever, does
not dispense coins, currency, tokens, or chips, and performs only the
following fmctions:
(a) Accepts currency or other representative of value to qualify a player
to participate in one or more games;
(b) Dispenses, at the player's request, a cash out ticket that has printed
upon it the game identifier and the player's credit balance;
(c) Shows on a video screen or other electronic display, rather than on a
paper ticket, the results of each game played;
(d) Shows on a video screen or other electronic display, in an area
separate from the game results, the player's credit balance;
(e) Selects randomly, by computer, numbers or symbols to determine
game results; and
(f) Mait~tainsthe integrity of the operations of the terminal.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of Idaho law, a tribal video gaming
machine as described in subsection (1) above is not a slot machine or an
electronic or electromechanical imitation or simulation of any form of
casino gambling.

3

Minute Entry, Knox v. State,Bingham County case no. CV 2008667 (filed August 19,2008).
Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Knox v. State, Bingham County case no. CV 2008-667 (filed June
2,2008) (hereinafter the "Amended Complaint"), at pp. 1,3.
5
Amended ComplainT, at p. I .
-.._^. ..^
1

-.__.--

Idaho Code 5 67-439C holds:
(1) Any tribe with an existing state-tribal gaming compact may amend its
compact throughout the procedure set forth in subsection (2) below to
incorporate all of the following terms:
(a) As clarified by this compact amendment, the tribe is permitted to
conduct gaming using tribal video gaming machines as described in
Section 67-429B, Idaho Code.
(bj In the10 years following incorporation of this term into its compact,
the number of tribal video gaming machines the tribe may possess is
limited to the number of tribal video gaming machines possessed by
the tribe as of January 1, 2002, plus 25% of that number; provided,
however, that no increase in any single year shall exceed 5% of the
number possessed as of January 1, 2002. Thereafter, the tribe may
operate such additional tribal video gaming machines as are agreed to
pursuant to good faith negotiations between the state and the tribe
under a prudent business standard.
(c) To the extent such contributions are not already required under the
tribe's existing compact, the tribe agrees to contribute 5% of its
annual net gaming income for the support of local educational
programs and schools on or near the reservation. The tribe may elect
to contribute additional sums for these or other educational purposes.
Disbursements of theses funds shall be at the sole direction of the
tribe.
(dj The tribe agrees not to conduct gaming outside of Indian lands.
(3) To amend its compact to incorporate the terms set forth in subsection (1)
above, a tribe shall deliver to the Secretary of State a tribal resolution
signifying the tribe's acceptance of the terms. Immediately upon delivery of
such tribal resolution to the Secretary of State, (a) the tribe's state-tribal
gaming compact shall be deemed amended to incorporate the terms; (b) the
tribe's compact as so amended shall be deemed approved by the state in
accordance with Section 67-429A, Idaho Code, without the need for further
signature or action by the executive or legislative branches of state
government, and (c) except to the extent federal govement approval is
required, the newly incorporated compact terms shall be deemed effective
immediately.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to (a) indicate that any gaming
activity currently conducted by any tribe is unauthorized or otherwise
inappropriate under Idaho law or the tribe's existing compact, or (b) prohibit
a tribe from negotiating with the state for an initial compact or a compact
amendment regarding tribal video gaming machines or any other matter
through a procedure other than the procedure specified in subsection (2)
above or which contains terms different than those specified in subsection
(1) above.

The Plaintiffs allege that these code sections violate Idaho Constitution, Article 111, § 20:
whicl~states:

(I) Gambling is contrary to public policy and is strictly prohibited except for the
following:
a. A state lottery which is authorized by the state if conducted in
conformity with enabling legislation; and
b. Pari-mutuel betting if conducting in conformity with enabling
legislation; and
c. Bingo and raffle games that are operated by qualified charitable
organizations in the pursuit of charitable purposes if conducted in
conformity with enabling legislation.
(2) No activities permitted by subsection (1) shall employ any form of casino
gambling including, but not limited to, blackjaclc, craps, roulette, poker,
bacarrat, keno and slot machines, or employ any electronic or
electromechanical imitation or simulation of any form of casino gambling.
(3) The legislature shall provide by law penalties for violations of this section.
(4) Notwithstanding the foregoing, the following are not gambling and are not
prohibited by this section:
a. Merchant promotional contests and drawings conducted incidentally to
bona fide nongaming business operations, if prizes are awarded
without consideration being charged to participants; and
b. Games that award only additional play.
The State contends that the Plaintiffs' alleged injuries cannot be redressed without the
joinder of the Shoshone-Bannock Tribe (hereinafter the "Tribe")," which is impossible due to the
Tribe's sovereign imm~nity.~
The State further argues that even if the action could proceed without
the Tribe, this Court cannot enter a declaratory judgment because the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act, 25 U.S.C.

2710 elseq. (the "IGRA"), together with the "Shoshone-Bannock Tribes and the

State of Idaho Compact for Class I11 Gaming" (hereinafter the "Compact"), preempts this Court's
jurisdiction over disputes regarding the ~ o m ~ a c t The
. ' State also raises the issue of the Plaintiffs'
standing to bring this suit on the basis that a declaratory judgment does not redress the Plaintiffs'

6

Amended Coinplaint, at pp. 1-2.
According to the honorable Lynn W h i l l , federal district judge, the "Shoshone and Bannock Tribes" is a single,
federally-recognized Indian Tribe. &:Affidavit of Clay R. Smith, Knox v. State, Bingham County case no. CV
2008-667 (filed April 28,2008) (hereinafter theL'Smith Affidavit"), at Exhibit 5, p. 8, footnote 4.
Brief in Support of Defendndants' Motion to Dismiss, Knox v. State, Bingham County case no. CV 2008-667 (filed
April 28,2008) (hereinafter the "State's Brief"), at p. I .
State's Brief, at p. 2.
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alleged injuries-in-fact."
111.

DISCUSSION

The State initially alleges that the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint should be dismissed on
three bases: (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
("I.R.C.P.")12(b)(l); (2) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under I.R.C.P.
12(b)(6); and (3) failure to join an indispensible party under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(7). This Court shall
discuss each of these bases seriatim.
A.

Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
In its Motion, the State argues this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate

whether certain gaming machines operated by the Tribe comply with "state law requirements.""
However, the Plaintiffs are not asking for an adjudication of whether certain gaming machines
operated by the Tribe comply with state law requirements. Instead, they argue that certain state
statutes, which concern tribal video gaming machines, do not conform to the parameters of
Article 111, 5 20 ofthe Idaho ~onstitution.'~
Although the State, in its Brief, raises the issue of this Court's lack of authority to issue
relief to the Plaintiffs, the State does not premise its argument upon I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l) but on
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).13 Nowhere in the State's briefing does the State rely upon the standard of
review applied to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(1).14Accordingly, this Court shall consider the State's lack of
authority arguments under the I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) standard.

'"tate's
Brief, at p. 9; Reply Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Knox v. Stafe,Bingham County
case no. CV 2008-667 (filed June 5,2008) (hereinafter the "State's Reply").
II
State's Motion, at p. 2.
l2 Plaintiffs' Memorandum, atpp. 2, 7.
l3 State's Brief, at p. 2.
State's Brief; State's Reply; Defendant's Notice of Supplemental Authority, Knox v. State, Bingham
County case no. CV 2008-667 (filed August 1I, 2008) (hereinafter theS'State's Supplement").
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B.

Failure to State a Cause of Action upon which Relief can be Granted.

The standard for reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to

I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) is the same as the standard for adjudicating a motion for summary judgment."
In other words, the non-moving party is entitled to have all inferences from the record and
pleadings viewed in his or her favor and only then may the question be aslced whether a claim for
relief has been stated.lb Dismissal is appropriate only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his or her claim that would entitle him or her to relief.17
However, this Court need not find that the Plaintiffs can only obtain the particular relief prayed
for, as long as the Court can ascertain that some relief may be granted."
The only facts which a court may properly consider on a motion to dismiss are those
appearing in the complaint, supplemented by those facts of which the court may properly take
judicial notice.lg If a court considers matters outside the pleadings on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, such motion must be treated as a motion for summary judgment and the proceedings
thereafter must comport with the hearing and notice requirements of I.R.C.P. 56."
In support of its Motion, the State submitted the Smith Affidavit. The State argues that
the exhibits attached to the Smith Affidavit are matters of pubIic record and therefore this
Court's consideration of them does not convert the State's Motion to motion for summary
Attached to the Smith Affidavit are the following: (1) Affidavit of Miren E. Artiach,
filed in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, consolidated case nos. CIV 01-

IdahoSchoolsforEqual Edncational Opportunip v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573,578,850 P.2d 724,729 (1993).
Idaho Schools for Equal Jducational OpportuniQ, 123 Idaho at 578, 850 P.2d at 729; Miles v. Idaho Power
Company, 116 Idaho 635, 637,668 P.2d 757, 759 (1989); Harperv. Harper, 122 Idaho 535,536, 835 P.2d 1346, 1347
(Ct. App. 1992); Ernst v. Hemenway & Moser, Co., 120 Idaho 941,946,821 P.2d 996, 1001 (Ct. A p p . 1991).
"Haraer. 122 Idaho at 536.835 P.2d at 1347: Ernst v. Hemenwav.
,. 120 Idaho at 946.821 P.2d at 1001.
~ a k e r122
, Idaho at 536; 835 P.2d at 1347:
19
Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 276, 796 P.2d 150, 153 (Ct. A p p . 1990); Owsley v. Idaho Indusirial
Commission, 141 Idaho 129, 133, 106 P.3d 455,459 (2005)
20
Hellicluon, 118 Idaho at 276,796 P.2d at 153.
2 ' Slate's Motion, at p. 7.
IS
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(2)L Order,
w ; ~ ~Bell v. Ceflumsa, Idaho Supreme Court case
no. 29226 (dated June 2, 2003);2~(3) Order Denying Petition for Rehearing, Bell v Cenarrusa,
Idaho Supreme Court case no. 29226 (dated October 16, 2003);"

(4) The Shoshone-Bannock

~ ; ~(5)~ Memorandum Decision
Tribes and the State of Idaho Compact for Class 111 ~ a r n i n and
and Order, Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho, United States District Court for the District of
Idaho case nos. CV-01-052-E-BLW and CV-OI-171-E-BLW (filed April 12, 2 0 0 4 ) ~ ~All of
these documents, save for the Compact, reveal on their face that they have been filed (without
qualification) with or by various state and federal courts and are, therefore, matters of public
record.27 Although the Compact does not show, on its face, that it has been made a part of the
public record in a previous state or federal case, the Plaintiffs do not dispute the authenticity of
Exhibit 4 to the Smith ~ffidavit.~'Neither do the Plaintiffs contend that this Court must
consider this matter under the I.R.C.P. 56(c) standard of review.29 Accordingly, this Court shall
not convert the State's Motion to a motion for summary judgment, despite the documents
attached to the Smith Affidavit.

Smith Affidavit, at Exhibit I.
Smith Affidavit, at Exhibit2
24 Smith Affidavit, at Exhibit 3.
Smith Affidavit, at Exhibit 4.
26 Smith Affidavit, at Exhibit 5.
27 See: U S . v. 14.02 Acres ofLaizdMore or Less in Fresno County, 530 F.3d 883,894 (9" Cir. 2008).
28 See: Plaintiffs' Memorandum; Plaintiffs' Supplwnent. -:
Lord v. Swine Pacjfic Holdings, Inc, 203
1175, 1178 (D. Idaho 2002).
29 See: Plaintiffs' Memorandum; Plaintiffs' Supplement. Again, the standard of review for an I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss is the same as an I.R.C.P. 56(c) motion for summary judgment. Idaho Schools for Equal
Educational Opportunity v. Evam, 123 Idaho 573,578,850 P.2d 724,729 (1993).
22

23
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The Tribe is Nut an Indispensible Party to this Lawsuit.

C.

Initially, the State argues that the Tribe is an indispensible party to this litigation and,
because it cannot be sued without its permission, this matter must be di~missed.~'Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) requires that the failure to join indispensible parties must be raised as an
affirmative defense, after which the burden falls on the plaintiffs to join "all parties who have or
claim any interest which would be affected by the dec~aration."~' Whether a party is
indispensable to an action depends largely upon the relief
The basis for the State's argument is the premise that the only means of effecting relief
for the plaintiffs is by modification of the Tribe's Compact with the

The plaintiffs

respond that they are not challenging or seeking to invalidate any tribal compacts with the State,
but are merely seeking ajudgment declaring I.C. $ 67-429B and 9 67-429C ~nconstitutional.~~
Declaratory judgments are authorized in Idaho under LC. § 10-1201, et seq. Relevant
code sections under Title 10, Chapter 12 read:

10-1201. Declaratory judgments authorized -Form and effect. - Courts of
record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights,
status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be
claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a
declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either
affirmative or negative in form and effect, and such declarations shall have the
force and effect of a final judgment or decree.

" State's Brief, at pp. 10-17. Tribal sovereign immunity is "a necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and selfgovernance." Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 512 F.3d 921, 928 (7*' CC. 2008) (Ho-Chunk II) [&:
Three
Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P.C., 476 U.S. 877, 894, 106 S. Ct. 2305, 90
L.Ed.2d 881 (198613. Tribal sovereign immunity extends to suits for declaratory relief. Ho-Chunk 11, 5 12 F.3d at
928
Imperial Granit Co. v. Pala Band of Mission Indians, 940 F.2d 1269, 1271 (9" CC. 1991) and Santa
ClaraPueblo s. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,59,98 S. Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed2d 106 (1978)l. Thus, suits against Indian tribes
are barred bv sovereien immunitv without a clear waver bv the tribe or con~ressionalabrogation. Ho-Chunk 11, 512
F.3d at 928 'citing:~YklahomaT& Commission v. citizen ~ a n d ~ o t a w a t o m ~ ~ nTribe,
d i a n 498 U.S. 505, 509, l l l S.
Ct. 905,909,112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (199I)J.
3 1 Hartman s. United Heritage Properly and Casualty Company, 141 Idaho 193, 198, 108 P.3d 340, 345 (2005)
LC. g 10-1211; Tomchakx walker, 108 Idaho 446,449,700 P.2d 68,71 (1985)).
32 Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. Slate, 132 Idaho 559, 976 P.2d 913 (1998) b:
Barlow v.
InternationalHaarvester Company, 95 Idaho 881, 896, 522 P.2d 1102, 1117 (1974)l.
33 State's Brief, at p. 9.
194
34 Plaintiffs' Memorandum, at pp. 2, 7.
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10-1202. Person interested or affected may have declaration. -Any person
interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a
contract or any oral contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are
affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have
determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument,
statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status
or other legal relations thereunder.
10-1211. Parties to action - Municipal order or franchise. - When
declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or ciaim
any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall
prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding. In any proceeding
which involved the validity of a municipal ordinance or franchise, such
municipality shall be made a party, and shall be entitled to be heard, and if the
statute, ordinance or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, the attorney
general of the state shall also be served, and be entitled to be heard and may
intervene.
10-1212. Construction of act. -This act is declared to be remedial; its
purpose is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with
respect to rights, status and other legal relations, and is to be liberally construed
and administered.
This Court has authority to render a declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of a state

This Court must then inquire whether the Tribe is an indispensable party to an
/

adjudication of the constitutionality of I.C. § 67-429B and 5 67-429C. Under I.R.C.P. 19(a)(l), a
party shall be joined if:
(1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those
already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the
action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence
may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that
interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk
of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of
the claimed interest.

-

Idaho

35 See: Gallagher
State, 141
665, 668, 115 P.3d
n n n n n m h n ? ~ ~ l nw-onin*hi~r,
\ i r
b n n ~ r m
m nleadrer

v.

756,759 (2005)

This Court's decision regarding whether or not the Tribe is an indispensable party is
di~cretionary.~~
This Court must therefore: (1) correctly perceive the issue as one of discretion;
(2) act within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with the legal standards applicable to
the specific choices available to it; and (3) reach its decision by an exercise of reason.37
The Plaintiffs in this case do not seek to enjoin the Tribe from operating the tribal video
gaming machines located in the Fort Hall Casino. The Plaintiffs do not seek, by this action, to
enjoin the use of tribal video gaming machines by all of the Indian tribes in the state of Idaho.
They are seeking a declaration that I.C. (i 67-429B and (i 67-429C are unconstitutional.
Should this Court ultimately grant the relief the PIaintilfs request, such declaration will
not invalidate the Compact between the Tribe and the Stale, which Compact the Tribe and the
* Tribe's legally
State executed prior to the enactment of I.C. (i 67-429B and $ 6 7 - 4 2 9 ~ . ~The
protectable interest in operating tribal video gaming machines flows from the Compact, not from
I.C. $ 67-429B and $ 67-429C. The Tribe's ability to protect its interests under the Compact is
provided for by the Compact, and, to a certain extent, by IGRA.
Furthermore, a final adjudication that I.C. (i 67-429B and (i 67-429C are unconstitutional,
should such outcome occur, does not necessarily result in the renegotiation ofthe Compact by the
State and the Tribes. Although renegotiation is certainly a possibility, another alternative is for
the Idaho Legislature to pursue alternative legislation, amendment of Article 111, (i 20 of the Idaho
Constitution, arbitration under the terms of the Contract, or renewed litigation in federal district
court regarding the scope of gaming allowed in Idaho. Interpretation of the Compact is not an
issue before this Court. Neither can this Court speculate as to how the State would ultimately
proceed upon an ultimate finding that I.C. $ 67-429B and (i 67-429C violate the Idaho

36
37

Utter x Gibbins, 137 Idaho361, 366,48 P.3d 1250, 1255 (2002).

Sun Valley Shopping Ce~te,;Inc. v. Idaho Power Co,119 Idaho 87,94,803 P.2d 993, 1000 (199 1).

38 See: Smith Affidavit, at Exhibit 4, pp. 31-33. The Tribe and the State signed the Compact on Februaly 18, 2000.
i d a h o ~ o d e6 67-429B and 67-429C went into effect in November of 2002.
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~onstitution.~~
Finally, this Court considers whether the absence of the Tribe from this suit leaves either
the Plaintiffs or the State subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations by reason of the Plaintiffs' request for a declaration that I.C. 3 67-429B
and § 67-429C are unconstitutional. Should this Court, and ultimately the Idaho Supreme Court,
determine that I.C.

5 67-429B and 5

67-429C are inconsistent with Art. 111, 5 20 of the Idaho

Constitution, that finding would be the same regardless of the party bringing the claim. Any
additional action by the State, necessitated by a finding of unconstitutionality, would be
consistent with the finding of constitutionality, rather than inconsistent therewith.
Based upon these findings, this Court concludes that the Tribe is not an indispensable
party to this lawsuit.

IGRA doe not Preempt State Court Action Adjudicating the Constitutionality of
State Statutes.

D.

The State asgues that the Plaintiffs' cause of action is preempted by I G R A . ~This
~ Court
notes, however, that IGRA confers jurisdiction on the federal district courts in three (3)
instances: (1) for "any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a
State to enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe ... or to conduct such negotiations in good
faith;" (2) for "any cause of action initiated by a State or Indian tribe to enjoin a class 111gaming
activity located on Indian lands and conducted in violation of any Tribal-State compact;" or (3)
for "any cause of action initiated by the Secretary to enforce the procedures" prescribed in

IGRA."'
None of the instances set forth in IGRA are found in this lawsuit. The Tribe has not filed
suit arising from the failure of the State to negotiate a compact or conduct negotiations in good

39See:IdahoSchooL~forEqualEducational Oppo~tunilyv. Stale, 132 Idaho 559,568,976 P.2d 913,922 (1998).
State's Brief, at pp. 17-27.
" 25 U.S.C. S) 2710(d)(7)(A)(i)-(iii);Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nalion, 463 F.3d 655, 659-60 (7" Cir. 2006)(Ho40

faith, neither the State nor the Tribe filed suit to enjoin class III gaming co~lductedin violation of
the Compact, and the lawsuit was not filed by the Secretary to enforce the procedures prescribed
in IGRA.
For these reasons, this Court finds that the Plaintiffs' suit for a declaratory judgment is
not preempted by IGRA.
E.

The Plaintiffs have Not Established that a Declaratory Judgment will Redress their
Claimed Injuries.

The question then becomes whether or not a citizen of this County, allegedly addicted due
to the proximity of tribal video gaming machines, maymaintain a petition for a declaration that
LC. S, 67-429B and § 67-429C are unconstitutional where such declaration does not necessarily
rid the area of the offending gaming machines.
As the State correctly asserts, the Plaintiffs must establish standing in order to maintain
their suit for a declaratory j ~ d ~ m e n t .It4is~ a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence that a
person wishing to invoke a court's jurisdiction must have standing!3

The doctrine of standing

focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the party wishes to have a d j ~ d i c a t e d . ~ ~
In order to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, a litigant must "allege or
demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will
prevent or redress the claimed injury.'*5 Finally, a citizen may not challenge a governmental
enactment where the injury is one suffered alike by all citizens of the j~isdiction.4~

Chunk 0.
198
State's Brief, aipp. 7-9.
Van Valkenburghv. Citizensfor Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 124, 15 P.3d 1129, 1132 (2000).
44
Thomson v. City of Lewisfon, 137 Idaho 473, 477, 50 P.3d 488, 492 (2002)
Miles v. Idaho Power
Company, 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989); Boundaw Backpackers v. Boundary County, 128 Idaho
371,375,913 P.2d 1141,1145 (1996)l.
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Idaho Code

5 67-429B authorizes Indian tribes, in conjunction with a compact with the

State, to conduct gaming using video gaming machines and defines the term "tribal video gaming
machine." Idaho Code 5 67-429C describes how Indian tribes may amend their compacts with
the State and includes the term "tribal video gaming machine" as defined in Idaho Code

5 67-

429B.
The Plaintiffs allege that after the enactment of LC. 5 67-427B and

5 67-427C, and after

the installation of slot machines at the Fort Hall Casino, they became compulsive gamblers,
driving the short distance from their homes to Fort Hall Casino three (3) to four (4) times per
week.47 The Plaintiffs gambled exclusively at Fort Hall Casino, using only the slot machines.48
The Plaintiffs have allegedly developed "clinical and devastating addictions to gambling at Fort
Hall Casino and estimate their losses at $30,000.00 to $50,000.00.~~
They allege that they have
~
paid additional sums they otherwise would not have incurred in seeking t ~ e a t m e n t . ~The
Plaintiffs claim that had the State not enacted I.C.

5

67-427B and

5

67-429C, neither Wendy

Knox nor Richard Dotson would have suffered the alleged harm."
The State does not dispute these facts for purposes of its dispositive motion.52 Indeed,
where standing is the issue raised by a motion to dismiss, this Court must construe Plaintiffs'
claims as
Instead, the State urges that a judgment declaring I.C.

5

67-427B and

5

67-429C

unconstitutional would not prevent or redress the claimed injury.54 Indeed, should Plaintiffs
receive the ultimate relief they request, a final adjudication that I.C.

41

48

49

Amended Complaint, at p. 3
Id.

z

1u.

so -

Amended Complaint, at p. 4

51 r r

10.
-

"State's Brief, at p. 9.
53
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S. Ct. 2197,2206,45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)
54
Id.
-

5 67-427B and 5 67-429C

are unconstitutional, their injuries would not be redressed. For the same reasons that the State
cannot show that the Tribe is an indispensable party, the Plaintiffs cannot show that a favorable
conclusion to their lawsuit would redress their injuries.
Specifically, the Compact, which predates the enactment of 1.C. 5; 67-427B and 5; 67429C, establishes that: (1) the State questioned whether the "electronic gaming currently
conducted by the Tribes in Idaho" fell within the confines of Article 111, 5; 20 of the Idaho
Constitution; (2) the Tribe interpreted lGRA to mean that the Tribe was entitled to offer any
gaming activities "that is otherwise permitted by any person, organization, or entity for ally
purpose;" and (3) the Tribe took the alternative position that if Article 111, 5 20 of the Idaho
Constitution did prohibit electronic games currently conducted by the Tribe, then the Tribe was
entitled to offer electronic facsimiles of any lottery game reasonably defined as owned and
operated by government en ti tie^.^' The State and the Tribe agreed to resolve the dispute of what
gaming the Tribes were allowed to conduct under IGRA by either or both parties filing a
~ ~ parties
declaratory judgment action in the U.S. District Court for the District of ~ d a h o .The
agreed to abide by the final judicial determination of the declaratory judgment

action(^).'^

Both palties filed suit for a declaratory judgment in the U.S. District Court for the District
During the pendency of the federal lawsuit, the
of Idaho, which suits were con~olidated.~~
parties notified the U.S. District Court of the passage of Proposition One and the resultant
~ ~ upon the enactment of I.C. 5; 67-429B and
enactment of I.C. 5; 67-429B and 5; 6 7 - 4 2 9 ~ .Based

5; 67-429C, the State (and consequently the U.S. District Court) 60 shifted i.ts focus from the types
of games allowed under the Idaho Constitution, to whether or not the Compact required the Tribe

55

Smith Affidavit, at Exhibit 4, pp. 6-7.
Smith Affidavit, at Exhibit 4, pp. 89.
57
Smith Affidavit, at Exhibit 4, pp. 10-12.
58
See: Smith Affidavit, at Exhibit 5, p. 4.
59 Smith Affidavit, at Exhibit 5, pp. 5-7.
60
&: Smith Affidavit, at Exhibit 5, p. 4.
56
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to submit to renegotiation of the Compact in order to utilize tribal video gaming machines6'
Thus, the U.S. District Court did not adjudicate the issue of and whether or not tribal video
gaming machines fit within Micle 111, 8 20 of the Idaho ~onstitution.~'Likewise, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals adjudicated the parties' rights under the Compact and did not address
the constitutionality of I.C. 8 67-429B and 5 6 7 - 4 2 9 ~ . ~ ~
Under this factual scenario, should the Plaintiffs attain the ultimate relief they seek, then
the Tribe and the State will fall back upon their Compact, which allows the Tribe to operate any
gaming activity that the State permits for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity.64
Either the State or the Tribe may request renegotiation of the

Whether or how the

State or the Tribe might return to the U.S. District Court for a finding as to the constitutionality
of tribal video gaming machines is a question of interpretation of the Compact, which is not
before this Court. Whether or not the State will seek to pass other legislation, or to amend the
Idaho Constitution, is highIy speculative.
In order for this Court to determine whether a declaratoty judgment will prevent or
redress the Plaintiffs' claimed injuries, the Plaintiffs must prove that the practical consequence of
such judgment would amount to a significant increase in the likelihood that they would obtain
relief that directly redresses the injury suffered.66 his "significant increase in the likelihood of
relief' is not present in this case. This Court cannot speculate as to the outcome of any
relitigation or renegotiation of the Compact, or any efforts on the part of the State to introduce
different statutes or even a constitutional amendment. A declaration that I.C. Ej 67-429B and

61

See: Smitli Affidavit, at Exhibit 5, p. 8.

5

See:
Bell v. Cenarrusa, Idaho Supreme Court Order no. 29226 (dated June 2, 2003) wherein the Idaho
Supreme Court declined to rule on the challenge to the constitutionality of Proposition One for lack of original
jurisdiction.
"See: Idaho v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 465 F.3d 1095 (9' Cir. 2006).
See: Smith Affidavit, at Exhibit 4, p. 7 and p. 30.
65 G t h Affidavit, at Exhibit 4, p. 30.
" Ufahv Evans, 536 U.S. 452,464, 122 S. Ct. 2191,2199, 153 L.Ed.2d 453 (2002)
62

20.f

67-429C are unconstitutional does not, without other, intervening events, rid the Plaintiffs of the
proximity of the slot machines to which they claim to be addicted.67
For these reasons, this Court finds that the Plaintiffs have not established standing and
this Court is compelled to grant the State's Motion to Dismiss.

1V.

CONCLUSlON AND ORDER

Although this Court does not find that the Tribe is an indispensable party to this suit, the
Court does find that the Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the relief sought will redress their
claimed injuries. Therefore, the Plaintiffs lack standing to maintain this action, and the lawsuit
must be dismissed. The State's Motion to Dismiss is therefore granted.
5T

IT IS SO ORDERED AND DATED this &day of September 2008.

- McConnell v. FederalElection Commission, 540 U.S. 93,229, 124 S. Ct. 619,709, 157 L.Ed2d 491 (2003)
('T
' he relief the Paul plaintiffs seek is for this Court to strike down the contribution limits, removing the alleged
disparate editorial controls and economic burdens imposed on them. But [Bipartisan Campaign Refonn Act of 2002
"BCRA"] $ 307 merely increased and indexed for inflation certain FECA [Federal Electiol~Campaign Act of 19713
contribution limits. * * * Although this Court has jurisdiction to hear a challenge to [BCRA] 3 307, if the Court
were to strike down the increases and indexes established by BCRA 3 307, it would not remedy the Paul plaintiffs'
alleged injury because both the Iimitations imposed by FECA and the exemption for news media would remain
unchanged. A ruling in the Paul plaintiffs' favor, therefore, would not redress their alleged injury and they
accordingly lack standing."')
" See:

^"
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IN TEE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BNGHAM
WENDY IaYOX and RICHARD DOTSON, )
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NOTICE OF APPEAL
(I.A.R. 17)

STATE OF IDAHO,ex rel., C.L. OTTER, )
Governor; BEN YSURSA, Secrelary of
)
State; and LAWRENCE WASDEN,
1
Attorney General,
1
Defendants.

TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTSIRESPONDENTS, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS,
AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT

NOTICE IS HEREBY GWEN THAT:
1.

The above named appellants Wendy ICnox and Richard Dotson appeal against the

above named defendantdrespondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order Granting
Defendants's Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice, entered in the above entitled action on the 21"' day

207
1-

NOTICE OF APPEAL

of September, 2008, and Judgment entered on the 25thday of September, 2008, Darren B. Simpson
presiding.
That appellant has aright to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and the judgment or

2.

orders described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Idaho Appellate
Rule 1l(a)(l).
3.

Appellant intends to assert that following issues on appeal:
(a)

That the District Court erred in determining that plaintiff lacked standing.

4.

No portion of the record has been sealed.

5.

A reporter's transcript is requested; specifically plaintiffs request a transcript of the

hearing held on August 18,2008, on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

6.

The appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's record

in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28 LAX.:
a.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and all briefs, memoranda, affidavits, and

exhibits filed in support therein; and
b.

Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and

Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
7.

I certify (a) that a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter; (b)

&at the estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's record has been paid; (c) that the appellate filing
fee has been paid; (d) that the reporter or the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated
fee for preparation of the transcript; and (e) that service has been made upon all parties required to
beservedpursuant to Rule20 and the attorneygeneralofIdaho pursuant to Idaho Code 567-1401(1).
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DATED this

a

day of October, 2008.

Attorney for Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and with
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the

a

day of October, 2008, I caused a true and correct

copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served upon the following persons at the
addresses below their names either by depositing said document in the United States mail with the
correct postage thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth below.
LAWRENCE G WASDEN ESQ
ATTORNEY GENERAI,
STEVEN OLSON ESQ
MICE-IAELS GILMORE ESQ
CLAY R SMITH ESQ
PO BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0010

[XI Mail
[ 3 Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile 208-854-8072

DAVID F HENSLEY ESQ
COUNSEL TO THE GOVERNOR
PO BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0034

[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ 1Facsimile 208-334-3454

SANDRA BEEBE
COURT REPORTER
501 NMAPLE 3310
BLACKFOOT ID 83221

[XI Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile 785-8057
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IN THE SWREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

WENDY KNOX and RICHARD DOTSON,
Plaintiffs / Appellants,

1
1
1

-vs-

1

SUPREME COURT # 35787

STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel. C.L. OTTER,
Governor; BEN YSURA, Secretary of
State; and LAWRENCE WASDEN, Attomey
General,

1
1
1
1
1
1

CERTIFICATION OF
EXHIBITS ON APPEAL

Defendants / Respondents,

I, SARA STAUB, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bingharn, do hereby certify, list and describe the
following exhibits which were offered or admitted during the proceedings in the aboveentitled case:
EXNIBTS/APPENDCES

NONE
W WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said
court at Blackfoot, Idaho, this
day of November 2008.

/q

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

WENDY KNOX and IUCI-IARD DOTSON,
Plaintiffs I Appellants,

1

-VS-

STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel. C.L. OTTER,
Governor; BEN YSURA, Secretary of
State; and LAWRENCE WASDEN, Attorney
General.
Defendants I Respondents,

1
1
1
1
1

SUPREME COURT # 35787
CERTIFICATION OF
CLERK'S RECORD

)

1
1

J

I, S M I STAUB, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bingham, do hereby certify that the above and
foregoing record in the above-entitled case was compiled and bound under my direction,
and is a true, full and correct record of the pleadings, documents and papers designated to be
...............

.. ....... ... .. ...

included in the clerk's record by the Idaho Appellate Rule 28, the notice of appeal, any
notice of cross-appeal, and any designation of additional documents to be included in the
clerk's record.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, J have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said
courl at Blackfoot, Idaho, this &day

of November 2008.
SARAH SXAUB, Clerk of t l H o u r t

IN THE SWREME COURT OF STATE OF IDAHO

WENDY KNOX and RICHARD DOTSON,

1',

1

Plaintiffs I Appellants,
-VS-

STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel. C.L. OTTER,
Governor; BEN YSURA, Secretary of
State; and LAWRENCE WASDEN, Attorney
General,
Defendants I Respondents,

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

SUPREME COURT # 35787
CERTIFICATE OF
SERVICE

)

I, SARAH STAUB, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State
of Idaho, in and for the County of Bingharn, do hereby certify I personally served or mailed, by
United States mail, one copy of the clerk's record and the reporter's transcript in the above-entitled
case to each of the attorneys of record, to wit:
Counsel for Appellants:

Curt R. Thomsen, THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC,
2635 Chuuling Way, Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404

Counsel for Respondents:

Attorney General, Civil Litigation Division, PO Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
David F. Hensley, Counsel to the Governor, PO Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0034

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said court at
Blackfoot, Idaho, this

14

day of November 2008.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

